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A Word to Readers
This book contains some of the outstanding articles that have
appeared in The Tax Adviser during the past year or so. The
articles, which have been selected for their practical value and
current interest, should be useful to every accounting practitioner
and executive who is professionally active in tax matters.
The purpose of the book is two-fold...
1. It will give current readers of The Tax Adviser an opportunity
to refresh their awareness of some of the past year’s more
noteworthy developments and how best to deal with them.
2. It will give new readers of The Tax Adviser an impressive
preview of the kind of perceptive and informative material they will
find in every issue of the magazine.
Whether you are a new subscriber to The Tax Adviser or a
reader of long-standing, you are in good company. The magazine
is now being read by a growing number of sophisticated tax
professionals who have come to recognize The Tax Adviser as an
invaluable source of information and guidance on current ques
tions of tax compliance and effective tax planning.
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Understanding the corporate
estimated tax rules

Computing corporate estimated income taxes
has become increasingly difficult. Some of the
TEFRA changes in the estimated tax provisions
became effective in 1983, while others first apply to
1984 estimated tax payments. Several recent rul
ings further complicate the task. In addition, the
regulations are out-of-date and provide little guid
ance for taxpayers; new regulations are currently
being drafted by the IRS. This article will review the
technical rules governing corporate estimated tax
payments, illustrate the application of these rules in
situations experienced by many corporations and
analyze some strategies for minimizing or deferring
estimated tax payments.
Estimated payment requirements

Under Sec. 6154(a), corporations are required to
pay estimated taxes if their estimated tax can
reasonably be expected to exceed $40.1 Sec.

1 Sec. 6154(a) refers to corporations subject to income tax
under Sec. 11. That provision excludes mutual savings banks
taxed under Sec. 594, and regulated investment companies
THE TAX ADVISER MARCH 1984

6154(b) states that any corporation required to
make payments under subsection (a) must pay
specific percentages of estimated tax, as shown in
Table I, page 4.
A corporation that does not pay the percentage
specified in Sec. 6154 must show that there was a
reasonable expectation that its estimated tax would
not exceed $40. Corporations can meet this burden
of proof only in very unusual circumstances. The
payment of 25% of projected tax liability, net of
credits, by the fifteenth day of the fourth, sixth, ninth
and twelfth months is considered the standard rule.
Sec. 6655 prescribes the penalty for failing to
make adequate and timely estimated tax payments.
If a corporation comes within one of the exceptions
contained in Sec. 6655, it may be possible to pay
substantially less than under the standard rule and
still not incur any penalties for underpayment of
estimated tax. The Sec. 6655 penalty is imposed on
the “amount of the underpayment” for the “period of
the underpayment.”

and real estate trusts taxed under Secs. 851-858 from liability
for corporate income tax. All section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, unless otherwise noted.
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Table I
The following percentages of the estimated tax
shall be paid on the 15th day of the

If the requirements of subsection (a)
__________ are first met__________
Before the 1 st day of the 4th month
of the taxable year
After the last day of the 3d month
and before the 1 st day of the 6th
month of the taxable year
After the last day of the 5th month
and before the 1 st day of the 9th
month of the taxable year
After the last day of the 8th month
and before the 1 st day of the 12th
month of the taxable year

4th
month

6th
month

9th
month

12th
month

25

25

25

25

33⅓

33⅓

33⅓

50

50

100

Table reprinted from Sec. 6154(b).

The amount of underpayment is defined as the
excess of the amount of the installment that would
have been required to be paid if the estimated tax
was equal to 90% (80% for taxable years beginning
before 1983) of the tax shown on the return over the
amount of the installment paid on or before the last
date prescribed for payment.2 The tax shown on the
return includes any alternative tax on capital gains
and the tax on insurance companies imposed by
Secs. 801-844.3 Investment tax credit (ITC) recap
ture is also considered a tax for purposes of making
estimated tax payments,4 but the minimum tax and
the personal holding company tax are not included.
The tax shown is reduced by most credits applica
ble to corporations and any overpayment of windfall
profits tax as prescribed in the regulations.5
The period of underpayment runs from the date
the installment was required to be paid to the earlier
of the fifteenth day of the third month following the
close of the taxable year, or the date on which the
underpayment is paid.6 A payment of estimated tax
is “considered a payment of any previous under
payment only to the extent such payment exceeds
the amount of the installment determined under
[Sec. 6655(b)(1)]. . . .”7 (Emphasis added.) This
rule makes it difficult to determine how much should
be paid to prevent the imposition of a penalty for a
previously underpaid quarter.
Example. Assume XYZ Corp. had to make quarterly tax
payments of $22,500 (90% x $100,000 tax liability
÷
4).

2
3
4
5
6
7
4

Sec.
Sec.
Rev.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

6655(b).
6154(a).
Rul. 78-257, 1978-1 CB 440.
6655(f).
6655(c).
6655(c)(2).

Also assume XYZ failed to make its estimated payment for
the first quarter. Any payment made by the due date for the
second quarterly installment is first applied to the second
quarter. Only the excess amount paid over $22,500 for the
second quarter could be applied to stop the penalty for the
first quarter underpayment. This rule applies even though
one of the exceptions under Sec. 6655 might have allowed a
smaller payment for the second quarter. Moreover, it is
difficult to accurately compute the required quarterly amount
until after the tax liability for the year is known ($22,500 in the
example), which creates problems in determining exactly
how much should be paid to stop the running of a penalty for
a previous quarter.

Underpayment penalties are computed based on
the amount of tax shown on the original timely filed
return. Subsequent amended returns filed after the
due date, IRS adjustments and net operating loss
(NOL) carrybacks will not eliminate or increase the
amount of the penalty.8
As mentioned above, estimated taxes are due on
the fifteenth day of the fourth, sixth, ninth and twelfth
months. If that day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or
legal holiday, the payment may be made on the
following business day.9 Payments should be de
posited with a Federal Reserve Bank or authorized
commercial bank depository. Starting in 1984, each
payment should be accompanied by the tax
coupons contained in the Federal Tax Deposit
Coupon Book (Form 8109),10 which replaces the

8 Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 712 F2d 199 (5th Cir. 1983) (52
AFTR2d 83-5787, 83-2 USTC ¶9544).
9 Sec. 7503. Regs. Sec. 301.7503-1 (b)(1) lists the legal holi
days for purposes of Sec. 7503.
10 If the corporation does not have the required coupon, it can
deliver its payment to an IRS office that provides Taxpayer
Service Information. Alternatively, it can mail the payment to
a Service Center if it also includes name, address, type of
return, period of coverage and employee identification
number.

Form 503 deposit card. Deposits can be made in
person or by mail. A payment will be considered
timely mailed if it is mailed on or before the second
day before the due date for the deposit, and the
deposit is properly mailed to the authorized bank
depository.11 The date the letter is registered or
certified will be deemed the date of mailing. Al
though mailing a deposit might add several extra
days of float, the corporation must be able to prove
that it made its payment in a timely manner. Al
though the issue is not clear, it appears that the Sec.
6655 penalty would stop running as of the date the
deposit was actually received, rather than the date
of mailing.
Penalty for underpayment of estimated tax

The amount of the underpayment penalty is de
termined at the rate established under Sec. 6621.
The rate was 16% for the first six months of 1983
and 11% for the second six months of 1983; it will
continue at 11% until June 30, 1984. The rate is
adjusted each January 1 and July 1, based on the
average adjusted prime rate charged by commer
cial banks during the prior six-month period ending
September 30 (January 1) and March 31 (July 1 ).11
12
The penalty is not deductible for federal tax pur
poses. Consequently, the current before-tax cost of
the penalty can be equivalent to interest at 20.37%
per annum (for a corporation with taxable income
being taxed at 46%).13
Because of the difficulty in estimating 90% of
current year tax liability, the penalty on underpay
ments that are between 80% and 90% of the actual
tax due is imposed at only 75% of the regular Sec.
6621 rate.14
Example. Assume that a corporation has a $2,000 under
payment of estimated taxes, resulting in a $400 penalty. If
the corporation had not paid at least 80% of the actual tax
due, through timely installments, the full $400 penalty would
apply. If, however, the corporation had paid at least 80% of
this amount (but less than 90%), its underpayment penalty
would be only $300 (75% x $400).15

In order to avoid penalties, many corporations
make estimated tax payments larger than the
amount computed using the standard rule or one of
the exceptions. As a result of this practice, the cor
poration may make estimated payments that total
more than the tax for the year. Previously, a cor

11 Sec. 7502(e)(2).
12 Sec. 6621.
13

---------------------------- = 20.37%
(1 - 46% tax rate)
14 Sec. 6655(a)(2).
15 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Law and
Explanation, CCH, at 72.

poration could use this overpayment when comput
ing its first quarter estimated tax payment for the
next year, even if the tax return was filed after the
due date of the quarterly payment. Rev. Rul. 8311116 has changed this rule for tax returns filed after
Dec. 31, 1983.
Rev. Rul. 83-111 states that an overpayment
from a previous year cannot be applied to the esti
mated tax of the current year until an election to
apply the overpayment is made. The election must
be made on the corporate income tax return when it
is filed. Consequently, corporations will have to file
the return before any overpayment can be applied
to the estimated tax for a particular quarter. For
example, if the corporation filed its return on the
extended due date (September 15 for a calendar
year corporation), any overpayment would be cred
ited to the third quarter. The change in the Service’s
approach could be significant because the IRS
would not pay interest on the overpayment, but the
corporation would be required to make estimated
tax payments.17

Quick refund provisions
A corporation that overpays its quarterly esti
mated tax payments may apply for a quick refund of
estimated tax. The IRS will generally act within 45
days from the date of filing the application. The ap
plication, filed on Form 4466, must be filed after the
close of the taxable year and by the fifteenth day of
the third month after the close of the taxable year. A
corporation may obtain a quick refund only when
the amount claimed equals or exceeds both 10% of
the corporation’s expected total tax liability for the
year and $500.18 The quick refund procedure would
not apply to overpayments that resulted from an
excessive payment made at the time of filing an
extension.
If the corporation claims too large an amount in a
quick refund application (i.e., the quick refund
causes the tax return to show a balance due), the
IRS may impose a nondeductible penalty at the
statutory rate established under Sec. 6621. The
penalty runs from the date of the refund payment to
the earlier of the due date of the return or the date
the tax is paid. The penalty is only imposed on the
lesser of the balance due on the return or the
amount of the quick refund claimed.19

16 Rev. Rul. 83-111, IRB 1983-31, 6.
17 See Fellows, “The Changing IRS Policy On Application of Tax
Overpayments to Estimated Tax Liabilities,” 61 Taxes 706
(Nov. 1983).
18 Sec. 6425.
19 Sec. 6655(h).
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ending July31. In order to come within Exception 1 for1983,
the following payments would have to be made:

Exceptions that avoid underpayment penalties

Sec. 6655(d) sets forth several methods by which
a corporation can avoid underpayment penalties
and pay an amount less than that required under
Sec. 6154. Corporations can take advantage of
these exceptions when planning to defer cash out
flow.
Exception 1. Exception 120 is the easiest, and
perhaps the most commonly used, means of com
puting a corporation’s estimated income tax pay
ments. A corporation can avoid all penalties for
underpayment of estimated tax if the installments
paid equal or exceed the tax shown on the prior
year’s return. The amount paid is determined on a
cumulative basis measured at each quarter. ITC
recapture is considered a tax shown on the prior
year’s return.21
Example. X Corp., a calendar-year corporation, filed its
1982 income tax return showing no tax liability other than
ITC recapture of $1,000 (X is not a “large corporation’’). To
avoid underpayment penalties for 1983 under Exception 1,
X must make equal quarterly installments totaling $1,000.

A corporation cannot use this exception if its pre
ceding taxable period consisted of less than 12
months or if no tax was shown on the return for the
preceding year. If the current period is a short tax
able year, the regulations22 provide that, in comput
ing the Exception 1 safe harbor, the tax shown on
the preceding year’s return will be reduced by divid
ing the tax by 12 and then multiplying by the number
of months in the short period. (This proration rule
also applies to Exception 2 estimates.) In the case
of a short taxable year, estimates are made quar
terly and equal one-fourth of the tax shown on the
prior year’s return. Any unpaid balance of the re
duced short year tax is due on the fifteenth day of
the last month of the corporation’s short taxable
year. This can create problems when corporations
decide to change tax years after the fifteenth day of
the last month or in the case of certain corporate
acquisitions. For acquisitions that will involve a con
solidated return or a Sec. 338 election, care should
be taken to avoid penalties for failure to make an
adequate final estimated tax payment, since the
payment arising from the acquisition may be due
before the acquisition took place. The following ex
ample illustrates the rules applicable to short tax
able years.

April 15: $25,000 (1/4 of $100,000)
June 15: $25,000 (1/4 of $100,000)
July 15: $8,334 ((7/12 of $100,000) - ($25,000 + $25,000))

Exception 2. The second exception23 allows cor
porations to avoid the estimated tax penalty by pay
ing, in four equal installments, an amount equal to
the tax computed at the rates applicable to the
current taxable year, but based on the facts shown
on the return for the preceding taxable year and the
laws applicable to that year. The IRS has held24 that
in computing an Exception 2 estimate, a net operat
ing loss carryover and ITC carryover to the preced
ing year constitute facts shown on the return of the
corporation for the preceding year. An Exception 2
estimate is generally computed when either the tax
rates have decreased from the previous year or
when an Exception 1 estimate cannot be used (e.g.,
prior year return was not a full 12-month return,
there was no tax liability in the prior year, or the
corporation was a qualifying S corporation for the
preceding year).
If the preceding year was a short taxable period,
Exception 2 can be used, as long as the taxable
income and credits for the preceding year are
annualized in the manner described in Sec.
443(b)(1) (before the reduction described in the last
sentence of the provision). The regulations25 state
that when the amount of a credit is dependent upon
an item of income or deduction, the credit shall be
computed based on the annualized amount of the
item, and treated as a credit against tax computed
on the annualized taxable income. An item such as
the foreign tax credit that is dependent upon foreign
income may be annualized when computing an Ex
ception 2 estimated tax payment. Other credits that
probably should be annualized are the targeted jobs
tax credit, research and development credit and
excess windfall profits tax credit. The ITC is not
dependent upon an item of income and consequent
ly a corporation must use the actual amount shown
on the preceding year’s short period return (in
cluding any amount not allowed because of limita
tions) in computing an Exception 2 estimate.26 The
ITC limitation for the current year is based on the
annualized tax for the short taxable year.
Example. In its preceding short taxable year from July 1.
1982 through Dec. 31, 1982, Y Corp. showed $150,000
of taxable income and ITC of $140,000. Because of
the ITC limitation, the corporation was only allowed to use

Example. X Corp., a calendar-year corporation, had a net
tax liability of $100,000 on its 1982 income tax return (X is
not a large corporation). In 1983 it will have a short year

20 Sec. 6655(d)(1).
21 Rev. Rul. 78-257, note 4.
22 Regs. Sec. 1.6655-3(b).
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23
24
25
26

Sec. 6655(d)(2).
Rev. Rul. 69-308. 1969-1 CB 304.
Regs. Sec. 1.443-1(b)(1)(vi).
IRS Letter Ruling 7739035 (6/29/77).

$55,713 of its ITC, leaving a carryover of $84,287. In 1983, Y
uses Exception 2 to determine the amount of the required
estimated tax payment. In computing its payment under
Exception 2, Y must annualize its previous short period
taxable income. It may offset the tax computed by the full
amount of ITC available from the prior year ($140,000)
subject to limitations applicable to the prior year. Total re
quired estimated tax payments in 1983, using Exception 2,
are $13,912 ($117,750 tax - $103,838 ITC).
1.
2.
3.
4.

Taxable income
$150,000
Annualized taxable income
300,000
Tax before credits
117,750
ITC limitation
103,838
([($117,750 - $25,000) x 0.85] + $25,000)
5. Lesser of ITC or limitation
103,838
6. Net tax for Exception 2
13,912
(line 3 - line 5)

When a corporation that has filed separate in
come tax returns is merged into a parent corpora
tion, the surviving corporation’s return for the pre
ceding year is used for purposes of Exceptions 1
and 2.27 The subsidiary’s return for the preceding
year is not taken into account. This rule also applies
when a corporation acquires another corporation
and subsequently files a consolidated tax return.28
The new member’s tax information for the preced
ing year will not be taken into account in determining
whether any of the exceptions apply.
Large corporation rules. In 1980, Congress
tightened the estimated tax requirements for large
corporations. To avoid underpayment penalties for
taxable years beginning in 1983, “large corpora
tions” must make estimated tax payments equal to
the greater of 75% of the tax shown on the return for
the current period or the amount required under
Exception 1 or 2.29 For taxable years beginning
after 1983, Exception 1 or 2 will no longer apply to a
large corporation, which is defined as any corpora
tion (or its predecessor corporation) that had tax
able income of at least $1 million for any of the three
tax years immediately preceding the current year.30
If a corporation is a member of a controlled group,
the $1 million amount is divided among the mem
bers under rules similar to those of Sec. 1561.31
Regulations on the large corporation provisions
have not yet been issued, and there are several
questions that may be answered in the regulations,
including the effect of NOL carrybacks and carry
forwards, amended returns and IRS adjustments
affecting the three base periods, and the proper
treatment of short tax years in determining if taxable
income exceeds $1 million. The IRS has given tax

27
28
29
30
31

Rev. Rul. 68-9, 1968-1 CB 566.
Regs. Sec. 1.1502-5(c), Example 3.
Sec. 6655(i) (65% for taxable years beginning in 1982).
Sec. 6655(i)(2) and (3).
Sec. 6655(i)(3)(B).

payers some guidance on NOL carrybacks and
carryovers in two letter rulings. In one, the IRS
concluded that “taxable income” as used in Sec.
6655(i)(2) means taxable income after the deduc
tion for NOL carryforwards.32 In the other ruling, the
IRS held that an NOL carryback that originates dur
ing the three-year testing period may be considered
in determining whether the corporation had taxable
income of $1 million or more in any year of the three
years.33
Example. Z Corp.’s taxable income is as follows:

19X2
19X3
19X4
19X5
19X6

Before NOL
carryback

After NOL
carryback

$ 300,000
1,100,000
950,000
(500,000)
500,000

$
0
900,000
950,000
0
500,000

For tax year 19X6, Z will not be a large corporation because
taxable income after the carryback does not exceed $1
million in the three preceding tax years.

Other issues remain unanswered. In the above
example, Z would not be a large corporation for
19X7. Assume that in 19X6 an IRS exam of Z’s
19X4 return increased taxable income to
$1,150,000. Because of this change, would Z be a
“large corporation” in 19X7? Would the answer be
any different if the examination is completed in
19X8? It would seem unfair to retroactively subject
a corporation to the “large corporation” rules.
Exception 3. To use Exception 3, a corporation
must pay estimated tax equal to 90% of the tax for
the year, computed by annualizing the taxable in
come for a specified period of the year.34 For tax
years beginning in 1984, Exception 3 will take on
greater significance, along with the seasonal in
come rules35 (which will apply infrequently). Excep
tion 3 will be the only underpayment exception
available to large corporations that fail to meet the
standard rule.
Exception 3 offers many planning opportunities
for increasing cash flow. Although the mechanics of
an Exception 3 estimate appear relatively simple,
they may become quite complicated. Under Excep
tion 3, payment of estimated tax must be based on
annualized taxable income for
—the first three months of the tax year for the
installment due in the fourth month;
—the first three or first five months for the install
ment due in the sixth month;
—the first six or first eight months for the install-

32
33
34
35

IRS Letter Ruling 8339017 (6/24/83).
IRS Letter Ruling 8328125 (4/15/83).
Sec. 6655(d)(3).
Sec. 6655(e).
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ment due in the ninth month; and
—the first nine or first 11 months for the install
ment due in the twelfth month.36
The corporation must compute tax on this annual
ized taxable income (discussed below) and deduct
applicable credits. It must then pay 90% of the net
tax liability multiplied by the applicable percentage
for the particular quarter. For example, if 90% of the
computed net tax liability equals $100,000, the cor
poration will be required to pay cumulatively
$75,000 (75%) as of the third-quarter due date.
Because the statute provides a choice in the period
used for installments due in the sixth, ninth or twelfth
month, the corporation should use the annualiza
tion period that results in the lowest tax.
Exception 3 income tax credits. There is some un
certainty about how to determine the credits to be
deducted from the tax computed on annualized in
come. The Service has ruled37 that a corporation
may not annualize its ITC in computing an Excep
tion 3 estimate, but the ruling does not explain how
to determine the amount of ITC that is deductible.
The IRS has not issued a ruling indicating whether
the corporation should deduct actual credits earned
through the date of the installment, or make a rea
sonable estimate of the tax credits it expects to earn
for the entire year. In addition, there is no authority
on the amount of any other credit that may be de
ducted for an Exception 3 estimate. Presumably,
the rules would be similar to those in Sec. 443,
which allow any credit based on an item of income
or deduction (i.e., foreign tax credit) to be an
nualized for purposes of Exception 3; however, the
IRS has not indicated that this method would be
acceptable.

Computation of taxable income for Exception 3.
Sec. 6655(d)(3) requires the annualization of tax
able income, rather than book income, for the
applicable period. It is often difficult, however, for
taxpayers to accurately determine taxable income
at an interim date during the year. The regulations38
require an accurate determination of the taxable
income for the appropriate period, using the cor
poration’s method of accounting for tax purposes.
Example. For tax purposes, a corporation accrues state real
property taxes on the date when the taxes are assessed. If
the date of assessment falls in the first three months of the
corporation's taxable year, the full amount of the assessed
tax is reflected as a deduction in computing taxable income
for the three-month period. The IRS has ruled that the tax
able income is then annualized.39 However, if, under the

36
37
38
39
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Sec. 6655(d)(3)(A)(i)-(iv).
Rev. Rul. 79-179, 1979-1 CB 436.
Regs. Secs. 1.6655-2(d) and 1.6654-2(d)(1).
Rev. Rul. 76-450, 1976-2 CB 444.

corporation’s method of accounting for tax purposes, it ac
crues real property taxes ratably over the period to which the
assessment relates, this method must be used for purposes
of Exception 3 computations.

The regulations under Sec. 6654 (individual
estimated tax penalties) give an example showing
how to determine taxable income for the applicable
period when an accrual basis taxpayer regularly
distributes year-end bonuses to its employees, but
does not accrue any liability for the bonuses until the
last month of the taxable year. The regulations state
that the taxpayer may not deduct any portion of the
year-end bonuses in determining its taxable income
for any installment of estimated tax.40 These reg
ulations and the ruling suggest that a corpora
tion should determine its taxable income for the
period as if a tax return is being prepared for the
short period ending on the last day of the applicable
month.
The IRS has not given taxpayers much guidance
on how to deal with book/tax differences or other
unusual items. For example, in determining Excep
tion 3 taxable income for the first three months, how
should ACRS depreciation be computed? Should
the corporation compute depreciation on estimated
additions during the year, or can it only use actual
additions through the three-month period? How
should depreciation on prior year ACRS additions
be treated? It would be logical to allow threetwelfths of the current year depreciation deduction
in computing taxable income for the three months.
The IRS has not yet issued any regulations answer
ing these questions.
The IRS has also not addressed how to treat
LIFO adjustments. Generally, corporations make
LIFO adjustments at the end of the taxable year. If
corporations are not allowed to make some approx
imation of the annual LIFO adjustment in computing
income for Exception 3, an overpayment of tax may
result if the corporation makes a large LIFO adjust
ment in its twelfth month. Currently, however, there
is no authority for prorating the annual adjustment in
computing taxable income for an earlier quarter.
The Sec. 6654 regulations discuss a method of
estimating cost of goods sold for companies using
some type of standard cost system, but this method
is generally inappropriate for a taxpayer’s LIFO ad
justment. Unless a more accurate determination is
available, the regulations state that the cost of
goods sold for a period should be the same propor
tion of the annual cost of goods sold as the gross
receipts from sales for the estimated tax period is of
gross receipts from sales for the entire taxable
year.41 The Service will use this computation of cost

40 Regs. Sec. 1.6654-2(d)(1).
41 Regs. Sec. 1.6654-2(d)(1 )(ii).

Table II
Date of tax payment:

3/15/84

4/15/84

6/15/84

9/15/84

12/15/84

3/15/85

135,975

Amount of tax payments

A. Deferred
compensation
paid in 1983
B. Deferred
compensation
paid in 1984

—

$46,319

305,944

305,944

305,944

_

108,375

—

223,144

223,144

Line A - line B

(108,375)

46,319

305,944

82,800

82,800

Cumulative deferral
(acceleration) of
estimated tax

(108,375)

(62,056)

243,888

326,688

409,488

of goods sold in evaluating the accuracy of an Ex
ception 3 calculation. In computing cost of goods
sold, however, the corporation does not have the
benefit of hindsight that the IRS does. Accordingly,
corporations should be conservative in estimating
cost of goods sold for the period unless an accurate
computation can be made.
Another unresolved issue under Exception 3 in
volves pension and profit-sharing contributions for
accrual basis taxpayers. Applying the rules on
methods of accounting (the real estate tax example
above), a corporation that accrues this expense
ratably over the year should be allowed to consider
the accrued expense in an Exception 3 computa
tion. From informal discussions with some IRS per
sonnel, however, it appears that the Service will
only allow this deduction in computing estimated
taxes when the payments are made.
If a corporation has requested a change in ac
counting method, it must continue to compute esti
mates under the old method until permission to
change is granted by the Commissioner.42 The IRS
has not ruled on how any adjustments required in a
change of methods should be treated under Excep
tion 3. The IRS has held, however, that the adjust
ments required, under Rev. Proc. 80-5, when a
corporation changes its method of accounting for
inventories should be a tax adjustment in the twelfth
month of the corporation’s year when computing an
Exception 3 estimate.43
Under Exception 3, corporations that have NOL
carryovers can enjoy a significant benefit. The en
tire amount of any available NOL carryover can be
deducted from the income of the appropriate period
before annualizing the income for the period.44

42 Rev. Rul. 81-259, 1981-2 CB 247.
43 Rev. Proc. 80-5, 1980-1 CB 582.
44 Rev. Rul. 67-93, 1967-1 CB 366.

545,463

(409,488)

$

0

Example. X Corp. has taxable income for three months of
$100,000 before deducting an NOL carryover of $125,000.
X may deduct the NOL before annualizing its three-month
income. Consequently, no estimated tax payment would be
required for both the first and second quarters since annual
ized three-month taxable income results in a loss.

Special rules apply under Exception 3 if the cur
rent year is a short taxable year. The tax computed
by annualizing income is reduced by multiplying it
by the number of months in the short taxable year
and dividing the resulting amount by 12. An Excep
tion 3 estimate for the quarter is then calculated
based on 90% of this reduced tax 45
The regulations46 also explain how a corporation
that has a 52-53 week taxable year should compute
an Exception 3 estimate. Basically, the corpora
tion’s accounting period is adjusted to coincide with
the various cut-off periods (three, five, six, eight,
nine and 11 months) specified in Exception 3.
Seasonal income exceptions. TEFRA added a
new rule for annualizing income for corporations
with seasonal income 47 Taxpayers can rely on this
rule if, in the preceding three taxable years, taxable
income for any period of six successive months
averaged 70% or more of total income for the tax
able year. Under this exception, income is annual
ized by assuming that the income will be earned, in
the current year, in the same pattern as in the three
preceding taxable years. Thus, tax is paid on the
annualized income in the same seasonal pattern in
which it is earned.
Example. X Corp. qualifies to use the seasonal income
exception of Sec. 6655(e) (i.e., it receives greater than 70%
of taxable income during six consecutive months of a tax-

45 Regs. Sec. 1.6655-3(b)(3).
46 Regs. Sec. 1,6655-2(a)(4).
47 Sec. 6655(e).
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able year). X has received $100,000 taxable income during
the first three months of the current year. Its average base
period percentage for the first three and four months of the
tax year is 75% and 80%, respectively. (Average base
period percentage is defined as “the average percent which
the taxable income for the corresponding months in each of
the 3 preceding taxable years bears to the taxable income
for the 3 preceding taxable years.”48) The first quarter
estimated tax payment is computed as follows:

payment of $800,000 that will be paid in either December
1983 or January 1984. The $800,000 is not considered in
the 1983 and 1984 estimates of taxable income, above. XYZ
can control when the payment is made and is attempting to
determine when it should be made. An analysis showing the
cash flow under both alternatives (assuming 90% of 1983
estimated tax has been paid in estimates under Exception 3
and that any overpayment on the tax return is credited to
estimated taxes on April 15) appears in Table II, p. 159.49

1. Annualized three-month income
($100,000 ÷ 0.75)
$133,333
2. Tax on line 1
41,083
3. Estimated tax payment required under
seasonal income exception
(($41,083 x 0.8) x 0.9)
29,580
4. Exception 3 estimate ([($400,000 x 0.46) $20,250] x 0.225)
36,844

In Situation A of Table II, it is assumed that the
payment was credited by April 15. This assumption
would be realistic if the corporation filed its return by
April 15 or filed a claim for a quick refund (Form
4466). Deferring the expense into 1984 is more
beneficial than taking the deduction in 1983.50 The
deferral produces even better results if the election
to apply the 1983 overpayment in Situation A is not
made until the September 15 payment. This will be
the case for many large corporations that have diffi
culty filing their returns before the due date of the
second estimated tax payment.
The example above illustrates another important
planning point. In the third and fourth quarters, the
corporation made estimated payments under the
standard rule, which requires a quarterly payment
equal to 22.5% of the current year tax. Under Ex
ception 3, however, payments must equal the tax on

Note that the seasonal income exception re
quires payment of estimated tax on income earned
through the end of the month in which the install
ment is due. These rules will benefit taxpayers that
receive a large percentage of taxable income in the
first three or four months of the taxable year.

Strategies for deferral of tax payments
Interaction of exceptions. A corporation (other
than a large corporation) may use a different excep
tion in each quarter to avoid underpayment penal
ties. Thus, corporations can make estimated pay
ments using the exception that results in the
smallest tax payment for a quarter. For this reason,
a corporation should evaluate all of the alternatives
each quarter before deciding what amount of esti
mated tax is to be paid. Computer modeling should
make the computations less time-consuming.

Timing of income and deductions. Practition
ers should consider several planning opportunities
under Exception 3, including the timing of income
and deductions. Any large expense that a corpora
tion will incur near year-end (such as deferred com
pensation payments) is generally more beneficial if
postponed to the first three months of the following
year, because the deduction is annualized in com
puting Exception 3 estimates. Conversely, large
items of income should be recognized in the latter
portion of the year, particularly if they are received in
the twelfth month of the tax year. There may be
other nontax considerations that affect the timing of
these items.
Example. XYZ Corp. expects taxable income of $2,400,000
in 1983 and $3,000,000 in 1984. The corporation has made
estimated tax payments equal to 90% of the tax on
$2,400,000 ($975,375). Income is earned ratably through
out the year. The corporation has a deferred compensation

48 Sec. 6655(e)(3)(A).
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49 Computations are shown below:
Tax on
Tax on
Tax on
Tax on

$1,600,000
2,200,000
2,400,000
3,000,000

= $ 715,750
=
991,750
= 1,083,750
= 1,359,750

(a)
1983 tax liability
$715,750
1983 estimated tax payments 975,375
1983 overpayment
259,625
1984 quarterly estimated
305,944
tax payments
(22½% x $1,359,750)
1984 first quarterly payment
46,319
($305,944 - $259,625)
135,975
1984 balance due
(10% x $1,359,750)
(b)
1983 tax liability
1,083,750
1983 estimated tax payments 975,375
1983 balance due
108,375
1984 first and second
quarterly payments
0 ($50,000 loss
annualized)
1984 third and fourth
223,144
quarterly payments
(22½% x $991,750)
545,463 ($991,750 1984 balance due
($223,143 + $223,144))
50 The present value of the deferral, using a 10% discount rate, is
approximately $20,900 before tax. If the corporation did not file
a quick refund claim and credited the overpayment to the third
quarter, the present value of the benefit would be approxi
mately $33,500.

Table III
1st quarter

2d quarter

3d quarter

4th quarter

22½% of CY tax

22½% of CY tax

22½% of CY tax

22½% of CY tax

Exception 1

25% of PY tax

50% of PY tax

75% of PY tax

100% of PY tax

Exception 2

25% of PYF
at CY rates

50% of PYF
at CY rates

75% of PYF
at CY rates

100% of PYF
at CY rates

Exception 3

22½% of CY
3-month
annualized income

45% of CY
3- or 5-month
annualized income

67½% of CY
6- or 8-month
annualized income

90% of CY
9- or 11 -month
annualized income

Standard rule

CY = Current year
PY = Prior year
PYF = Prior year facts

the cumulative income annualized. A corporation
may be able to take advantage of this distinction
between the standard rule and the rule for excep
tions when it has made limited estimated tax pay
ments in the early quarters and is able to accurately
estimate taxable income for the year. Table III,
above, illustrates the payments required using the
standard rule and the various exceptions.
Corporations that rely on Exception 3 for all quar
ters should be aware of the deferral benefits from
proper timing of income and deductions. To the
extent that taxable income from the first quarter can
be postponed, the corporation might be able to
defer the estimated tax to the third quarter. For
example, a deferral in the recognition of income
from March until April may result in a deferral of the
estimated tax payment until September. However,
a corporation must weigh the benefits from the de
ferral of estimated taxes against the effect on re
ported first-quarter earnings. A corporation might
achieve a one-quarter deferral of estimated tax
without affecting reported quarterly earnings by de
ferring an item of income from May to June.

Delay qualifying as “large corporation.” Com
panies entering a high-growth phase should con
sider another planning opportunity for deferring
estimated tax payments. In the year the company

becomes profitable, it could rely on Exception 2 and
pay no estimated tax. If taxable income in the early
profitable years could be kept below the $1 million
threshold, the corporation could rely on Exception
1 or 2 for the following year. Once the company
reaches the threshold, however, it would be re
quired to pay 90% of current year estimated tax. For
a company that is rapidly growing, but not yet a
“large corporation,” prior-year tax should be signifi
cantly lower than 90% of current-year tax. Accord
ingly, the corporation should be careful in selecting
tax periods and in timing its income and deductions,
in order to delay meeting the large corporation
threshold and thus accelerate its tax payments.

Conclusion
If a corporation has underpaid its estimated in
come tax, the cost can be very high. However, the
cost of overpaying estimated taxes can be just as
high, in the form of accelerated cash outflow. Good
cash management demands that a corporation re
view all of the alternatives when computing its
estimated tax payment. Only in this way will a cor
poration be able to pay the minimum amount of
estimated tax required while avoiding all under
payment penalties. tta
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Shared equity arrangements—the tax
consequences for the lender and
borrower

Introduction

In the last several years, high interest rates have
spurred renewed interest among real estate pur
chasers, developers, and potential lenders in the
concept of shared equity arrangements, in both the
commercial and residential sectors. Although these
arrangements (also called “shared appreciation
mortgages” or SAMs) can take various forms, they
usually involve a lender who, instead of charging
the market rate of interest, agrees to charge a lower
interest rate in exchange for some type of participa
tion in future earnings or appreciation from the
property. For example, the agreement may specify
that, in addition to the stated interest charges, the
lender will receive a stated percentage of the ap
preciation of the property accruing over the term of
the loan or before the property is sold. When
income-producing property is involved, the lender
may agree to receive a percentage of the net profits
or net cash flow derived from the property. Both
12

lenders and borrowers are understandably con
cerned about how shared equity arrangements will
be taxed. Despite the increasing use of these ar
rangements, however, there is considerable uncer
tainty as to the proper tax treatment.

Debtor/creditor vs. partner
To analyze the income tax treatment of a shared
equity arrangement, the nature of the relationship
between the lender and the borrower must be
examined: Are the parties in a typical debtor/
creditor relationship, or does the lender’s participa
tion right create a true equity interest so that the
principles of partnership or joint venture taxation
apply?
Although shared equity arrangements have been
in use for some time, their proper tax treatment has
received little attention in administrative rulings or
judicial decisions. Moreover, few commentators
THE TAX ADVISER, JANUARY 1983

have examined this issue. The analysis in most of
the earlier cases focused on whether the contingent
or indefinite payments to the lender were deductible
as interest, rather than on the relationship between
the parties. In Farley Realty Corp.,1 however, the
Court went beyond a simple interest analysis.

environment, lenders are more willing to forgo fixed
interest payments and fixed maturity dates. Accord
ingly, it is possible that a court would reach a differ
ent conclusion on the same facts today. Neverthe
less, Farley illustrates a reasonable approach to
analyzing shared equity arrangements.

The Farley decision. In Farley, the corporate
taxpayer arranged to purchase a building for
$380,000; the seller agreed to receive $100,000 in
cash and retain a first mortgage of $280,000. To
raise most of the $100,000 down payment, the tax
payer entered into an agreement with Sorsby to
serve as second mortgagee, and advance $70,000
to the taxpayer for 10 years. In return, Sorsby would
receive interest on the principal amount at 15% for
the first two years and 13% for the remaining eight
years. The $70,000 loan was personally guaran
teed by the corporation’s shareholders. In addition
to interest, the agreement provided that Sorsby
would receive 50% of the appreciation in the value
of the property. The agreement also provided that if
either the taxpayer or Sorsby proposed to sell the
property, or to buy out the other party, the other
party had the option to purchase the property at the
proposed price. Whether or not this option was
exercised, if the property was sold before the
$70,000 loan matured, Sorsby was to receive 70%
of the first $100,000 of the selling price in excess of
the outstanding amount of the first mortgage, plus
50% of the balance. In any event, Sorsby had an
unconditional right to repayment of the $70,000
loan.
Sorsby died before the maturity date of the loan
and the administrators of his estate offered to pur
chase the property. The taxpayer challenged the
enforceability of the agreement with Sorsby, but
eventually settled with his estate for $120,583
($70,000 principal, $583 unpaid interest on the
principal, and $50,000 in settlement of Sorsby’s
participation right). The taxpayer deducted the
$50,000 as an interest expense on its return, but the
deduction was disallowed by the IRS.
The Court examined the nature of the relationship
between the taxpayer and Sorsby, and held that
Sorsby’s right to share in the appreciation of the
property was separable from his right to repayment
of the loan and that the right to share in the proper
ty’s appreciation constituted an equity interest.1
2 To
support this conclusion, the Court noted that there
was no fixed date on which the relationship with
Sorsby would terminate, and there was no definite
amount to be paid to Sorsby. In the current business

Elements of debtor/creditor relationship. The Farley
decision suggests that the first step in determining
the proper tax treatment of a shared equity ar
rangement is to analyze the nature of the relation
ship between the “borrower” and the “lender.” Un
less a true debtor/creditor relationship exists, pay
ments made for the use of money will not be de
ductible as interest under Sec. 163.
Generally, a debtor/creditor relationship exists
when there is an “unconditional and legally en
forceable obligation to pay”3 a principal sum. In
Farley, the Court adopted a relatively narrow
definition of this relationship.

1 Farley Realty Corp., 279 F2d 701 (2d Cir. 1960) (5 AFTR2d
1646, 60-2 USTC ¶9525).
2 Id. at 704.

Interest on an indebtedness presupposes a debtor-creditor
relationship. The incidents of this relationship have been
stated to be an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain at
a reasonably close fixed maturity date along with a fixed
percentage in interest payable regardless of the debtor’s
income or lack thereof.4

Rev. Rul. 69-189 suggests that some variation
from this definition is permissible: “To be deductible
under section 163(a) of the Code, it is not necessary
that interest be stated as a specific percentage of
the sum loaned or computed at a rigid stated rate,
but it is a prerequisite that the sum claimed as
interest be definitely ascertainable.”5 The meaning
of the term “definitely ascertainable” has never
been discussed in rulings or decisions. It appears,
however, that interest can be definitely ascertain
able even though the amount cannot be determined
at the beginning of the loan. For example, in Kena,
Inc.,6 the Court allowed an interest deduction for
payments measured by a percentage of profits for a
period of four years, at which time the principal
amount of the loan was due. Rev. Rul. 76-413,
which cites Kena, provides additional support for
deducting contingent or uncertain interest. The rul
ing states: “The method of computation does not
control a payment’s characterization as interest, so
long as the amount in question is an ascertainable
sum contracted for the use of borrowed money.”7
Interest may not be considered “definitely ascer
tainable” when there is no fixed schedule for pay

3 Mertens, 4a Law of Federal Income Taxation, §26.04 (1979)
(footnotes omitted).
4 Note 1, at 704 (citations omitted).
5 Rev. Rul. 69-189, 1969-1 CB 55. See also IRS Letter Ruling
8140017 (TAM, 6/30/81).
6 Kena, Inc., 44 BTA 217 (1941).
7 Rev. Rul. 76-413, 1976-2 CB 213.
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merit. Thus, in the context of shared equity ar
rangements, the factor of when “interest” will be
paid may be critically important in determining the
nature of the relationship between the parties; if the
payment is to be made during a fixed period of time
that is not dependent upon the sale of the property,
a debtor/creditor relationship probably exists. An
ownership interest probably exists, however, if the
“lender” must wait for the sale of the property to
receive his return.
Although the exact definition of a debtor/creditor
relationship remains uncertain, certain factors gen
erally indicate that this relationship does not exist:
1. When repayment of principal is contingent on
the success of the venture, there is no “uncondi
tional” obligation to repay and a debtor/creditor rela
tionship will generally not exist.8
2. When there is no fixed maturity date for the
loan, a court may find that no “obligation” to repay
exists. In Farley, the Court cited the lack of a matur
ity date as a critical factor to support its conclusion
that, as to the right to 50% of future appreciation, no
debtor/creditor relationship existed, even though
the facts in Farley indicated that the principal was
due in 10 years. The Court apparently found no
debtor/creditor relationship because even after the
principal was repaid, the lender retained a 50%
interest in all future appreciation of the property until
sold. Thus, when the lender is to receive his return
may ultimately be determinative of the relationship
between the parties.
3. If the lender has the right to convert part or all
of the loan into an equity interest, a court may con
clude that no indebtedness exists.9 The proposed
regulations under Sec. 385 provide some insight as
to the Service’s view on convertible debt instru
ments, at least in the corporate area. Under Prop.
Regs. Sec. 1.385-0(c)(2), these loans, referred to
as “hybrid instruments,” may be treated as equity,
rather than debt, if the present value of the equity
(conversion) features comprises more than 50% of
the fair market value of the instrument.
Creative lenders and borrowers will probably de
vise new types of shared equity arrangements, and
tax practitioners will be called on to determine
whether the arrangements create debtor/creditor or
equity relationships. Often, the arrangements will
have attributes of both. Indeed, the Court in Farley
split the arrangement into two elements—the right
to repayment of the $70,000 with interest (a
debtor/creditor relationship), and the right to 50% of
future appreciation (an equity relationship). The tax
consequences of the debtor/creditor element are
relatively simple: The creditor receives interest in

8 IRS Letter Ruling 8140017, note 5.
9 Rev. Rul. 72-350, 1972-2 CB 394.
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come and the debtor can take an interest deduction
for all interest paid on the indebtedness. The fact
that the interest payment is contingent or that its
amount cannot be ascertained until some future
time should not, by itself, prevent an interest deduc
tion.10

Tax treatment of equity interests
If the analysis of the relationship between the
lender and the borrower suggests that the lender’s
participation rights rise to the level of an equity
interest, the tax treatment of the arrangement
should be determined under the rules of partnership
taxation. The tax treatment of the equity element is
more complex than the debtor/creditor rules dis
cussed above.
If a partnership relationship exists between the
lender and the borrower, Sec. 721(a) may apply.
That section provides that, generally, no gain or loss
shall be recognized to either the partnership or to
any of its partners, upon a contribution of property
to the partnership in exchange for a partnership
interest. In the usual shared equity arrangement,
the lender receives his partnership interest in ex
change for making a low-interest loan. Therefore,
the application of Sec. 721(a) will depend on
whether the granting of a low-interest loan consti
tutes a contribution of property. The following
examples are helpful in resolving this question:
Example 1. X wishes to purchase a parcel of land for
$125,000, but has only $25,000 in cash. Y, a lender, agrees
to grantX a $100,000 15-year loan at 10% interest at a time
when the prevailing interest rate is 15%. In return for the
low-interest loan, Y will receive the right to 50% of the
appreciation in value of the land when it is sold. (This exam
ple is similar to the facts in Farley; there, the Court held that
because the lender could continue to share in the apprecia
tion of the property even after the loan had matured, the
lender’s participation rights rose to the level of an equity
interest.)

If the land is sold after five years for $175,000
($50,000 profit), Y’s total receipts pursuant to his
agreement with X will be
1. $50,000 of interest (10% per year times
$100,000 for five years);
2. the repayment of the $100,000 principal in
year five; and
3. $25,000, his share of the appreciation in the
value of the land.
In this example, both X and Y will have to deter
mine how to treat the $50,000 profit from the sale of
the land. Each of them could report $25,000 of
capital gain, or X could report $50,000 of capital
gain and treat the $25,000 paid to Y as additional
interest. Compare the economic results in Example
1 with the following example:

10 Rev. Rul. 76-413, note 7.

Example 2. X and Y form a partnership to purchase the same
parcel of land for $125,000. Y lends the partnership
$100,000 for 15 years at 15% (the current market rate) and
agrees to contribute $5,000 to the partnership in each year
the loan is outstanding. X contributes $25,000 to the part
nership in year one and agrees to contribute $10,000 to the
partnership in each year the loan is outstanding. The
partnership agreement includes a special allocation, under
Sec. 704(b), for interest expense—two-thirds toX and onethird to Y—while the loan from Y is outstanding. Profit from
the sale of the land will be allocated 50/50 to each partner;
any losses will be funded by and allocated 100% to X.

A sale of the land after five years for $175,000 will
produce the following results:
1. Total interest payments from the partnership
to Y will be $75,000, of which $50,000 will be allo
cated to X and $25,000 to Y, leaving Y with net
interest income of $50,000;
2. before the sale of the land, the capital ac
counts of X and Y will be
—$25,000 for X (his $25,000 initial contribution
plus five $10,000 contributions, less $50,000 of al
located interest expense);
—zero for Y (five $5,000 contributions less
$25,000 of allocated interest expense);
3. upon the sale of the land, the $175,000 pro
ceeds will be distributed as follows: $100,000 will be
distributed to Y as a loan repayment, $50,000 will be
divided 50/50 between X and Y as a distribution of
partnership profits (presumably capital gain), andX
will receive an additional $25,000 according to the
balance in his capital account.
In both of these examples, the economic results
forX and Y are the same. In Example 2, Y acted as
both a creditor and a partner. As a creditor, he
reported $75,000 of interest income based on the
market interest rate; as a partner, he contributed
$25,000 cash to the partnership and reported
$25,000 of capital gain and $25,000 of interest ex
pense. Considering the identical economic effects,
should Y’s contribution of cash in Example 2 be
treated any differently from his grant of the lowinterest loan in Example 1? Or, does Y’s grant of a
low-interest loan constitute property under Sec.
721(a)?
The term “property” in Sec. 721 has received little
judicial or administrative attention. In a letter ruling,
however, the Service characterized money as
“property that may be received by the [p]artnership
in a tax-free exchange under section 721 of the
Code.”11 By analogy, it can be argued that the grant
of a low-interest loan is a contribution of property,
and should qualify for nonrecognition treatment
under Sec. 721(a). A low-interest loan is, in es
sence, an intangible asset with a current economic
value to the partnership. Based on this conclusion,

11 IRS Letter Ruling 8117210 (1/30/81).

the tax treatment of X and Y in Example 1 can be
determined relatively easily. The loan for $100,000
at 10% creates a debtor/creditor relationship be
tween X and Y in which X pays $50,000 to Y (which
constitutes interest income to Y, and generates an
interest deduction for X). Y’s right to 50% of the
appreciation of the land is an equity interest and, to
that extent, X and Y should be deemed to have
formed a partnership. In return for his partnership
interest, Y contributed property in a nontaxable
transaction under Sec. 721(a). When the partner
ship sells the land, both X and Y recognize $25,000
of capital gain.
The Service’s view of this proposed tax treatment
is uncertain. The IRS may reject the partnership
approach, and instead, characterize the arrange
ment as a cancellation of indebtedness. Under this
approach, Y would be treated as having cancelled
accrued interest (in an amount equal to the differ
ence between the interest computed under the lowinterest rate and the current market rate) in return
for his partnership interest. One commentator has
suggested that the receipt of a partnership interest
in exchange for the cancellation of the partnership’s
obligation to pay accrued interest may not be a taxfree transaction under Sec. 721.12 In addition,
Regs. Sec. 1.721-(b)(1) states: “To the extent that
any of the partners gives up any part of his right to
be repaid his contributions (as distinguished from a
share in partnership profits) in favor of another part
ner as compensation for services (or in satisfaction
of an obligation), section 721 does not apply.” (Em
phasis added.) This situation could occur in Exam
ple 1, with a slight modification of the facts: In ex
change for granting the 10% loan, Y receives a
one-third interest in both capital and future appreci
ation. X is responsible for paying all interest on the
loan and is entitled to all interest deductions. As
suming a sale of the land for $175,000, the results to
X and Y would be as follows:
1. On formation of the partnership, X contributes
$25,000, of which $8,333 (one-third) would be cred
ited to Y’s capital account;
2.
during the first five years, Y would receive

12 McKee, Nelson, and Whitmire, 1 Federal Taxation of Partner
ships and Partners, ¶4.02[3] (1977). Even if the IRS argues
that the cancellation of accrued interest is not a contribution of
property, the tax consequences to the lender and the bor
rower should not differ from what we have suggested, as long
as the lender is given only a future profits interest that is not
capable of valuation. (See the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Sol
Diamond, 492 F2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974) (33 AFTR2d 74-852,
74-1 USTC ¶9306), aff'g 56 TC 530 (1971).) The lender
should still be entitled to capital gain treatment as long as an
equity relationship, as opposed to a debtor/creditor relation
ship, exists. As discussed earlier, this determination may
hinge on when the lender is entitled to receive his distributive
share of gain.
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$50,000 of interest income;
3. before the sale of the land, Y’s capital account
would be $8,333 and X’s capital account would be
$16,667 (the initial $25,000 contribution less $8,333
credited to Y);
4. on the sale of the land, Y would receive
$100,000 as loan repayment, plus an additional
$25,000 (his $8,333 of capital plus one-third of the
$50,000 profit, or $16,667); X would receive
$50,000 (his $16,667 of capital plus two-thirds of
the $50,000 profit, or $33,333).
In this example, Y’s economic position is exactly
the same as in the first two examples. Under Regs.
Sec. 1.721-1(b)(1), however, Y would recognize
$8,333 of ordinary income upon the formation of the
partnership. X would probably be entitled to treat the
$8,333 as prepaid interest. Under both the accrual
method of accounting and Sec. 461(g), X would
capitalize this amount, and amortize it over the loan
period. Requiring Y to recognize gain upon the for
mation of the partnership makes sense; if the land
was sold for only $125,000 (cost), Y would still re
ceive $8,333 of the proceeds. Y has, in fact, been
paid $8,333 of interest up front, in the form of a
share of partnership capital.
The results in the last example can be reconciled
with the approach advocated in Examples 1 and 2
by focusing on step one of the suggested analysis
for shared equity arrangements: Step one requires
a characterization of the relationship between the
parties as a debtor/creditor relationship, an equity
relationship, or a combination of both. When Y re
ceives an immediate one-third interest in capital, it
is just as if he had been paid $8,333 of interest,
which he contributed to the partnership in exchange
for his partnership interest. The $8,333 “payment”
to Y is attributable to the debtor/creditor relation
ship, since the property has not yet appreciated in
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value, and therefore should be taxable as ordinary
income.
Thus, the proper tax treatment of the lender’s
participation rights can be summarized as follows:
1. A lender who receives an immediate equity
interest in the property (as opposed to a right to
share in future appreciation or cash flow from the
property) should recognize ordinary income equal
to the value of the equity interest received.13 The
borrower should treat a corresponding amount as
prepaid interest, or a similar capital expenditure,
amortizable over the term of the loan.14
2. A lender who receives only a right to share in
the appreciation or cash flow from the property
should not be taxed under Sec. 721(a) until the
partnership incurs income or loss from the sale or
operation of the property. The lender’s share of
partnership income should retain its character as
capital gain or ordinary income, depending on the
nature of the partnership’s business.15

Conclusion
To date, cases and rulings have provided little
guidance for investors and lenders involved in
shared equity arrangements. In fact, the IRS has
specifically declined to issue a ruling on cancella
tion of debt in return for a partnership interest.16 The
Service is apparently studying this area, however,
and a ruling on shared equity arrangements can be
expected in the near future. Until then, confusion
will continue as to the proper tax treatment of these
financing arrangements. tta
13
14
15
16

Regs. Sec. 1.721-1(b)(1).
See, e.g., Sec. 461(g).
Sec. 702(b).
IRS Letter Ruling 8117210, note 11.
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Employee stock ownership trusts:
an update

Introduction

Unlike other employee benefits, employee stock
ownership trusts (ESOTs) have continued to be
nurtured by Congress, the SEC and, reluctantly, the
IRS. Recent developments in this area include the
liberalization of the available tax credit, the elimina
tion of the requirement of distributing stock to an
electing participant, the addition of an election that
permits employees to choose between receiving
cash income or having a pre-tax ESOT contribution
made in their behalf and the exemption of ESOTs
participation from the Federal Securities registra
tion requirements unless the plan is both contrib
utory and voluntary. This article provides an update
on the present status of ESOTs and examines the
effects of recent changes in tax rules.
One result of establishing an ESOT is the finan
cial involvement of employees, which is intended to
increase productivity. Recently, however, ESOTs
have been used to accomplish three additional
goals: First, ESOTs are still used as a corporate
THE TAX ADVISER, NOVEMBER 1983

financing vehicle. Second, there is a growing trend,
particularly in closely held corporations, to use
ESOTs as a method of financing the purchase of a
senior stockholder’s interest. Finally, a substantial
number of ESOTs are being used to reduce the
corporation’s immediate commitment to its
employees in exchange for giving them a long-term
stake in the corporation’s anticipated growth. This
usage is often sought by employees.
The practical considerations raised by each of
these objectives are often different, and the adviser
should be aware of these differences. For instance,
if the ESOT is committed to repurchasing the stock
of the participants, should the senior stockholder
(assuming there is one) be an ESOT participant?
Should a reserve be built up for a planned repur
chase from participants or are the participants ex
pected to retain their stock after distribution? If the
ESOT plans to purchase a controlling interest in the
corporation, should there be a provision for the
transfer of a substantial interest to key management
personnel who may not be satisfied with only their
17

ESOT interest? Should the ESOT own bonds in
stead of stock even though, in some contexts, this
is not permitted by the tax law?

tered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or (ii) if
the obligation is not traded on such a national securities
exchange, at a price not less favorable to the plan than the
offering price for the obligation as established by current bid
and asked prices quoted by persons independent of the
issuer;
(B) from an underwriter, at a price (i) not in excess of the
public offering price for the obligation as set forth in a pros
pectus or offering circular filed with the Securities and Ex
change Commission, and (ii) at which a substantial portion
of the same issue is acquired by persons independent of the
issuer; or
(C) directly from the issuer, at a price not less favorable to
the plan than the price paid currently for a substantial portion
of the same issue by persons independent of the issuer;
(2) immediately following the acquisition of such obliga
tion—
(A) not more than 25 percent of the aggregate amount of
obligations issued in such issue and outstanding at the time
of acquisition is held by the plan, and
(B) at least 50 percent of the aggregate amount referred to
in subparagraph (a) is held by persons independent of the
issuer; and
(3) immediately following acquisition of the obligation, not
more than 25 percent of the assets of the plan is invested in
obligations of the employer or an affiliate of the employer.

Ongoing definitional issues

Questions continue to surface in connection with
the meaning of the label “employee stock owner
ship plan.” Confusion about the definition of this
term in the Revenue Act of 1978 was clarified by the
Technical Corrections Act of 1979, which provided1
that an employee stock ownership plan is (1) a stock
bonus plan which is (2) designed to invest primarily
in qualifying employer securities, a defined term.
The 1979 legislation also adopted, by reference,
previously issued regulations on what were for
merly referred to as “leveraged employee stock
ownership plans.” These regulations clearly distin
guish between borrowing ESOPs, which must
comply with Regs. Sec. 54.4975-7, and nonborrow
ing ESOPs, which must only comply with Regs.
Sec. 54.4975-11.2 The regulations3 also state that,
to the extent that an ESOP does not invest in qualify
ing employer securities, it will be treated as a stock
bonus plan or a money purchase plan.
Thus, the following definitional categories have
been established: stock bonus plans, ESOPs that
do not borrow, ESOPs that borrow and PAYSOPs.
These categories both define the various entities
referred to as ESOTs in this article, and explain the
parameters of their permissible operation.

Stock bonus plans. A stock bonus plan
—must be a qualified plan;
—must distribute benefits in the stock of the em
ployer;4
—can invest in any prudent investment except
nonqualifying employer securities and nonqualify
ing real property;5
—is exempted from the 10% limitations6 on hold
ing qualified employer securities.7 Qualified em
ployer securities include8 stock or marketable obli
gations. The term “marketable obligation” means
... a bond, debenture, note, or certificate, or other evi
dence of indebtedness (hereinafter in this subsection re
ferred to as “obligation”) if—
(1) Such obligation is acquired—
(A) on the market, either (i) at the price of the obligation
prevailing on a national securities exchange which is regis

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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Sec. 4975(e)(7).
See also Regs. Sec. 54.4975-7.
Regs. Sec. 54.4975-11(b).
Regs. Sec. 1.401-1(b)(1)(iii).
ERISA Section 407(a)(1).
Id. Section 407(a)(3) and (b)(1).
Id. Sections 408(e) and 407(d)(3).
Id. Section 407(d)(5) and (e).

—must distribute benefits in stock of the em
ployer,9 except1011
that the plan may provide a cash
distribution option if the participant has the right to
demand any securities of the employer held by the
plan or cash (except that the stock option need not
be offered in certain cases where the corporation’s
charter or bylaws substantially restrict stock owner
ship to employees or to a qualified plan).
It is not clear whether a stock bonus plan can be
designed to invest primarily in employer securities.
If this is possible, the requirements to qualify as a
nonborrowing ESOP could be easily evaded by
simply designating a plan as a “stock bonus plan.”
A liberal view of the limitations on stock bonus plans
is supported by the ERISA provision11 that, in the
case of eligible individual account plans (which in
clude stock bonus plans), the diversification and the
prudence requirements are not violated by the ac
quisition or holding of qualified real property or em
ployer securities.
In contrast, however, the requirement12 that
ESOPs be designed to invest primarily in qualifying
employer securities tends to undermine this argu
ment. If plans that are designed to invest primarily in
employer securities do not have to be ESOPs, then
any plan that does not meet the requirements of the
ESOP regulations (see below) will be a stock bonus
plan and (except for being prohibited from borrow
ing, which includes purchasing on credit,13 and not

9
10
11
12
13

Regs. Sec. 1.401-1(b)(1)(iii).
Secs. 401(a)(23) and 409A(h).
ERISA Section 404(a)(2).
Sec. 4975(e)(7).
Regs. Sec. 54.4975-11(a)(8).

being able to pay the earnings from qualifying em
ployer securities immediately to participants14) will
suffer no penalty. Thus, Regs. Sec. 54.4975-11,
which controls nonborrowing ESOPs, would then
have little impact.

ESOPs that do not borrow. ESOPs that do not
borrow
—must be designed to invest primarily in qualify
ing employer securities.15 Sec. 409A(l) provides:
(1) in general—The term “employer securities” means
common stock issued by the employer (or by a corporation
which is a member of the same controlled group) which is
readily tradable on an established securities market.
(2)

SPECIAL RULE WHERE THERE IS NO READILY TRADABLE COM

there is no common stock which meets the
requirements of paragraph (1), the term "employer secur
ities” means common stock issued by the employer (or by a
corporation which is a member of the same controlled
group) having a combination of voting power and dividend
rights equal to or in excess of—
(A) that class of common stock of the employer (or of
any other such corporation) having the greatest voting
power, and
(B) that class of common stock of the employer (or of
any other such corporation) having the greatest dividend
rights.
MON stock—If

(3) PREFERRED STOCK MAY BE ISSUED IN CERTAIN CASES—
Noncallable preferred stock shall be treated as employer
securities if such stock is convertible at any time into stock
which meets the requirements of paragraph (1) or (2) . . .
and if such conversion is at a conversion price which (as of
the date of the acquisition by the tax credit employee stock
ownership plan) is reasonable. . . . [P]referred stock will
be treated as noncallable if after the call there will be a
reasonable opportunity for a conversion which meets the
requirements of the preceding sentence.

—must satisfy the following requirements:16
(1) Be designated as an ESOP;
(2) Have certain loan provisions (even though
they will not be used) which are not terminable;
(3) Not be obligated to acquire securities at an
indefinite time determined by the happening of an
event, such as the death of the seller (i.e., not be
obligated under a buy-sell agreement);
(4) Not be integrated with Social Security if they
were designated an ESOP after Nov. 1, 1977.
(5) Maintain a suspense account pursuant to
Regs. Sec. 54.4975-11(c) and -11(d).
—must satisfy the stock bonus rules discussed
above, if it is also a stock bonus plan (rather than a
money purchase plan17), except that the cash or
stock distribution choice discussed above would be

14
15
16
17

Regs. Sec. 54.4975-11(f)(3).
Secs. 409A(h) and (I); 4975(e)(8).
Regs. Sec. 54.4975-11.
It is generally assumed that a corporation cannot adopt a
money purchase ESOT without also having a stock bonus
ESOT.

a choice between cash or employer securities.
In the case of a money purchase plan (it must be
either a stock bonus or money purchase plan18),
practitioners must be careful to avoid the require
ments of ERISA Section 407(d)(3) that only eligible
individual account plans may hold more than 10%
(qualified) employer securities and that the defini
tion of individual account plans only includes money
purchase plans that were in existence on Sept. 2,
1974. It is clear that Sec. 4975(e)(7) must be inter
preted to void this date requirement.
ESOPs that borrow. ESOPs that borrow must
meet all of the requirements of nonborrowing
ESOPs plus the requirements of Regs. Sec.
54.4975-7, as explained in The Tax Adviser article
of May 1978.19

PAYSO.
As of Jan. 1, 1983, the old 1%
TRASOP tax credit (which could be increased by
½% employee contributions to an ESOT matched
by the employer) was modified dramatically. The
old credit was terminated as of Dec. 31,1982. The
new credit is based on payroll dollars paid or ac
crued (rather than investment credit property) and
these plans are now called PAYSOPs. The credit is
limited to the lesser of
—the value of employer securities contributed or
treated as contributed20 to the plan, or
—the applicable percentage of payroll. This per
centage is based on amounts paid or accrued dur
ing a particular calendar year (without regard to the
corporate fiscal year), as follows:21
For aggregate compensation
paid or accrued during
a portion of the taxable
year occurring in
calendar year:
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988 or thereafter

The applicable
percentage is:

0.50
0.50
0.75
0.75
0.75
0.00

It is anticipated that these provisions will be ex
tended past 1987.
—or, the first $25,000 of the corporation’s tax
liability plus 90% of any liability in excess of
$25,000.22 “Liability for tax” is defined for purposes
of this provision.23

18 Sec. 4975(e)(7).
19 Pavlock and Lieberman, “Employee stock ownership trusts:
the final regulations,” TTA, May 78, at 266 et seq.
20 Sec. 44G(c)(4).
21 Sec. 44G(a)(2)(B).
22 Sec. 44G(b)(1)(A).
23 Sec. 44G(b)(1)(B).
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Controlled groups must apportion the $25,000 of
liability, but apparently cannot offset any tax credits
claimed by using the loss carryovers of other en
tities. There is a three-year carryback and a 15-year
carryforward period for any unused credit.24 Any
unused carryover can be deducted.25 If the employ
ee’s income is set by a ratemaking board, the enti
ty’s income may not be reduced by the credit re
ceived.
Special discrimination rules apply to PAYSOPs.
Under these rules, no more than one-third of em
ployer contributions may be allocated to officers,
stockholders who own (directly or indirectly) 10% of
the stock or employees whose compensation ex
ceeds two times the current limit on contributions to
defined contribution plans, which is now $30,000.26
The annual limitations of Sec. 415(c)(6) do not
apply to PAYSOP plan forfeitures or contributions
made to repay interest on loans made to purchase
employer securities.
If the employer’s articles of incorporation or
bylaws restrict stock ownership to employees and
Sec. 401 trusts, the PAYSOP may distribute cash in
lieu of stock to participants as their benefit.27 Addi
tional requirements for PAYSOPs in effect require
the plan to be a nonborrowing ESOP (see above).28
Accordingly, the general requirements for qualified
plans relating to eligibility participation, nonalien
ability of assets, election of how benefits are to be
distributed, intention to provide a permanent benefit
and investment prudence (established by Sec. 401)
will also apply.
The plan must be designed to invest primarily in
employer securities.29 For PAYSOPs, the range of
acceptable investments in the stock of the em
ployer is limited (unlike certain ESOPs discussed
above) to common stock issued by the employer, or
by a corporation that is a member of the same
controlled group, which is readily tradable on an
established securities market.30 If there is no com
mon stock that is readily tradable, the term “em
ployer securities” means “common stock issued by
the employer (or by a corporation which is a
member of the same controlled group) having a
combination of voting power and dividend rights
equal to or in excess of (A) that class of common
stock of the employer (or of any other such corpora
tion) having the greatest voting power, and (B) that
class of common stock of the employer (or of any

24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Sec. 44G(b)(2).
Sec. 404(i).
Secs. 44G(c)(1)(A) and 415(c)(6)(B).
Sec. 409A(h)(2).
Sec. 409A(a)(1).
Sec. 409A(a)(2).
Sec. 409A(l)(1).
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other such corporation) having the greatest divi
dend rights.”31
In applying these rules, the term “controlled
group of corporations” has the meaning given to the
term by Sec. 1563(a), determined without regard to
subsections (a)(4) and (e)(3)(C). If the common
parent directly owns stock possessing at least 50%
of the voting power of all classes of stock and at
least 50% of each class of nonvoting stock in a
first-tier subsidiary, that subsidiary (and all other
corporations below it in the chain that would meet
the 80% test of Sec. 1563(a) if the first-tier sub
sidiary were the common parent) are treated as
“includible corporations.”32
Noncallable preferred stock will be treated as
satisfying the readily tradable common stock re
quirements if it can be converted at a conversion
price which, as of the date of the acquisition by the
ESOP, is reasonable.33
Under a special rule, a subsidiary that is owned at
least 50% by the parent may contribute parent stock
to the subsidiary’s tax credit ESOP without trigger
ing the recognition of gain, even if the basis of the
parent’s stock is less than its value in the hands of
the subsidiary.34
A PAYSOP must be established on or before the
due date (including any extensions of that date) for
the filing of the employer’s tax return for the taxable
year in which or with which the plan year ends.35
This provision is more liberal than the general pen
sion, profit-sharing, stock bonus plan and ESOP
rules. Contributions to the plan must be made not
later than 30 days after the due date (including
extensions) for filing the tax returns,36 which is dif
ferent from the old TRASOP rules.
Even though an ESOP tax credit is eventually
recaptured or redetermined, the stock transferred to
the plan must be retained in the plan;37 a deduction
would probably be available, however.
A PAYSOP must provide for the immediate allo
cation to participants’ accounts of all employer se
curities transferred to it or purchased by it,38 except
as may be necessary to comply with the limitations
on allocations to participants. In that situation, a
postponed allocation is permitted.39
Once this allocation has been made
—there is 100% vesting;40

31
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33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Sec. 409A(l)(2).
Sec. 409A(l)(4).
Sec. 409A(l)(3).
Sec. 409A(m).
Sec. 409A(f).
Sec. 44G(c)(2).
Sec. 409A(g).
Sec. 409A(b)(1)(A).
Secs. 415 and 409A(b)(4).
Sec. 409A(c).

—for stock purchased by a loan, i.e., leveraged
stock, there must also be an immediate allocation of
the stock to the participants’ accounts;41
—all allocations of contributed or purchased
stock must be in substantially the same proportion
as the compensation of the participants.42
The literal application of this rule would mean that
a tax credit ESOP would rarely qualify as a stock
bonus plan or an ESOT since any dividends earned
on the employer securities the plan owned would
have to be converted to employer securities before
being allocated to the participant whose account
held the shares. The purchase would then violate
the provision requiring allocation to all participants.
This difficulty does not occur with regular stock
bonus plans or ESOTs because they are not re
quired to make proportional allocations. It is doubt
ful whether the Service will adopt such a narrow
interpretation of the PAYSOP requirements. In
stead, the Service will probably determine that the
allocation requirements do not apply in the case of a
dividend distribution.
The required allocation is made according to the
participant’s income, but without regard to income
in excess of $100,000. This dollar amount is not
indexed, and therefore will not increase with infla
tion 43
When the employer has a “registration-type class
of securities,” each participant in the plan must be
entitled to direct the plan as to the manner in which
those employer securities, which are allocated to
the participant’s account and are entitled to vote,
are to be voted 44 The term “registration-type class
of securities” means a class of securities that must
be registered under Section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and a class of securities that
would be required to be registered except for the
exemption from registration provided in subsection
(g)(2)(H) of Section 12 of that Act.45
If the employer does not have a “registration-type
class of securities,” the plan will qualify under the
Code only if “each participant in the plan is entitled
to direct the plan as to the manner in which voting
rights under employer securities which are allo
cated to the account of such participant are to be
exercised with respect to a corporate matter which
(by law or charter) must be decided by more than a

41 For a discussion of immediate allocations in the context of
unleveraged ESOPs and leveraged ESOPs, see Pavlock and
Lieberman, The taxation of ESOTs (part II)." TTA, March 76,
p. 132, and “Employee stock owner trusts—an update," TTA,
Aug. 77, p. 476.
42 Sec. 409A(b)(1)(B).
43 Sec. 409A(b)(2).
44 Sec. 409A(e)(2).
45 Sec. 409A(e)(4).

majority vote of outstanding common shares
voted.”46
Sec. 409A retains the requirement that no em
ployer security allocated to a participant may be
distributed before 84 months after allocation, ex
cept in the case of death, disability or the partici
pant’s separation from service.47 There are several
exceptions to this requirement, however, if a par
ticipant transfers to the employment of an employer
who acquires substantially all of the assets or stock
of the employer.48 If a new plan is then established,
Sec. 409A(i) provides:
. . . the employer may withhold from amounts due the plan
for the taxable year for which the plan is established (or the
plan may pay) so much of the amounts paid or incurred in
connection with the establishment of the plan as does not
exceed the sum of—
(A) 10 percent of the first $100,000 which the employer
is required to transfer to the plan for that taxable
year . .
and
(B) 5 percent of any amount so required to be trans
ferred in excess of the first $100,000. . . .
. . . the employer may withhold from amounts due the plan
(or the plan may pay) so much of the amounts paid or
incurred during any taxable year as expenses of administer
ing the plan as does not exceed the lesser of—
(A) The sum of—
(i) 10 percent of the first $100,000 of the dividends paid
to the plan with respect to stock of the employer during the
plan year ending with or within the employer’s taxable
year, and
(ii) 5 percent of the amount of such dividends in excess
of $100,000 or
(B) $100,000.49

For PAYSOPs, the employees’ mandatory put
option, which requires the employer to purchase the
distributed stock upon exercise, must be exercis
able for a period of at least 60 days following dis
tribution and an additional 60-day period in the fol
lowing year.50
If a taxpayer who has claimed an ESOP credit for
any taxable year fails to satisfy any requirement
under Sec. 409A, or fails to make any contribution
that is required under Sec. 48(n) within the period
required for making such contribution, the Code
provides for a penalty in an amount equal to the
amount involved in the failure.51 The amount cannot
exceed the amount of credit claimed and cannot be
less than one-half of 1% of the credit claimed, mul
tiplied by the number of months (or parts thereof)
during which the failure continues. The penalty
does not apply if the employer corrects the failure
within 90 days after it is notified of the failure.

46
47
48
49
50
51

Sec.
Sec.
Id.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

409A(e)(3).
409A(d).
409A(i).
409A(h)(4).
6699(a).
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Sec. 401(k) rules
A potentially dramatic use for ESOTs is in the
area of Sec. 401 (k) plans. Under Sec. 401 (k), stock
bonus plans and profit-sharing plans can be estab
lished with employee contributions.
It appears that PAYSOPs can also be established
using Sec. 401(k), provided that Sec. 44G is inter
preted so that the Sec. 401 (k) salary reduction fol
lowed by the employer’s transfer to the plan meets
the Sec. 44G(c) requirement of an employer con
tribution.
Unlike traditional thrift plans, where employee
contributions were taxable but tax on the invest
ment gains was deferred, the taxes on Sec. 401 (k)
employee contributions are deferred. Moreover, the
employer may save unemployment taxes and
worker compensation insurance costs by not pay
ing these amounts for the sums taken from the
employee’s salary and contributed to the plan. So
cial Security taxes now apply, however.
In addition to satisfying the Sec. 401(k) require
ments and the stock bonus plan requirements, a
Sec. 401(k) ESOT or stock bonus plan must offer
the employee cash or a plan contribution; not dis
tribute benefits except upon retirement, death, dis
ability, separation from service, hardship or attain
ing age 59½; and not allow forfeiture of the benefits.
Under Sec. 401(k)(3), the following discrimina
tion rules govern actual participation:
• The deferral percentage for highly compen
sated employees must bear a relationship to the
deferral percentage for all other eligible employees
for the plan year that meets either of the following
tests:
(1) The deferral percentage for the highly com
pensated employees is not more than 150% of the
deferral percentage of all other eligible employees.
(2) The excess of the deferral percentage for
highly compensated employees over that of all
other eligible employees is not more than three
percentage points, and the deferral percentage for
the group of highly compensated employees is not
more than 250% of the deferral percentage of all
other eligible employees.
• Highly compensated employee means “any
employee who is more highly compensated than
two-thirds of all eligible employees. . . .”
Sec. 401 (k) stock bonus plans are attractive be
cause they help to solve the three most important
problems connected with stock bonus plans:
• The difficulty in attracting certain groups of
employees. Often, younger and lower paid employ
ees are unimpressed by the fact that a contribution
is being made on their behalf. Sec. 401(k) plans
address this problem because, in the case of em
ployees who are not attracted by an ESOT, neither
the employer nor the employee will be penalized by
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a contribution requirement that the employee does
not appreciate.
• The relatively lengthy period for a sale of sig
nificant amounts of employer stock. With Sec.
401(k) plans, employee contributions add to the
sums available for the purchase, and the sale
period can be significantly reduced.
• In the case of a buy-out of a stockholder’s
interest, the drain on the corporation’s cash re
serves during the buy-out period. Both an ESOP
and a stock bonus plan provide twice the cash flow
(assuming a 50% tax bracket) for buy-out purposes,
as opposed to purchases funded without an ESOT.
A Sec. 401 (k) ESOP will reduce the cash flow drain
even further than a non-Sec. 401(k) ESOT. The
resulting cash flow savings percentage for the em
ployee contribution portion will at least equal 100%
less the corporation’s combined federal and state
income tax bracket. Thus, for a corporation in the
50% tax bracket, every dollar of Sec. 401 (k) buy-out
money will produce a 50% cash flow savings, in
comparison to a regular ESOT. The total cash flow
savings (compared to no ESOT) will be 75% (50%
+ (50% x 50%)).
For example, a $2,000 payment to the selling
shareholder would produce the following results:

Redemp
tion
buy-out

Cross
purchase
buy-out

Employee
Employer portion of
funded
Sec. 401(k)
ESOP
ESOP
buy-out
buy-out

Cost to
corporation:
Income earned
by corporation $4,000
Pay-out to fund
program
Tax on income
earned

Cash flow cost
to corporation

4,000

4,000

0

2,000

2,000

2,000

0

2,000

2,000*

1,000

0

4,000

4,000

3,000

0*

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

1,600

1,600

1,600

1,600

1,000

N/A

N/A

N/A

Benefit to
selling
shareholder:

Amount received
Net, if capital
gains

Net, if
dividend

* Assumes payments to shareholders for buy-out were not de
ductible.

Practical considerations should lead employers
to establish Sec. 401(k) plans in tandem with em
ployer matching programs in which the company
matches employee contributions. Many employees
are reluctant to invest in these programs merely to
postpone taxes, and because the reluctant employ

ees tend to be among the lower paid, it is difficult to
meet the nondiscrimination test unless they are en
couraged to participate. Experience shows that an
employer’s willingness to match employee contribu
tions will generate sufficient participation.
Practical aspects of using ESOTs for
stockholder buy-outs

ESOTs should be used to accomplish specific
goals. These goals could include repayment of loan
principal with pre-tax dollars; motivation of employ
ees by giving them a stake in the company; increas
ing the sales price for the business; or, decreasing
the pay-off period for a sale when the purchaser
wants to pay for the purchase of the business using
its profits.
The increase in the sales price is based on the
theory that a buyer of a business will be willing
to pay an amount equal to X% of the corpora
tion’s cash flow over Y years. Regardless of whatX
and Y equal, if cash flow is increased, by using
pre-tax dollars to pay for principal, a buyer will prob
ably pay more for the business. Of course, this
theory assumes that the yearly ESOT appraisal will
reflect this increased value, which should be true
because the net tax savings will be reflected in the
company’s finances.
The decreased pay-off period is based on the
theory that, assuming a set sales price, the corpora
tion has more pre-tax dollars than it would otherwise
have had because of the ESOT, and thus will be
able to pay a larger amount in each payment period.
Dilution

Numerous commentators52 have noted that the
pre-sale stockholders’ interests are reduced in
value by an ESOT contribution, because the value
of the contribution to the corporation is “only” 50¢
for each dollar of stock contributed. This dilution
theory does not always hold true, however.
• First, when a sale of all the stock is involved,
whether or not the ESOT is buying all the stock
being sold, if one assumes that the purchaser will
only pay a certain percentage of the corporate in
come each year for a certain number of years, the
ESOT-aided sale will always generate more net
income to the selling stockholder so that there is no
dilution. Moreover, the assumption that buyers will
base their purchase price on the income (past or
projected) that can be earned by the corporation

52 See, e.g., “Employee Stock Ownership Plans," a Deloitte
Haskins & Sells publication (1978), p. 17; and. John D. Menke,
“How to Analyze, Design and Install an Employee Stock
Ownership Plan,” Panel Publishers, 1982-19, p. 1071.

over a certain period of time, is likely to reflect
reality.
Assume sales of $6,520,000. Assume pre-tax
profit of 5% or $326,384. Assume the corporation
has a value of $1 million, based on the assumption
that the corporation can be bought out with after-tax
dollars over seven years at 14% interest.
$233,192
(140,000)

First year payment
Interest
Principal

93,192

Tax cost of principal

93,192

Total cost without the ESOT
($233,192 + $93,192)

$326,384

Total after-tax cash flow necessary to buy business:
(i) If corporation has
to spend pre-tax dollars
(ii) If ESOT buys

$326,384
(233,192)
$ 93,192

Cash savings

Assume the corporation transferred this $93,192
cash savings to the ESOT:
------ $93,192------ _ 9.3% corporation’s
$1,000,000 value

value transferred to the ESOT

The stockholders then sell 9.3% of their stock to
the ESOT for $93,192, retaining ownership of
90.7% of the corporation.
The corporation’s value without the ESOT re
mains at $1 million (it did not grow because the
$326,384 in earnings was used up in the redemp
tion).
Corporate value with the ESOT:
(i) Pre-ESOT value
(which will generate
$326,384)

$1,000,000

(ii) Extra after-tax retained
earnings:
$93,192 x 50% = $46,596.
which would buy (without an
ESOT) additional stock
equal in value to:
$ 46,596 = 14% x $1,000,000 =
$326,383

Total new value of corporation
with ESOT

$140,000
of value53
$1,140,000

Thus, without an ESOT, a redemption costing
$326,384 would support a sale price of $1 million.
With an ESOT, it would support a sale price of
$1,140,000 (even if the ESOT-generated savings of
$46,596 ($93,192 x 50%) were not subsequently
contributed to the ESOT).

53 In other words, the 14% more pre-tax profit will proportionately
increase the purchase price if the purchaser will pay a certain
percentage of the corporate income.
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Moreover, after the first year of the sale to the
ESOT and after taxes, the shareholders retain the
following:
Stock investment (90.7% of $1,140,000)
Interest payment ($140,000 x 0.5)
Principal payment ($93,192 x 0.8)

$1,033,980
70,000
74,554
$1,178,534

This amount is more than the $1,051,554 of value
they would have had (net of taxes) from a sale
without the use of an ESOT.
• If the pre-sale stockholders sell all of their
stock, there will be no dilution to them because they
will receive fair market value at the time of the sale;
thereafter, the after-tax impact is irrelevant to them.
Since the purchasers would have had to pay out of
after-tax dollars otherwise, they are not hurt either.
• If the plan is replacing an existing retirement
plan, there is no dilution because the corporation
was already incurring the same costs.
Finally, even if dilution occurs, an ESOT is often
the only way for an owner to receive a fair value for
his stock, since there are often no outside buyers
willing to pay fair market value. The owner will there
fore be in a better position than he would otherwise
be, despite the dilution.

Voting control
A common misconception about ESOTs is that
the employees will have the opportunity to vote the
stock of the closely held corporation. Except in the
rare situation of a vote requiring more than a major
ity for passage, it is not necessary to allow the
employee participants to vote the stock before a
distribution of stock. It is almost unheard of for par
ticipants owning stock in a closely held corporation
not to want to sell the closely held corporation ESOT
stock back to the corporation; therefore, the partici
pants will rarely be in a position to vote. Some of the
alternatives for voting the ESOT stock are sum
marized below.
• In some situations, the ESOT can own nonvot
ing stock or bonds (see discussion above for the
rules that apply to each type of ESOT).
• In some situations, the ESOT can own nonvot
ing stock convertible to voting stock if a certain
event occurs, such as nonpayment of a dividend or
a drop in earnings.
• The ESOT can generally offer participants
cash instead of stock at the time of distribution.
• The ESOT (except in the case of registration
type securities) can deny participants the right to
vote the stock until it is distributed to them (unless a
vote requiring more than a majority is taken).
• In situations that do not involve loans or in
stallment sales, an ESOT can provide for a call by
the ESOT on the stock at the time of its distribution.
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Corporate information
Except during any period when a participant is
either voting stock held by the ESOT or has re
ceived a distribution of stock, and not resold it to the
ESOT, participants are not entitled to receive finan
cial information about the corporation,54 other than
indirectly (i.e., the participants’ account balances
will, to some degree, reflect stock value changes).

Cash or stock distribution election

As previously discussed, a participant who is
about to receive a distribution can now elect to
receive cash, the corporation’s stock or, if allowed,
securities.55 Participants who receive stock or se
curities
—will be taxed immediately on the ESOT’s basis
in the stock, and
—will later receive capital gains treatment for the
difference between the ESOT’s basis in the distrib
uted stock and its subsequent sale price.56
If the sale occurs more than 12 months after the
date on which the transfer agent is tendered the
stock, gains from the sale will be long-term capital
gains. If cash is distributed, the distribution will pre
sumably not be eligible for capital gains treatment
(unless capital gains treatment is available because
of lump-sum distribution treatment).

Higher contribution limits
For ESOTs in which no more than one-third of the
benefits goes to officers, 10% stockholders and
employees receiving compensation that is more
than two times the normal dollar limit (i.e., $30,000
plus post-1986 cost of living adjustments), the Sec.
415 limitation on contributions does not apply to
forfeitures of securities acquired with a loan and
interest payments on loans.57
Federal security laws

Recent pronouncements by courts and the SEC
emphasize the relationship between ESOTs and
the federal securities laws. In SEC release No. 336281,58 the Commission ruled that participation in
an ESOT will constitute a security, which may be
subject to the securities laws, if
—the plan is both voluntary and contributory, and
—the plan’s voluntary portion is paid from salary
54 ERISA Section 104.
55 Sec. 409A(h).
56 Sec. 402(e)(4)(J).
57 Sec. 415(c)(6)(C).
58 The release was clarified in a “letter of inquiry” dated Dec. 23,
1982, made available Jan. 24, 1983 and put on the SEC
significant list April 14, 1983.

(rather than an employee bonus).
The Commission’s position conflicts, however, with
the District Court’s holding in Cunha, et al. v. Ward
Foods, Inc., et al.,59 that a voluntary and contrib
utory plan is not a security.
Thus, although the participation of employees
may not require the registration of securities in most
cases, registration may be required for Sec. 401 (k)
ESOTs. Registration requirements under state law
vary.

Holding period of distributions

The IRS has ruled60 that the holding period for the
common stock of distributees begins on the day
after the day on which the plan trustee delivers the
stock to the transfer agent with instructions to re
issue the stock.

59 Cunha, et al. v. Ward Foods, Inc., et al., DC Hawaii, 1982.
60 Rev. Rul. 82-75, 1982-1 CB 116.

Conclusion
Several important changes in employee ben
efits have raised new issues and created new tech
nical requirements for practitioners working with
ESOTs. The Technical Corrections Act of 1979 clar
ified the meaning of the term employee stock own
ership plan, and the regulations introduced new
requirements for employee stock ownership plans,
particularly ESOPs that borrow and money pur
chase pension plan ESOTs, which by definition
must be ESOPs. The change of the old TRASOP
tax credit to a PAYSOP tax credit should increase
the use of tax credit ESOTs. The passage of Sec.
401(k) will also create new interest in ESOTs as
long as lower paid employees are encouraged to
participate. Implementing these plans in connection
with employer matching programs should solve this
problem. Finally, it appears that ESOTs can avoid
dilution or voting control problems through careful
planning. Thus, the long-term viability of ESOTs is
probably assured. tta
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Working with the expanded
alternative minimum tax

Introduction

The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982 (TEFRA) made significant changes in the cal
culation of the alternative minimum tax. The
changes, which apply to noncorporate taxpayers
after 1982, are intended to broaden and strengthen
the alternative minimum tax, in order to insure that
taxpayers with substantial income do not avoid all
tax liability.1 TEFRA also repealed the regular
add-on minimum tax for all but corporate taxpayers.
Five preference items formerly subject to the
add-on minimum tax are now incorporated in the
alternative minimum tax computation. TEFRA also
changed the base amount used to calculate the
alternative minimum tax; this amount now equals
adjusted gross income plus an expanded list of
specified preference items (including the five men
tioned above), minus specified itemized deduc
tions.1
2 Depending on a taxpayer’s filing status, he

1 S. Rep. No. 97-494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), at 108.
2 Sec. 55(b). See also H. Rep. No. 97-760,97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982), at 474.
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may exempt up to $40,000 from the tax. Amounts in
excess of this exemption are taxed at a flat rate of
20%. As amended by TEFRA, the alternative min
imum tax will apply only to the extent that it exceeds
the taxpayer’s “regular tax liability.”
As a result of these structural changes, many
taxpayers will be subject to the alternative minimum
tax for the first time in 1983. Therefore, practitioners
must fully understand the new provisions and de
vise planning strategies that blunt their impact. Tim
ing will play an important role because many of the
planning opportunities must be implemented
promptly. This article will review the TEFRA provi
sions on the alternative minimum tax and illustrate
possible tax planning techniques.

Alternative minimum taxable income
Beginning in 1983, the alternative minimum tax is
imposed on “alternative minimum taxable income.”
This base figure is determined by taking adjusted
gross income (determined without regard to the net
operating loss deduction under Sec. 172), and in
creasing AGI by the amount of specified tax prefer
THE TAX ADVISER, MARCH 1983

ence items. This figure is then reduced by the sum
of (1) the alternative tax net operating loss (NOL)
deduction, (2) the alternative tax itemized deduc
tions, and (3) any income resulting from a deemed
accumulation distribution by a trust under Sec.
667.3
In loss years beginning after 1982, the alternative
tax NOL is calculated by reducing the regular tax net
operating loss deduction by any tax preference
items used to compute the NOL. In addition, any
itemized deductions that are alternative tax item
ized deductions reduce the alternative tax net
operating loss.4 Practitioners should note that these
special alternative tax NOL computations do not
affect the calculation or availability of the regular tax
NOL deduction.
A transitional rule provides that pre-1983 regular
tax NOLs can be offset against alternative minimum
taxable income.5 Thus, taxpayers with unabsorbed
regular tax NOL carryovers may be able to avoid the
revised alternative minimum tax. To the extent that
these pre-1983 NOLs postponed the imposition of
the add-on minimum tax in an earlier year, however,
the pre-TEFRA version of Sec. 56 continues to
apply when the NOL carryover is used to reduce
either taxable income or alternative minimum tax
able income.6

Alternative tax itemized deductions. Alterna
tive minimum taxable income is calculated using
certain itemized deductions; one of the permitted
deductions is Sec. 165 nonbusiness casualty
losses. Beginning in 1983, nonbusiness casualty
losses are deductible only to the extent that the
aggregate amount of the losses exceeds 10% of
adjusted gross income. In addition, the $100 floor
continues to apply to each casualty loss.7 Wagering
losses allowed under Sec. 165 are also deductible
to the extent of wagering gains during the taxable
year.8
Medical expenses are also permitted as an item
ized deduction under Sec. 55, if they exceed 10% of
adjusted gross income. Sec. 55 specifically pro
vides for a 10% limit despite the TEFRA amend
ment to Sec. 213, which implements a 5% limit.9
Thus, if the alternative minimum tax applies in a
post-1982 taxable year, medical deductions be
tween 5% and 10% of adjusted gross income will
result in no tax benefit.
“Qualified interest” can also be deducted in com

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Sec. 55(b).
Sec. 55(d).
Sec. 55(d)(2)(B).
Sec. 56(b)(1) and (2).
Sec. 165(h)(1)(A) and (B).
Secs. 55(e)(1)(A) and 165(d).
Secs. 55(e)(7) and 213(a).

puting alternative minimum taxable income. This
term includes “qualified housing interest” and all
other deductible interest not in excess of “qualified
net investment income.”1011Qualified housing in
terest includes interest on debt incurred to con
struct, acquire or substantially rehabilitate the prin
cipal residence of the taxpayer or a “qualified dwell
ing” used by the taxpayer or a family member.11 For
purposes of this provision, family members include
brothers and sisters, parents, grandparents, chil
dren and grandchildren.12 A “qualified dwelling”
may be a house, apartment, condominium or
mobile home.13 The dwelling need not be the princi
pal residence of the taxpayer; a vacation home may
fall within the definition of “qualified dwelling.”
Neither the Act nor the committee reports indicate
the extent to which the taxpayer or family member
must actually use the structure to deduct the in
terest. Qualified housing interest also includes in
terest paid on debt incurred before July 1, 1982, if
the debt is secured by the taxpayer’s principal resi
dence or property that is a “qualified dwelling.”14
Sec. 55(e)(5) defines “qualified net investment
income” as the excess of “qualified investment in
come” over “qualified investment expenses.”
“Qualified investment income” is calculated in the
same way as net investment income under Sec.
163(d)(3)(B), except that “qualified net investment
income” includes all net capital gains from invest
ment dispositions; net investment income includes
only short-term capital gains. “Qualified net invest
ment income” also includes interest received from
all-savers certificates and the dividend income ex
clusion.15 Net income from a limited partnership
interest or an S corporation in which the taxpayer is
a passive investor also enters into the calculation.16
“Qualified interest expenses” are defined as de
ductions allowable in computing adjusted gross in
come that are directly connected with the produc
tion of “qualified investment income.” The definition
excludes, however, any of the deductions that are
part of the expanded list of preference items.17 In
addition, interest incurred to purchase or carry a
limited partnership interest or passive S corporation
investment is excluded. This interest is therefore
subject to the “qualified net investment income”
limitation.18

10 Sec. 55(e)(3).
11 Sec. 55(e)(4)(A)(i) provides that a residence qualifies as a
principal residence if it falls within the definition of Sec. 1034.
12 Secs. 55(e)(4)(A)(ii) and 267(c)(4).
13 Sec. 55(e)(4)(B).
14 Sec. 55(e)(4)(C).
15 Sec. 55(e)(5)(B).
16 H. Rep., note 2, at 475-476.
17 Sec. 55(e)(5)(C).
18 H. Rep., note 2, at 476.
27

The other two alternative minimum tax itemized
deductions are the charitable contribution deduc
tion and the estate tax deduction for income in re
spect of a decedent set forth in Sec. 691.19 Income
in respect of a decedent consists of all items of
income earned by the decedent before his death
that are not properly includible on his final individual
income tax return under his method of accounting.20
A special rule for estates and trusts allows deduc
tions for amounts paid or permanently set aside for
charitable purposes and the amount of the distribu
tion deduction.21

Tax preference items. As mentioned above, the
expanded alternative minimum tax computation in
corporates five tax preferences formerly subject to
the add-on minimum tax:
1. The accelerated depreciation on real property
in excess of straight-line depreciation for the applic
able recovery period.
2. The accelerated depreciation on leased per
sonal property in excess of straight-line deprecia
tion for the applicable recovery period.
3. The 60-month amortization deduction for cer
tified pollution control facilities in excess of the
depreciation deduction otherwise allowable.
4. The percentage depletion deduction allowed
during the year in excess of the adjusted basis of the
property at year-end.
5. The excess intangible drilling costs for oil, gas
and geothermal wells, reduced by net income from
the property.
Two minimum tax preference items were deleted
by TEFRA: the amortization of child care facilities
and the adjusted itemized deductions.
To mitigate the impact of the expanded alterna
tive minimum tax, TEFRA added an election for
excess intangible drilling costs. Individuals, other
than limited partners, may elect to capitalize their
intangible drilling costs, which will then not consti
tute preference items. The costs will be eligible for
the regular investment tax credit, as five-year re
covery property, and will be recovered using the
appropriate ACRS write-off percentages.22 Under
the revised investment tax credit rules, a basis ad
justment of 50% of the credit will be required, unless
the taxpayer elects a reduced credit of 8%.23
Alternatively, all taxpayers, including limited
partners, can eliminate excess intangible drilling
costs as a preference item by electing to capitalize
the costs and deduct them ratably over a 10-year

19
20
21
22
23

Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
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55(e)(1)(B) and (E).
691(a).
55(e)(6)(A).
58(i)(4).
48(q).

period.24 This election also applies to several of the
newly created tax preference items.25 Both elec
tions are revocable only with IRS consent. The pre
cise time and manner of making the elections will be
outlined in regulations, but Sec. 58(i) specifically
provides that in the case of partnerships, the elec
tions must be made at the partner level as to each
partner’s allocable share of eligible expenditures.26
The 60% long-term capital gain deduction re
mains a tax preference item, and, for many tax
payers, it will be the most common preference item.
Several new tax preference items were added by
TEFRA, including the exclusion for dividends and
interest. Sec. 57(a)(1) provides that the $100 divi
dend exclusion available for individuals ($200 on a
joint return), along with any all-savers interest
excluded from gross income are tax preference
items. Beginning in 1985, a partial interest exclu
sion of up to $450 per year ($900 on a joint return) is
scheduled to replace all-savers interest as an item
of tax preference.27 For mining exploration ex
penses (determined on a property-by-property
basis under Sec. 616 or 617), circulation expenses
(Sec. 173) and research and experimental ex
penses (Sec. 174), the excess of the amount allow
able as a deduction over amounts that would have
been allowable if the expenses were capitalized
and amortized over 10 years also constitutes pref
erence items.28 These preference items can be
avoided, however, by the election to capitalize the
expenditures and write them off over a 10-year
period, discussed above. The bargain element at
the time of exercise of an incentive stock option
(Sec. 422) is also a new tax preference item.29 The
committee reports indicate, however, that this pref
erence will not apply when there is an early disposi
tion of the stock acquired through exercise of the
option.30 An early disposition can occur within two
years of granting the option or one year after the
actual transfer of the shares takes place. The early
disposition will result in the taxation of the bargain
element as ordinary income.
The exemption amount and the rate of tax
Once alternative minimum taxable income is de
termined, it is reduced by the appropriate exemp
tion amount. For individual taxpayers, the exemp

24 Sec. 58(i)(1).
25 It applies to “qualified expenditures,” which are defined, in
Sec. 58(i)(2), to include mining exploration and development
costs, circulation expenditures and research and devel
opment expenditures.
26 Sec. 58(i)(5).
27 Sec. 128.
28 Sec. 57(a)(5) and (6).
29 Sec. 57(a)(10).
30 H. Rep., note 2, at 475.

tion amount depends upon the filing status of the
taxpayer: For married taxpayers filing jointly and
surviving spouses, the exemption is $40,000. For all
other individual taxpayers, the exemption amount is
$30,000, except for married taxpayers filing sepa
rately. For these taxpayers and for estates and
trusts, the exemption amount remains $20,000.31
As indicated earlier, alternative minimum taxable
income in excess of the exemption amount is taxed
at a 20% rate.32 The graduated rate structure was
repealed by TEFRA.

Credits available
Refundable tax credits continue to reduce the
alternative minimum tax. The available credits in
clude the credit for taxes withheld (Sec. 31), the
credit for gasoline, special fuels and lubricating oil
(Sec. 39), and the earned income credit (Sec. 43).
For computational purposes, these credits do not
directly offset the alternative minimum tax; instead,
the credits reduce the “regular tax,” which is rede
fined for purposes of the alternative minimum tax.33
Accordingly, when 20% of the alternative minimum
taxable income is reduced by this “regular tax,” the
resulting alternative minimum tax will be reduced by
the amount of the refundable credits.
The foreign tax credit remains the only nonre
fundable credit available to offset the alternative
minimum tax. This credit is only allowed to the ex
tent of the foreign tax on foreign-source minimum
taxable income. The allowable credit can be deter
mined using the following formula:
alternative minimum taxable
income from sources outside
the United States
x the alternative minimum tax
the entire alternative
plus the regular tax
minimum taxable income

The foreign tax credit may not exceed the lesser of
the foreign taxes paid (or accrued), or the alterna
tive minimum tax.34 To determine the credit, the
foreign taxes paid or accrued are increased by the
lesser of the foreign tax credit allowable under Sec.
33 for regular tax purposes, or the alternative min
imum tax.35 The alternative minimum taxable in
come from sources outside the United States is
calculated in the same way as the alternative min
imum taxable income discussed above, but only
items from sources outside the United States are
taken into account.36

31
32
33
34
35
36

Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.
Sec.

55(f)(1)(A), (B) and (C).
55(a)(1).
55(f)(2).
55(c)(2)(C).
55(c)(2)(B).
55(c)(2)(D).

For any year in which the taxpayer has alternative
minimum tax liability, credit carryovers are not re
duced to the extent that the tax applies. The follow
ing example, from the Senate Finance Committee
Report, illustrates this point:
Assume that taxpayer X has a regular tax liability before
credits of $10,000 and investment tax credits of $5,000. His
alternative minimum tax before offset by the regular tax is
$8,000. He will pay a total tax of $8,000: a regular tax of
$5,000 ($10,000 less $5,000 of ITC) and an alternative
minimum tax of $3,000 ($8,000 less the regular tax of
$5,000). Although he has used up the entire investment tax
credit against the regular tax, his actual tax benefit is only
$2,000 ($10,000 regular tax before credits less the alterna
tive minimum tax of $8,000). Therefore, the $3,000 of in
vestment tax credit for which no benefit was received is
available as a carryover or carryback to the taxable year to
which the credit would normally be carried.37

When multiple nonrefundable credits are avail
able in a taxable year in which the taxpayer has
alternative minimum tax liability, the ’82 Act estab
lishes a “priority system” for determining the
amount of the carryback or carryover available in
another taxable year. This system applies to the fol
lowing credits: the investment tax credit (Sec. 38),
WIN credit (Sec. 40), jobs credit (Sec. 44B), residen
tial energy credit (Sec. 44C), credit for alcohol used
as a fuel (Sec. 44E) and the credit for research and
development expenses (Sec. 44F). After the foreign
tax credit is taken into account, these credits are
treated as used in the order in which they are listed
above.38 Further, if no tax benefit is obtained from
more than one tax credit, the additional credit al
lowed is first allocated to the last credit used under
this priority system.39 To illustrate, if taxpayer x, in
the example above, also had a residential energy
credit of $2,000 available in the calculation year, the
tax benefit would not change. Under the priority
system, however, $2,000 of the investment tax cre
dit, and none of the residential energy credit, would
be considered used. As a consequence, the resi
dential energy credit carryover would be $2,000 and
the investment tax credit carryover would continue
to be $3,000.

Comparative example
With an understanding of the technical changes
in the alternative minimum tax, the following com
parative example, using the 1983 tax year, can be
used to illustrate the increased complexity and
larger tax liability that may result. The example is
based on a taxpayer who files a joint return and has
four exemptions available.

37 Note 1, at 110-111.
38 Sec. 55(c)(3).
39 Note 1, at 111.
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Alternative
minimum tax

Regular tax

$100,000
Salary
Dividends
(net of exclusion)
10,000
Net long-term
capital gain
($375,000 - $225,000) 150,000

Old law

New law

100,000

100,000

10,000

10,000

150,000

150,000

Adjusted gross income
Charitable contributions
Taxes
Interest expense—
principal residence
Other interest expense
Miscellaneous itemized
deductions
Zero bracket amount
Exemptions

260,000
(45,000)
(35,000)

260,000
(45,000)
(35,000)

260,000
(45,000)
N/A

(12,000)
(25,000)

(12,000)
(25,000)

(12,000)
(25,000)

(5,000)
3,400
(4,000)

(5,000)
N/A
(4,000)

N/A
N/A
N/A

Taxable income

137,400

Tax preferences:

60% long-term
capital gains
Dividend exclusion
Bargain element in
incentive stock
option exercised
Adjusted itemized
deductions

225,000
200

225,000
—

—

25,000

0

N/A

Alternative minimum
taxable income
Exemption

359,000
(20,000)

428,200
(40,000)

Alternative minimum
tax base

339,000

388,200

Regular tax
Alternative minimum tax
Investment tax credit
Foreign tax credit

52,702
—
(5,000)
(2,000)

—
63,800a
N/A
(2,000)

Net tax due

45,702

61,800

—
77,640b
N/A
(2,000)

$ 75,640

a ($40,000 x 10%) + ($299,000 x 20%) = $63,800.
b ($388,200 x 20%) = $77,640.

Tax planning opportunities
After becoming familiar with how the new alterna
tive minimum tax provisions work, practitioners can
begin to plan ways to minimize the impact of the tax
on their clients. One effective approach is to control
when long-term capital gains are recognized. If the
alternative minimum tax seems likely to apply in a
year in which the regular tax that would otherwise
apply is expected to be small, practitioners should
consider reducing long-term capital gains, in order
to avoid the alternative minimum tax liability. This
reduction can be accomplished in a number of
ways. Installment sales can be used to spread
long-term capital gain over several tax years. The
sale of capital assets at a loss can be used to offset
current capital gains. If stock is involved, a short
sale can be used to de:er recognition of the gain
until the next taxable year. If the taxpayer’s invest
30

ment strategy permits, he can refrain from selling
appreciated capital gains property completely. Re
ducing long-term capital gains is a particularly effec
tive way to decrease alternative minimum tax liabil
ity, since alternative minimum taxable income in
cludes 100% of long-term capital gains (40% di
rectly, as part of adjusted gross income, and 60% as
a preference item) while taxable income, for pur
poses of the regular tax computation, includes only
40% of the gain.
Reducing or eliminating tax preference items.
Another approach to minimizing alternative min
imum tax liability involves reducing or eliminating
the items of tax preference generated during the tax
year. Along with reducing the amount of long-term
capital gain recognized, the election to capitalize
excess intangible drilling costs, mining exploration
expenses, circulation expenses and research and
experimental expenses and amortize these costs
over a 10-year period can be used to reduce prefer
ence items.40 Taxpayers other than limited partners
can also avoid the excess intangible drilling cost
preference by an election to capitalize the costs and
amortize them over a five-year period under the
ACRS rules.41 This election is normally preferable
to the 10-year election because of the shorter
write-off period and the availability of the investment
tax credit.
The preference items that result from excess
accelerated depreciation of real property and
leased personal property can also be avoided. An
election under ACRS permits the use of the
straight-line method to recover costs over one of
several specified periods 42 This election will elim
inate the excess accelerated depreciation prefer
ence items. For real property, the election is avail
able on a property-by-property basis. The election
for personal property covers all property of the
same class placed in service during the year.
Taxpayers should also avoid tax shelter invest
ments in which the tax benefits derive from items of
tax preference. If the taxpayer’s investment results
in alternative minimum tax liability, he may be incur
ring substantial economic risk and receiving little or
no economic benefit in the form of income tax re
ductions. Further, tax credits that result from the tax
shelter investment may be of limited value if the
alternative minimum tax applies.

Accelerating income and shifting deductions.
When income fluctuates from year to year, a tax
payer may be subject to the alternative minimum tax

40 Sec. 58(i).
41 Sec. 58(i)(4).
42 Sec. 168(b)(3).

in one year and the regular tax in the next year. In
this situation, the taxpayer should consider accel
erating ordinary income into a year in which the
alternative minimum tax applies. The tax savings
involved will depend on the amount of income
accelerated and the difference between the tax
payer’s marginal tax rate and the 20% alternative
minimum tax rate, but the savings can be substan
tial. This income-shifting technique can yield only
limited benefits, however; at some point, an addi
tional dollar of ordinary income reportable in the
computational year will result in regular tax liability
equal to the alternative minimum tax. Once this
point is reached, it will be detrimental for the tax
payer to continue the income-shifting strategy. It is
important to approximate this break-even point as
soon as possible, to insure an optimum result.
Taxpayers who want to accelerate ordinary in
come should also consider exercising an option
under an incentive stock option plan, if the stock has
appreciated in value, and then selling the stock in
the same year. As indicated above, this early dis
position will lead to ordinary income treatment for
the bargain element.43 This approach will also elim
inate a tax preference item, of an equal amount,
however.44 Consequently, the net tax rate on the
bargain element, which will enter into AGI, will be
only 20%. If the taxpayer is normally in the 50%
marginal tax bracket, this rate is no higher than the
net long-term capital gain rate that would apply if the
stock was held long enough to qualify for long-term
capital gain treatment. In addition, the elimination of
the preference item may result in future tax savings
by avoiding the alternative minimum tax. Whether
this strategy is appropriate will depend on the tax
payer’s investment goals.
Another way to minimize the applicable alterna
tive minimum tax is to defer deductions. Both the
deductions used to compute adjusted gross income
and the alternative tax itemized deductions provide
only a 20% tax benefit, instead of the greater benefit
normally available for regular tax purposes. More
over, itemized deductions that are not alternative
tax itemized deductions (i.e., taxes and miscellane
ous itemized deductions) provide no tax benefit at
all if the alternative minimum tax applies. This is
also true for medical expenses between 5% and
10% of adjusted gross income, as indicated above.
Discretionary expenditures, such as charitable
contributions and elective medical treatments, may
be relatively easy to postpone; current payment of
interest and taxes is more likely to be mandatory.
Nevertheless, by deferring the purchase of major
consumer goods, the sales tax deduction can be

43 If the selling price exceeds the exercise price, some additional
cash will be received and some additional tax paid.
44 H. Rep., note 2, at 475.

postponed. Similarly, taxpayers can skip state in
come tax estimated payments or reduce the
amount of withholding. Even though a state esti
mated tax underpayment penalty may be imposed,
this approach may still be advisable as a tax-sav
ings strategy. Again, however, there is a limit to the
potential benefits from shifting these deductions: as
deductions are reduced, a point will be reached at
which the regular tax will apply, rather than the
alternative minimum tax. The curtailment of deduc
tions will then be counterproductive.
When a tax adviser determines that the alterna
tive minimum tax will apply in a future tax year, he
should normally recommend that his client accel
erate deductions (within appropriate limits) to
maximize their tax benefit. For example, charitable
contributions (subject to percentage limitations),
state income taxes and certain other expenditures
which generate miscellaneous itemized deductions
can be prepaid with relatively few tax problems, if
normal substantiation procedures are followed.
Necessary elective medical procedures can be per
formed in the current tax year, rather than at a future
date, and a current deduction will be available if
payment is made before year-end.
There are a number of important restrictions on
the taxpayer’s ability to accelerate deductions,
however. The prepayment of medical expenses
alone will not generate a current tax deduction; the
medical service must be performed before year
end 45 In addition, prepaid interest will not give rise
to a current deduction. Instead, these payments
must be amortized over the applicable prepayment
period 46 Finally, the taxpayer’s liquidity may restrict
his ability to make advanced payments. This prob
lem may be overcome, however, by using credit
cards. Deductions may be permitted in the year that
a purchase is charged by the taxpayer even though
actual payment of the liability incurred is not made
until the next tax year.47

Conclusion

The expanded alternative minimum tax presents
new challenges for tax practitioners. They must
familiarize themselves with the new provisions, and
begin working with their clients to minimize the im
pact of the tax. Many of the planning strategies must
be implemented as soon as possible to produce the
most benefits. In addition, the estimates necessary
for this planning must be closely monitored and
adjusted to reflect any significant changes that will
affect the planning strategy devised. tta

45 Robert S. Bassett, 26 TC 619 (1956); Robert M. Rose, 52 TC
521 (1969).
46 Sec. 461(g).
47 Rev. Rul. 78-39, 1978-1 CB 73.
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Professional corporations
and the affiliated service group

Introduction

From the inception of the professional corpora
tion, many professional practitioners have ap
preciated and increasingly enjoyed the tax and ad
ministrative advantages offered by this business
entity. Legislation in every state now permits the
rendering of professional services through pro
fessional corporations.1 Professional corporations
offer two main benefits that a partnership cannot
provide: (1) state law advantages, such as limited
liability for business debts (but not malpractice1
2),
coupled with convenience in managing the busi

1 See generally, “Tax Pitfalls For Incorporated Professionals,”
4 Del. J. Corp. Law 500 (1979).
2 See generally, “Accident And Malpractice Liability Of Profes
sional Corporation Shareholders,” 10U. Mich. J. Law Reform
364 (Winter 1977).
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ness entity and transferring ownership, and (2) tax
advantages. At the corporate level, the corporation
can deduct contributions to a qualified retirement
plan and payments of certain employee death ben
efits, purchases of certain employee life and
health insurance and employee medical expense
reimbursement. At the shareholder level, the value
of these contributions or benefits is not included in
the recipient’s taxable income.3

3 Secs. 402(a), 101(b), 79(d) and 105, respectively. Although
unincorporated entities may also deduct contributions to a
qualified retirement plan, corporations are not subject to the
limitations on these contributions contained in Secs.
401(a)(17) and 404(e). This accounts for the advantages
available through adoption of the corporate form. Partners
owning more than a 10% interest in a trade or business and an
individual owning the entire interest in an unincorporated
trade or business are considered owner-employees within the
meaning of Sec. 401(c)(3). Although unincorporated entities
THE TAX ADVISER, MAY 1983

The IRS did not readily accept the use of the
corporate form by professionals, and has some
times argued that the individual, rather than the
corporation, is the true earner of income. This ar
gument is often raised when corporate formalities
have been ignored or have not been consistently
followed.4 The Service has established guidelines
to avoid this result.5 The Service has also applied
Sec. 482 to professional corporations where corpo
rate formalities have been observed, but two or
more trades or businesses exist to divert earnings

may also take deductions for the enumerated forms of
employee benefits that are provided, in addition to qualified
retirement plan contributions, the cost of these benefits for
owner-employees is included in taxable income. These limi
tations can be avoided through incorporation (see note 31,
infra).
Effective for plan years beginning after Dec. 31,1982, or for
plan years ending after July 1,1982, for plans not in existence
on this date, the Sec. 415 limitations on deductible contribu
tions that may be made to a qualified plan by an unincorpo
rated entity are the same as those applicable to corporations.
For plan years beginning after Dec. 31,1983, the old limita
tions, under Sec. 404(e), on deductible contributions to a
qualified plan on behalf of self-employed individuals are re
pealed. When this latter provision becomes effective, the tax
incentives for using professional corporations will be greatly
reduced. See Sections 235(a) and 238(a) of TEFRA.
(Hereinafter, TEFRA’s provisions are referred to as “Section,”
and Internal Revenue sections are referred to as “Sec.”.)
4 See, e.g., Jerome J. Roubik, 53 TC 365 (1969). The corpora
tion did not own any equipment, incur any debts, have con
tracts with any of its employee-shareholders, or have an of
fice. The only corporate expense was a minimal monthly
payment to one of the employee-shareholder’s secretaries to
keep the corporate books.
5 A brief summary of the rules to follow when incorporating the
professional is provided by IRS Letter Ruling 8031028 (TAM,
4/25/80):
(a) A partnership agreement showing the professional
corporation and not the individual professional as the partner
should be adopted.
(b) The individual professional should assign his interest in
the partnership over to his professional corporation.
(c) Insurance policies for general liability, malpractice, etc.,
should be changed to provide coverage for the professional
corporation.
(d) The professional corporation, if possible, should hire
other lay or professional employees aside from the
shareholder-owners.
(e) The professional corporation should incur business
debts other than retirement plan and salary obligations.
See also IRS Letter Rulings 8152003 (TAM, 4/22/81)
(interests in individual service contracts should be as
signed to the professional corporation); 8151082 (9/25/81)
(individual professionals should enter into employment con
tracts with the professional corporation to avoid personal hold
ing company status); and 8008059 (11/28/79)(substantial
loans from the professional corporation’s qualified trust to the
individual professional should be avoided; however, reason
able bona fide loans are permissible). See Sec. 72(p), added
by Section 236(a), for restrictions imposed on participant
loans from qualified plans.

from one business to the other.6 When Sec. 482 is
applied, the person who performed the services
may realize additional income when income, deduc
tions or credits are reallocated to prevent the eva
sion of taxes.7 Thus, although professional corpora
tions have enjoyed great popularity, the IRS con
tinues to scrutinize their use, while recognizing their
validity for tax purposes.8
In the sixties and early seventies, the use of pro
fessional corporations expanded rapidly despite
strong IRS opposition. Another trend has now
emerged, with professional corporations again at
the center of a tax-avoidance controversy. Until re
cently, a professional could obtain the maximum
advantage from the retirement plan deductions
available at the corporate level by incorporating,
establishing a qualified plan, and administering the
corporation as the sole shareholder and employee.
Thereafter, the corporation would become a partner
in a service partnership and render professional
services for partnership clientele. This approach
allowed the professional to obtain the advantages
of both the corporate and partnership form, with the

6 The courts have consistently taken the position that where two
or more trades or businesses are under common control, the
controlling individual may not funnel profits from a productive
business to a business with low income or a net operating
loss, in order to reduce taxable income of the productive
organization. See, e.g., Est. of Ernest M. Ach, 42 TC 114
(1964), aff’d, 358 F2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966)(17 AFTR2d 700,
66-1 USTC ¶9340) (profits from a retail dress business sold to
a corporation previously in the dairy and creamery business
reallocated to the dress retailing organization); Victor Borge,
TC Memo 1967-173, aff’d as mod’d and rem’d, 405 F2d 673
(2d Cir. 1969)(23 AFTR2d 69-320,69-1 USTC ¶19131) (profits
derived from entertainment contracts owned by a corporation
in the poultry farm business reallocated to the individual
entertainer-shareholder); Richard Rubin, 51 TC 251 (1968),
rev’d and rem’d, 429 F2d 650 (2d Cir. 1971)(26 AFTR2d
70-5051,70-2 USTC ¶9494), and 56 TC 1155 (1971), aff’dper
curiam, 460 F2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972)(29 AFTR2d 72-1194,
72-1 USTC ¶9440) (income of professional corporation real
located to the individual shareholder since services rendered
were not on behalf of the corporation, but instead, were per
formed by an individual acting in a separate business capac
ity); Daniel F. Keller, 77 TC 1104 (1981)(profits of a corpora
tion may be allocated to an individual shareholder-employee
without two separate trades or businesses in existence where
dealings between the taxpayer and the corporation do not
reflect arm’s-length dealings between two uncontrolled par
ties). See Sec. 269A, added by Section 250(a) of TEFRA,
effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1982.
7 Sec. 482. As the Second Circuit noted in Rubin, id., unlike
Sec. 61, where the assignment of income doctrine is applied,
Sec. 482 permits only a partial reallocation of income to the
professional person, as opposed to all earned income of the
corporation.
8 See Rev. Ruls. 70-455, 1970-2 CB 297; 70-101, 1970-1 CB
278; and 77-31, 1977-1 CB 409.
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added flexibility of an individually owned retirement
plan.9
Clearly, a qualified plan that benefits only one
person in a partnership of several corporations vio
lates the spirit of the pension provisions that Con
gress enacted to insure that plans did not discrimi
nate in favor of officers, shareholders or highly
compensated employees.1011Historically, partner
ships consisting of corporate partners have been
used by many businesses, particularly closely held
corporations. Separate management companies
were established to obtain maximum retirement
plan benefits for highly compensated individuals,
while other “rank and file employees” were left in an
operating entity with no retirement benefits. One
provision of the Employee Retirement Income Se
curity Act (ERISA) attempted to correct this abuse
by requiring the aggregation of employees of all
controlled groups. In addition, the controlling entity
is treated as a single employer in order to determine
whether a retirement plan satisfies the coverage
and other qualification requirements of the Code.11
This provision applies to controlled groups of cor
porations that meet the tests for control under Sec.
1563(a), and to partnerships or proprietorships in
which a partner owns more than a 50% interest.12
The IRS has also maintained that Sec. 414(c) is
not the exclusive means for determining whether a
retirement plan satisfies the coverage and nondis
crimination requirements of Secs. 410(b)(1) and
401 (a)(4) in the context of a partnership of corpora
tions. In Rev. Rul. 68-370,13 the Service introduced
a “pro rata approach,”14 requiring the employees of

9 See, e.g., Thomas Kiddie, M.D., Inc., 69 TC 1055 (1978);
Lloyd M. Garland, M.D., F.A.C.S., P.A., 73 TC 5 (1979).
10 Secs. 401 (a)(4) and 410(b)(1). To qualify under Sec. 401 (a), a
retirement plan must meet one of two coverage tests: (1) The
plan must benefit a nondiscriminatory classification of
employees as required by Secs. 401 (a)(4) and 410(b)(1 )(B) or
(2) a prescribed number of employees must participate in the
plan as required by Sec. 410(b)(1)(A).
11 Sec. 414(b) and (c). See also H. Rep. No. 93-807,93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974). Note that two or more retirement plans within
a controlled group may be aggregated to comply with the
coverage test of Sec. 410(b)(1); however, where two plans are
combined for this purpose, the single plan must also comply
with the nondiscrimination requirements of Sec. 401(a)(4).
See Regs. Secs. 1.410(b)-1(d)(3) and 1.414(c)-1.
12 Regs. Sec. 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(i)(C) and -2(c)(2)(iii) define
control, for purposes of partnerships, as the ownership of
an interest in profits or capital of more than 50%. Sec. 414(c)
does not define this term.
13 Rev. Rul. 68-370, 1968-2 CB 174.
14 The pro rata approach is illustrated in this example: Partner A,
a professional corporation, has a 10% interest in the partner
ship and the contribution formula under its plan is 15% of
compensation. Employee X earns $10,000 a year. Partner A
would be required to make a contribution to a qualified trust
equal to 15% of $1,000 (10% x $10,000) or $150.
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a joint venture, which is a partnership for tax pur
poses, to be treated as employees of the corporate
joint venturer, M, and requiring these employees
and M's distributive share of the compensation paid
to them to be taken into account in determining
whether M’s profit-sharing plan was a qualified plan
under Sec. 401(a). The ruling required M to make
contributions on behalf of the employees of the joint
venture, but only to the extent of M's distributive
share of their compensation. Thus, a corporate
partner’s retirement plan that covered the corporate
employees and the partnership employees, but only
to the extent of the corporation’s pro rata share of
compensation paid to them, would qualify under
Sec. 401(a).
In Kiddie15 and Garland,16 two significant cases,
the effectiveness of the controlled group provisions
of ERISA was severely undermined. Both cases
involved substantially similar facts: Two doctors
separately incorporated and each corporation set
up a retirement plan for the benefit of its individual
shareholder-employee. The corporations then
formed a partnership, owned 50% by each corpora
tion, which supplied secretarial and administrative
services. Since neither doctor owned more than
50% of the partnership interests, the corporations
and the partnership were not a controlled group
subject to the coverage and nondiscrimination re
quirements of the Code. Thus, each doctor was free
to administer his own retirement plan even though
no plan was maintained for the benefit of the
employees of the partnership. Moreover, in Gar
land, the Tax Court stated that the controlled group
provisions of ERISA were the exclusive method for
determining whether a plan qualified under Sec.
401(a). As a result, the Service’s position that a
corporation’s plan may instead meet the require
ments of Rev. Rul. 68-370 was rejected.
These decisions illustrated the apparent ease
with which the nondiscrimination and coverage pro
visions of Secs. 401(a)(4) and 410(b)(1) could be
evaded by the use of multiple corporations. In re
sponse, Congress re-examined the controlled
group provisions of ERISA, and in December, 1980,
enacted legislation aimed at eliminating abuses.17
Sec. 414(m) provides that, for certain purposes, all
employees of the members of an affiliated service
group will be treated as employed by a single
employer.18 Except in one instance, an affiliated
service group is defined as a group consisting of a

15 Kiddie, note 9.
16 Garland, note 9.
17 Sec. 414(m), added by the Miscellaneous Revenue Act of
1980, P.L. 96-613, section 5(a) (also added by the Miscel
laneous Revenue Act, P.L. No. 96-605, section 201(a)).
18 Sec. 414(m)(1).

primary or first organization and any other service
organization that is a partner or shareholder in the
primary organization and regularly performs ser
vices for that organization.19 A service organization
is defined as any member organization whose prin
cipal business is the performance of services; this
definition would include organizations of doctors,
lawyers, accountants, engineers, architects, con
sultants and other professionals.20
For purposes of qualified employee retirement
plans, Sec. 414(m) applies to employee participa
tion and eligibility, discrimination and vesting re
quirements, employee benefit and contribution
rules and the top heavy plan provisions.21 Sec.
414(m) also goes a step further than its counter
parts, Sec. 414(b) and (c), and applies to any medi
cal expense reimbursement plans under Sec.
105(h) and any cafeteria plans under Sec. 12522
that may be adopted by an affiliated service
group,23 and to leased employees who have ren
dered substantially full-time service for more than
one year.24 The legislation is effective for plan years
ending after Nov. 30,1980; for plans in existence on
that date, it applies to plan years beginning after
Nov. 30, 1980. This article will examine how the
1980 legislation affects partnerships (affiliated ser
vice groups) whose partners (service organiza
tions) are professional corporations that choose to
adopt separate retirement plans.
The Service’s interpretation of Sec. 414(m)
It is not clear how the IRS will apply the provisions
of Sec. 414(m). The statutory language is vague
and no regulations, temporary or permanent, have
been promulgated. The legislative history also of
fers little indication of how Congress intended these
provisions to be applied.25 The main unresolved
issue is whether the affiliated service group or the
service organization is to be treated as the “single
employer” referred to in the statute. Many tax prac
titioners and commentators believed that the
enactment of Sec. 414(m) signalled a return to the

Sec. 414(m)(2).
Sec. 414(m)(3).
Sec. 414(m)(4)(A) and (B).
Sec. 125(d). A cafeteria plan is any employer plan, exclusive
of deferred compensation plans, that provides employee
benefits, such as health insurance, life insurance, medical
expense reimbursement, etc., and permits participants to
choose among two or more of the various benefits offered.
23 Sec. 414(m)(4)(C) and (D).
24 Sec. 414(n) added by Section 248(a). Note that contributions
and benefits provided by the leasing organization are treated
as having been provided by the affiliated service group.
25 See generally, H. Rep. No. 96-1278, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980), and H. Rep. No. 96-1050, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980).
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pro rata approach of Rev. Rul. 68-370 26 which
would allow the service organization, rather than
the affiliated service group, to be treated as the sole
employer, and would permit employer contributions
or benefits for separate plans within the group to
vary. Other practitioners speculated that the Ser
vice might advocate a “best plan approach” in
which all eligible employees of the affiliated service
group must receive the same benefits available
from the best available plan in the service organiza
tion. This second approach is far more restrictive,
because it effectively treats the affiliated service
group as the single employer, which is obligated to
provide equal benefits for all employees. This ap
proach would eliminate any flexibility that may be
obtained from the administration of separate plans.
Rev. Rul. 81-10527 illustrates the provisions of
Sec. 414(m). The ruling repudiates the pro rata
approach, making Rev. Rul. 68-370 obsolete. The
ruling specifically states that in testing for discrimi
nation, all compensation paid by the affiliated ser
vice group to plan participants will be considered,
without regard to the percentage of ownership of
any corporate partner in the partnership. Although
several plans of the service organizations may be
aggregated in determining whether the coverage
tests of Sec. 410(b) are satisfied, the plan, consid
ered as a unit, must meet the nondiscrimination
requirements of Sec. 401(a)(4).
The language in the ruling that compensation
paid by the affiliated service group to plan partici
pants is considered without regard to the percent
age of ownership of a corporate partner seems to
reject the pro rata approach of Rev. Rul. 68-370.
The treatment of the partnership and its corpo
rate partners as the single employer is the key to
the reasoning of Rev. Rul. 81-105. Apparently, sev
eral service organizations may have individual
employees within the sphere of an affiliated service
group. If there is only one employer for purposes of
applying Sec. 414(m), however, no pro rata con
tributions to a retirement plan can be made on be
half of partnership employees, because, for tax
purposes, there is no other employer with whom to
divide the contributions. In Rev. Rul. 68-370, the
service organization, rather than the affiliated ser
vice group, was treated as the single employer,
allowing for the pro rata inclusion of employee ben

26 For a discussion of Sec. 414(m) and the pro rata approach, in
the context of partnerships of professional corporations, see
Lamon and Thompson, “Qualified Retirement Plans For Af
filiated Service Corporations: What To Do Under New Legisla
tion,” 59 Taxes 67 (Feb. 1981), and Cook, “Incorporating The
Professional Practice Through A Partnership Of Professional
Corporations,” 17 Ga. S. Bar J. 102 (Feb. 1981).
27 Rev. Rul. 81-105, 1981-1 CB 256.
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efits within the employer’s plan. Since the service
organization plans were not aggregated to deter
mine whether the plans complied with the coverage
and nondiscrimination requirements, the organiza
tions were considered separate entities within the
partnership, and pro rata contributions by the corpo
rate partners to their respective retirement plans
were permitted.28 Although Sec. 414(m) does not
clearly indicate whether the affiliated service group
or the service organization is to be treated as the
single employer, Rev. Rul. 81-105 leaves little
doubt of the Service’s position: the affiliated service
group is the sole employer for purposes of the man
datory coverage and nondiscrimination require
ments.
Rev. Rul. 81 -105 provides another indication that
the pro rata approach cannot be used. The ruling
states that where several retirement plans within
the affiliated service group are aggregated to com
ply with the coverage tests of Sec. 410(b)(1), the
nondiscrimination requirements of Sec. 401(a)(4)
also apply. Sec. 401 (a)(4) prohibits employer con
tributions or benefits to a qualified retirement plan
that discriminates in favor of officers, shareholders
or highly compensated employees. In Rev. Rul.
81-202,29 issued shortly after Rev. Rul. 81-105, the
Service set forth guidelines for determining whether
several plans, considered as a single plan, provide
contributions and benefits that discriminate in favor
of a prohibited group, as defined in Sec. 401 (a)(4).
The ruling supersedes Rev. Rul. 70-58030; in this
earlier ruling, the Service stated that aggregated
plans that do not provide equal employer contribu
tions for the prohibited group and rank and file
employees will not automatically fail the nondis
crimination test of Sec. 401(a)(4), as long as the
plan contributions are comparable. Rev. Rul.
81-202 rejects this position, and states that aggre
gated plans are not discriminatory where the per
centage of benefits provided, based on the annual
nondeferred compensation that the prohibited
group members receive, does not exceed the per
centage provided for the rank and file employees.

28 See IRS Letter Ruling 7834059 (5/26/78), which states: “It is
our conclusion that the conclusion stated in Rev. Rul. 68-370
has not been affected by the enactment of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and that it may still be
relied upon for authority that the employees of a partnership or
a joint venture are considered employees of each member or
partner for purposes of testing for coverage and nondiscrimi
nation in contributions or benefits. We believe that sections
414(b) and (c) do not establish exclusive rules for aggregation
of employees for these purposes.” See also IRS Letter Rul
ings 7902086 (10/16/78) and 7905020 (10/31/78); and Lamon
and Thompson, note 26, supra.
29 Rev. Rul. 81-202, 1981-2 CB 93.
30 Rev. Rul. 70-580, 1970-2 CB 90.
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Employer provided benefits are computed by de
termining the value of either accumulated or post
retirement benefits that employees will receive. In
the context of the defined benefit plan, the benefits
are based not only on the amount of dollar contribu
tions by the employer, but also on the value of other
benefits that the employer may make available to
the employees under the plan. As a result, all
employee benefits that rank and file employees will
receive under the single, aggregated plan must be
proportionately equal to those that prohibited group
members will receive. The amount of dollar con
tributions to the respective plans may vary; when
the plans are combined, however, all the benefits
must produce an equal percentage of benefits for
both prohibited group and rank and file employees.
Where the employer is an owner-employee within
the meaning of Sec. 401 (c)(3), certain other restric
tions, which are not relevant here, must be ob
served in computing benefits.31
Tax planning strategies

Before structuring a partnership of professional
corporations, practitioners should apply the princi
ples from these rulings to the particular factual situa
tion. If the service organization is treated as the
single employer for planning purposes (as it would
be under the pro rata approach), the nondiscrimina
tion requirements of Sec. 401(a)(4) might be vio
lated when employer contributions to the several
plans within the group are not uniform. If these
requirements were not satisfied, when the plans
were later aggregated, there would be prohibited
discrimination, and the plans would not comply with
Rev. Rul. 81-202 and Rev. Rul. 81-105.

Example. Assume that partnership X, which
renders medical services, has five common-law
employees and three partners, A, B and C, who
decide to form three professional corporations each
employing one shareholder-owner. Corporations A,
B and C each has defined contribution plans cov
ering its sole shareholder, and three of the
partnership common-law employees. (Similar age
and service requirements exclude two of these
employees from plan participation.) Corporation A’s
shareholder is single, with minimal living expenses,
and wants to shelter a greater portion of his income;

31 Sec. 401(c)(3) defines an owner-employee as any employee
who owns the entire interest in an unincorporated trade or
business or a partner who owns more than a 10% interest in
the capital or profits of a partnership. Thus, a professional
corporation cannot be considered an owner-employee under
Sec. 401 (c)(3), since this provision does not apply to incorpo
rated associations.

accordingly,A’s plan calls for an annual contribution
equal to 20% of employee compensation. The
shareholders of Corporations B and C have families
and need more cash immediately, so the plans of B
and C call for an annual contribution equal to 10% of
employee compensation. All the corporate partners
share profits equally and each pays one-third of the
salary of the common-law partnership employees.
The corporations make contributions to their re
spective retirement plans on behalf of covered
employees, based on the pro rata amount of com
pensation paid to the employees of X.
Under Sec. 414(m), Corporations A, B and C are
considered service organizations; together with
partnership X, the service organizations comprise
the affiliated service group. This entity is treated as
the single employer of both the partnership
employees and the corporate shareholders for pur
poses of determining whether any of the three plans
satisfy the coverage tests of Sec. 410(b)(1) and the
nondiscrimination requirements of Sec. 401(a)(4).
Standing alone, none of the three plans qualifies
under Sec. 410(b)(1)(A), because of the 70%
coverage requirement: none of the plans covers
70% of the affiliated service group employees. Two
of the three plans can be aggregated to comply with
the coverage requirements. Regardless of which
plan is aggregated with the Corporation A plan,
however, the nondiscrimination requirements of
Sec. 401 (a)(4) may be difficult to meet using the
single employer concept of Sec. 414(m). For pur
poses of the discussion below, it will be assumed
that the A and B plans are combined and treated as
plan A-B.
Sec. 401(a)(4) provides that the employer con
tributions made to plan A-B cannot discriminate in
favor of highly compensated individuals. Under
Rev. Rul. 81-202, the employer benefits and con
tributions to the plan for the X employees must be
proportionately equal to those that the corporate
shareholders receive. This requirement appears to
be satisfied, under the pro rata approach, because
the three X employees would receive contributions
based on the portion of their salaries paid by Corpo
rations A and B (one-third each), equal to the ben
efits that the shareholder-owners of these corpora
tions would receive. Upon closer examination,
however, it appears that plan A-B would discrimi
nate in favor of the highly compensated share
holder-owner of Corporation A since Rev. Rul.
81-105 requires that all income paid to the partner
ship employees by Corporations A and B be con
sidered without regard to A’s percentage of owner
ship in partnership X. Therefore, the shareholder of
Corporation A receives an employer contribution
equal to 20% of his annual compensation while the
X employees covered by A-B plan receive an
employer contribution equal to 15% of this amount.

(The rate of contribution for the X employees is
computed by averaging the contributions provided
by Corporations A and B, whose plans are treated
as a single unit when testing for discrimination.) As
a result, the highly compensated shareholder
owner of Corporation A would receive 5% more in
employer contributions than the common-law
employees of the X partnership. Since these are
defined contribution plans, no other employee ben
efits can be provided by plan A-B to equalize this
discrepancy in dollar contributions, and it is as
sumed that imputed social security benefits would
not eliminate the discrepancy.32 Accordingly, the
A-B plans would not satisfy the requirements of
Rev. Rul. 81 -202, and would discriminate in favor of
a highly compensated individual, contrary to Sec.
401(a)(4).
As the example illustrates, when an affiliated ser
vice group is composed of several service organiza
tions, each with its own retirement plan, the level of
employer contributions will often differ from plan to
plan, because more highly compensated individu
als will want to shelter a higher percentage of their
income. In this situation, the single employer ap
proach of Sec. 414(m) and the coverage tests of
Sec. 410(b)(1) will make it difficult to comply with the
discrimination rules of Sec. 401 (a)(4). Practitioners
should examine the terms and conditions of any
retirement plans being considered to determine
whether the discrimination problem will arise if a
partnership of professional corporations is formed.
Although the Service’s apparent rejection of the
pro rata approach will diminish the usefulness of the
professional corporation as a tax planning device, it
is consistent with the single employer concept of
Sec. 414(b), (c) and (m) and also with recent judicial
interpretations of what constitutes employer dis
crimination under ERISA.33 Rev. Rul. 81-105
suggests that the Service has taken a tougher
stance in applying the single employer concept of
Sec. 414(m) than many practitioners expected, but
has not gone to the other extreme and adopted the
best plan approach. The affiliated service group

32 The calculation of imputed social security benefits for the
purpose of equalizing the discrepancy in benefits between
prohibited group members and rank and file employees is
beyond the scope of this article. It is assumed in this example
that imputing these benefits would not equalize the discre
pancy because the shareholder-owner of Corporation A re
ceives a substantially higher salary in excess of the taxable
wage base used for integrating social security benefits. See
Rev. Ruls. 71-446, 1971-2 CB 187; 78-92, 1978-1 CB 118;
and 81-202, Section 6.
33 See, e.g., S. Achiro, 77 TC 881 (1981). Pension plans of two
separate corporations will be aggregated to test for coverage
and discrimination in favor of prohibited group members
where shareholders of one corporation implicitly agree to vote
their stock as specified by shareholders of the other corpora-
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must be treated as the single employer to determine
whether benefits provided by different plans within
the group are nondiscriminatory, but it is still possi
ble to vary the level of employer contributions to
some degree. Since the test for determining dis
crimination under Sec. 401(a)(4) is based on a
combination of benefits available to plan partici
pants, employer contributions in terms of a per
centage of employee compensation may vary
among different qualified plans within the affiliated
service group. This variation may not be so substan
tial as to make it impossible to equalize the per
centage of benefits provided by the several plans
based on the annual nondeferred compensation
received by all covered employees. Likewise, dis
ability benefits, vesting schedules and other
employer benefits provided by a defined benefit
plan may vary from other qualified plans within the
group, but if the percentage of total benefits availa
ble to all employees of the aggregated single plan is
equal, the nondiscrimination test of Sec. 401(a)(4)
will be satisfied.
Thus, the IRS has apparently adopted a position
that compromises between the pro rata approach of
Rev. Rul. 68-370 and the best plan approach under
Sec. 401 (a)(4). The Service clearly favors the best
plan approach, however, as indicated by the appli
cation of the nondiscrimination guidelines, in Rev.
Rul. 81-202, to aggregated retirement plans. The
inability to vary employer contributions for the dif
ferent plans of an affiliated service group, as permit
ted under the pro rata approach, will severely limit
the tax advantages offered by a partnership of pro
fessional corporations. A highly compensated
shareholder-owner of a professional corporation
will no longer be able to shelter a proportionately
larger percentage of his income than the other
shareholder-owners of the group by separately in
corporating. These limitations will destroy many of
the tax incentives for entering into such an ar
rangement. It should be noted, however, that Sec.

Even if the IRS permitted the use of the pro rata
approach in the future, several provisions of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 have
decreased the utility of the professional corporation
as a tax planning device. As indicated above, the
same limitations on deductible contributions to qual
ified plans now apply to both partnerships and cor
porations, and the restriction on deductible con
tributions for owner-employees will be ineffective
for plan years beginning after Dec. 31, 1983.35
These changes eliminate one of the greatest advan
tages of the professional corporation versus the
partnership—larger deductions for employer con
tributions to qualified retirement plans. Moreover,
the new top heavy plan rules contained in Sec. 416
may prove to be a difficult obstacle for many profes
sionals to overcome when implementing qualified
plans, regardless of whether the business entity
chosen is a partnership or a corporation.36
Taxpayers who choose the professional corpora
tion can avoid the restrictions applicable to owner
employees for employer-provided benefits such as
death benefits, life and health insurance and
medical expense reimbursement.37 If a partnership
of professional corporations is later formed, the
levels of benefits provided by the various qualified
plans within the affiliated service group can vary to
some degree, providing limited individual flexibility
in plan administration. The professional corporation
must be careful, however, that none of its
employees are also members of a qualified partner
ship plan covering owner-employees. In that situa

tion. See also Fujinon Optical, Inc., 76 TC 499 (1981). The
taxpayer was a member of a controlled group of three corpora
tions whose business and operations were unrelated and
totally independent, but all members of the controlled group
were still treated as a single employer even though each
corporation within the group did not interact with the others.
Thus, the taxpayer’s plan did not meet the coverage require
ments and discriminated in favor of highly compensated
employees; E.F. Higgins & Co., Inc., 74 TC 1029 (1980).
When three separate pension plans of the same corporation
were aggregated so that the combined plan complied with the
necessary coverage requirements, the plan was still found
discriminatory, because employer contributions to prohibited
group members exceeded those to rank and file employees,
even though the discrimination did not result from an inten
tional act on the part of the employer.

34 Sec. 414(m)(1).
35 See note 3, supra.
36 Section 240(a) added Sec. 416, which requires qualified plans
with 60% or more of total benefits accumulated for key
employees to apply the strict vesting requirements, minimum
benefit requirements and compensation requirements enu
merated toall employees to avoid losing qualified status. Key
employees include 5% owners or officers of the employer;
thus, any partner or shareholder with a 5% ownership interest
in his professional business or any officer of a professional
corporation falls within this definition. Since professional or
ganizations tend to be small businesses that establish qual
ified plans primarily for the benefit of their professional owners,
it will be easy for these plans to run afoul of the top heavy
provisions. These provisions also apply to aggregated plans of
the affiliated service group (see Sec. 414(m)(4)(B)).
37 See notes 3 and 31, supra.
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414(m) specifically grants the IRS the power to alter
the single employer approach through regula
tions.34 Therefore, the regulations under Sec.
414(m) may permit the use of the pro rata method,
although this possibility seems unlikely in light of
Rev. Rul. 81-105.

Changes under TEFRA

tion, the regulations do not permit aggregation of
the two plans in order to meet the necessary cover
age requirements.38
Thus, a partnership of professional corporations
may still have some viability as a tax planning de
vice, but the tax incentives have diminished sub
stantially. A partnership of professional corpora
tions can no longer be used to allow several
partners to separately incorporate and tailor qual
ified retirement plans to their individual needs, by
sheltering the desired percentage of taxable in
come. This business entity can be used by owner
employees of partnerships to avoid certain limita
tions on the deductibility of employer payments for
some employee benefits (other than contributions
to qualified employee plans for plan years begin
ning after Dec. 31,1983), and to obtain a qualified
plan that provides individually tailored benefits to a
limited degree. Because no regulations have been
promulgated under Sec. 414(m), partners should
avoid separately incorporating solely to adopt re
tirement plans with varying employer contributions.
Moreover, the professional corporation should not

38 Regs. Sec. 1.410(b)-1(d)(3)(ii).

be treated as the single employer when planning to
meet the coverage and nondiscrimination require
ments. To avoid any doubt as to the qualified status
of separate corporate retirement plans within the
affiliated service group, taxpayers can request a
private letter ruling under Sec. 414(m).39

Conclusion
Although recent legislation has substantially lim
ited the planning strategies available to partner
ships of professional corporations, the partnership
arrangement may still offer some tax advantages in
certain circumstances. To benefit from these ad
vantages, the corporate form should be adopted
with rigorous adherence to formalities, and a careful
analysis of all retirement plans within the affiliated
service group should be undertaken. These steps
will insure that the professional corporation within a
partnership is a viable entity for tax purposes, and
that its retirement plan meets the necessary cover
age and nondiscrimination requirements. tta

39 See Rev. Proc. 81-12, 1981-1 CB 652.
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Income tax consequences of
service partnership mergers

Each year, numerous mergers of two or more
service partnerships occur. The income tax con
sequences to the parties are one of several consid
erations that should be evaluated before a merger is
consummated.1 The parties contemplating a
merger should first consider broader policy issues
that have income tax implications, such as post
merger retirement plans of the partners, noncom
petition agreements and financial arrangements
with partners not wishing to merge. Once these
questions have been settled, the partners of each
organization can consider the income tax issues
related to these items, including: Which is the con
tinuing partnership; will gain or loss be recognized

1 For a discussion of one firm’s approach to merger negotia
tions with a larger firm, see Liberty, “To Merge or Not to
Merge?” 151 J. Accountancy 52 (Jan. 1981).
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from the merger; what problems will arise in con
nection with accounts receivable, depreciation, in
vestment tax credits, qualified retirement plans, the
optional basis adjustment election; and several
other items.
Continuing and terminating partnerships

The drafters of subchap. K of the Code appar
ently regarded partnership mergers as largely
trouble-free transactions. The portion of Sec. 708
that covers partnership mergers is characterized by
relatively simple statutory language:
In the case of the merger or consolidation of two or more
partnerships, the resulting partnership shall, for purposes of
this section, be considered the continuation of any merging

Authors’ note: This research project was partially funded by a
grant from the School of Management, University of Minnesota.
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or consolidating partnership whose members own an in
terest of more than 50 percent in the capital and profits of the
resulting partnership.2

Thus, the threshold question is, what is a partner
ship merger? Specifically, what form must a trans
action take to come within the rule of Sec. 708? In
the corporate area, the merger provisions of the
Code, specifying forms of transactions, must be
adhered to strictly. Is the same careful attention to
the transaction form necessary for a partnership
merger to come under Sec. 708? In the rulings
issued by the Service,3 one transaction form has
been used. In Rev. Rul. 68-289, the Service indi
cated that a partnership merger will be examined
assuming a specified transaction form, regardless
of the form actually used by the merger participants.
The specified form involves the following two
steps:
• Transfer of the terminating partnership’s as
sets to the continuing partnership in exchange for a
partnership interest.
• A pro rata liquidating distribution of the interest
in the continuing partnership to the partners of the
terminating partnership.
Thus, it is likely that a combination (“merger or
consolidation”) of two or more partnerships4 into a
lesser number of partnerships, in which the partners
of all partnerships have interests in the capital and
profits of the continuing partnerships, will be clas
sified as a merger under Sec. 708 regardless of the
form selected. For purposes of the discussion be
low, the transactions are assumed, unless other
wise stated, to follow the form prescribed by Rev.
Rul. 68-289.
The regulations under Sec. 708 address several
aspects of partnership mergers. These issues are
discussed in connection with either the resulting
(continuing) partnership or the terminating partner
ship. Other important aspects of partnership
mergers are not specifically covered by Sec. 708 or
its related regulations, including the recognition of
gain or loss and the basis of partnership assets. The
remainder of this article discusses these issues.
The continuing partnership. A literal reading of
the statute appears to permit more than one
partnership to be the continuing partnership. Sec.
708 simply requires “any merging . . . partnership
whose members own an interest of more than

2 Sec. 708(b)(2)(A).
3 Rev. Ruls. 68-289, 1968-1 CB 314; 77-458, 1977-2 CB 220;
and IRS Letter Ruling 7805028 (11/3/77) are illustrative.
4 The analysis in the remainder of this article is based on the
assumption that only one partnership terminates; this analysis
would still apply even if there was more than one terminating
partnership.

50%. . .
For example, assume RST partnership
and TUV partnership merged with R, S, T, U and V,
each receiving an equal interest in capital and pro
fits of the new RSTUV partnership. In this example,
both the RST partnership and the TUV partnership
would be continuing partnerships because the
members of each own an interest of more than 50%
(namely 60%) in RSTUV.
Regs. Sec. 1.708-1 (b)(2)(i) goes beyond the
statute, however, and states the following rule for
determining which partnership constitutes the con
tinuing partnership:
If the resulting partnership can, under the preceding sen
tence, be considered a continuation of more than one of the
merging or consolidating partnerships, it shall, unless the
Commissioner permits otherwise, be considered the con
tinuation of that partnership which is credited with the con
tribution of the greatest dollar value of assets to the resulting
partnership. (Emphasis added.)

No guidance is given in the regulations or in any
judicial decisions as to when the IRS would permit
an alternative method for determining which is the
continuing partnership. A request for a ruling ap
pears to be the only way to obtain substantial as
surances on this point.
The “greatest dollar value of assets” is not de
fined in the regulations or interpreted by case law.
The phrase raises two questions:
• What valuation method should be employed to
determine the “dollar value”—tax basis, book value
(GAAP) or fair market value?
• Should the “dollar value of assets” be defined
as gross assets, gross assets net of specific en
cumbrances on those assets, gross assets net of
liabilities to outsiders, or gross assets net of all
liabilities (amounts due to outsiders and partners)?
Because of the different potential valuation
methods and definitions of the “assets,” parties
contemplating a merger might want to select the
method and definition favorable to them, and then
seek an advance ruling to provide assurance as to
the income tax treatment.
In some circumstances, it is possible that no
partnership will be treated as the continuing
partnership. For example, assume that MN, RS and
TV partnerships merge, and each partnership con
tributes an equal “dollar value of assets” to the new
MNRSTV partnership. Each individual partner re
ceives an equal interest in capital and profits of the
new partnership. Here, each of the three partner
ships would terminate, because no one of them
would meet the “more than 50%” rule of Sec. 708.
The same outcome is likely if two partnerships, MN
and RS, merge, and each partnership contributes
an equal dollar value of assets and each of the old
partners receives an equal interest in capital and
profits.
The capital and profits ownership requirement of
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Sec. 708 is phrased in the conjunctive, i.e., an in
terest in both capital and profits of more than 50% is
required. Assume that the WX and YZ partnerships
merge and the partners have the proportionate in
terests in capital and profits shown below.
Pre-merger

WX partnership:

YZ partnership:

W
X

Y
Z

Post-merger

Capital
interest

Profits
interest

Capital
interest

Profits
interest

50%
..50
...
100

50
50

30
30

20
20

50
50

20
20

30
30

100——

100—

100%
——

50
50
■
100
—. .

100

Neither WX nor YZ would qualify as the resulting
partnership. WX receives 60% of the capital, but
only 40% of the profits; YZ receives 60% of the
profits, but only 40% of the capital.
If none of the partnerships in a merger continue,
the “new” partnership must adopt a taxable year.
Sec. 706(b) states that a partnership may not adopt
a taxable year other than that of its principal
partners, without a bona fide business purpose.5 In
essence, the statute requires new partnerships to
operate on a calendar-year basis unless the princi
pal partners all have another taxable year. Under
Rev. Proc. 72-51,6 however, a partnership may
adopt an accounting period different from that of its
principal partners only if the adoption would result in
a deferral of income of three months or less. Thus,
partnerships with individuals as partners can adopt
a September 30, October 31 or November 30
year-end, in addition to a December 31 year-end.
The terminating partnership. Under Regs. Sec.
1.708-1 (b)(1)(iii), a partnership tax year terminates
on (1) the date on which operations cease or (2) the
date when, within a 12-month period, there is a sale
or exchange of 50% or more of the total interests in
partnership capital and profits. The partnership tax
year closes for all partners on the date the partner
ship terminates.7 A return must be filed for the year
ending on that date.

Gain or loss on merger

Closing of the partnership year. When the ter
minated partnership’s tax year closes, the partners
may be faced with a bunching of income if their
fiscal year differs from that of the resulting partner

5 A “principal partnership is a partner having an interest of 5
percent or more in partnership profits or capital.” Sec.
706(b)(3).
6 Rev. Proc. 72-51, 1972-2 CB 832.
7 Regs. Sec. 1.708-1(b)(1)(iii).
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ship. For example, assume ABC partnership has
been filing its tax returns with an April 30 fiscal
year-end. On October 1 ABC is merged into XYZ
partnership and ABC is terminated. The XYZ
partnership reports its income on the calendar year.
The partners in the terminated ABC partnership will
have to report 20 months of income in one taxable
year: the 12 months of income from ABC for the
fiscal year ending April 30; the five months of in
come from ABC for May 1 through September 30,
the effective date of the merger; and the three
months of income from the new XYZ partnership for
October 1 through December 31.
Partnerships formed before the enactment of
subchap. K in 1954 may have taxable years other
than the calendar year. When one of these partner
ships considers a merger, and retention of the cur
rent taxable year is advantageous, the pre-1954
partnership should be the continuing partnership.
This approach would avoid bunching of income in
the year of merger and the potential for income
deferral would be retained. If losses have been
incurred by a terminating partnership or by its
partners, however, and income is recognized by the
continuing partnership, the ending of two tax years
for the partnership in the same taxable year of the
partner could be desirable.
If several partnerships are contemplating a
merger and one of them has an advantageous fiscal
year, e.g., January 31, the continuing partnership
should try to retain that tax year. The order in which
the partnerships merge should be arranged so that
the January 31 partnership survives as the continu
ing partnership. The January 31 fiscal year-end
would then be retained even though the “original”
partnership is not directly providing the “greatest
dollar value of assets” or its original members do
not “own an interest of more than 50 percent in the
capital and profits of the resulting partnership.” For
example, assume that partnership A, with a January
31 year-end and $30,000 in assets to contribute, is
contemplating a merger with calendar year-end
partnerships B and C, which have $45,000 and
$25,000 in assets, respectively. If partnerships A
and C were to merge first, partnership A would be
the continuing partnership with a January 31 year
end and $55,000 in assets. If partnership A (merged
A and C) and B then merged, partnership A would
still be the continuing partnership and the January
31 year-end would be retained. Assuming that the
form of the transaction is respected, this procedure
can be used to retain a tax advantageous year-end.
When the partnership with the tax advantageous
fiscal year is not the continuing partnership, sig
nificant bunching of income may result. This bunch
ing problem can be minimized, however, by adopt
ing one of the following procedures:
1. A partial liquidation followed by a transfer of

assets to the “new” or continuing partnership.
a. The fiscal year partnership distributes as
sets to its partners in a partial liquidation.
b. The partners contribute assets to the “new”
or continuing partnership and receive
partnership interests in return.
The fiscal year partnership must retain sufficient
assets and carry on sufficient activities to maintain
its existence.8 In addition, cash distributed should
not exceed the basis of the partnership interest and
any Sec. 751 property should be distributed pro
rata. Otherwise, the partners will recognize gain
from the distributions.
2. A two-tier partnership arrangement followed
by a partial liquidation.
a. The fiscal year partnership contributes
some assets to the “new” or continuing
partnership and receives a partnership in
terest in return. (A two-tier partnership ar
rangement would then exist.)
b. The fiscal year partnership distributes the
“new” or continuing partnership interest at a
later date to its partners in a partial liquida
tion.
As noted in (1) above, the fiscal year partnership
would have to retain sufficient assets and carry on
sufficient activities to maintain a separate exis
tence.
Under either approach, the fiscal year partner
ship would avoid termination in the year of the
“combination” and the partners could then select
the year in which to terminate the fiscal year
partnership.

ABC partnership balance sheet
(tax basis)

Cash
Building
Accumulated
depreciation

Total

$ 1,000 Mortgage payable
25,000 Capital account:
Partner A
Partner B
(8,000)
Partner C

18,000 Total

21,000
(1,000)
(1,000)
(1,000)

$18,000

Also assume that the continuing partnership has no
other liabilities, and that partners A, B and C receive
a 15% interest in the capital and profits of the con
tinuing partnership. Under these circumstances,
partners A, B and C would not recognize any gain
from the merger. The basis of their interests after
the transfer would be calculated as follows:
Adjusted basis of interest prior to the merger
Decrease in liabilities attributable to partner
Increase in liabilities attributable to partner
(15% x $21,000)

$6,000
(7,000)

Adjusted basis of interest after the merger

$2,150

3,150

Partners in the continuing partnership should
also be aware of the potential for gain recognition
when the “new” partners are deemed to assume
their share of the continuing partnership’s liabilities.
If this assumption of partnership liabilities reduces
the “old” partners’ share of liabilities so that the
adjusted basis of their partnership interest becomes
negative, the “old” partners will have to recognize
gain under Sec. 731. This is unlikely in a service
partnership, however.
Accounts receivable

Constructive distribution ofcash. Partners of a
merging partnership may have to recognize gain
from a merger, under Sec. 731, when the partner
ship’s liabilities exceed the basis of the partnership
property contributed to the continuing partnership.
This is most likely to occur in a “tax-shelter”
partnership, in which the losses from the partner
ship have exceeded the partner’s capital contribu
tion and the partner now has a negative capital
account.9 The liabilities of a service partnership
may also exceed the basis of its assets. Even
though liabilities exceed the basis of the assets, the
partners would not necessarily recognize gain. To
illustrate, assume the following balance sheet of
ABC partnership:

8 In David A. Foxman, 41 TC 535 (1964), acq. 1966-2 CB 4, the
Tax Court ruled that a partnership which sold its assets for two
promissory notes did not terminate under Sec. 708(b)(1)(A).
The partners retained capital accounts in the partnership. A
similar conclusion was reached in Baker Commodities, Inc.,
415 F2d 519 (9th Cir. 1969)(24 AFTR2d 69-5516,69-2 USTC
¶9589).
9 Sec. 465 has severely limited this situation.

The structuring of a partnership merger requires
special care whenever the terminating cash basis
partnership has substantial uncollected accounts
receivable.
Continuing accrual method partnership. The
accounts receivable of a cash basis partnership
have a zero basis. When a cash basis partnership
merges with an accrual basis partnership, the ac
counts receivable are considered income to the
resulting partnership, and must be reported at the
end of the first year after the merger. This can result
in an allocation of income to the “old” partners of the
resulting partnership, and a bunching of income to
the “new” partners.10 This allocation of income
could be avoided through a special allocation of the
income from the transferred accounts receivable.
Under Sec. 704, this income, and the receivable
collection proceeds, could be allocated to the
partners of the terminating partnership. To be effec

10 Ezo Products Co., 37 TC 385 (1961).
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tive, however, the special allocation of income and
cash should be set out in the merger agreement and
the partnership agreement.11
Another way to approach the disproportionate
distribution problem is to distribute undivided in
terests in the accounts receivable to the partners of
the terminating partnership on a pro rata basis. This
pro rata distribution should avoid Sec. 751 (b) prob
lems. Alternatively, the receivables could be re
tained by the terminating partnership along with
sufficient other assets for that partnership to remain
in business.12 After the receivables were collected,
the cash proceeds could be distributed to the
partners, reducing the bunching of income since the
income would be considered taxable when the cash
was received by the partnership. Upon collection
and distribution of the proceeds, the partnership
could be terminated.
The bunching of income could also be minimized
by timing the merger to occur on the first day of the
resulting partnership’s fiscal year. The accounts re
ceivable would then be collected and the income
reported in the same year. A special allocation of
income and cash distributions could also be
employed here. Thus, while there might be a larger
than normal amount of income reported by the tax
payer, he would have sufficient cash available to
pay the taxes.
Another way to prevent the bunching problem is
an installment sale of the uncollected receivables
by the terminating partnership to the resulting
partnership, before the merger. The terminating
partnership could then choose between two alterna
tives:
• The installment obligation could be retained by
the partnership and all other properties transferred
to the resulting partnership. Under the rationale of
Foxman,13 the retention of the installment obligation
should be sufficient business activity to avoid termi
nation under Sec. 708(b)(1)(A).
• The installment obligation could be distributed
pro rata to the partners of the terminating partner
ship in a nonliquidating distribution prior to the
merger.
Under Regs. Sec. 1.453-9(c)(2), a distribution
under the nonrecognition provision of Sec. 731 is
not treated as a taxable disposition (except as pro
vided for in Secs. 736 and 751). In the situation
outlined above, the transfer of the installment obli
gation to the partners should not accelerate rec
ognition of gain, assuming that the distribution is pro

11 Many service partnerships do not have and do not want written
agreements. If these partnerships are involved in a merger,
care should be taken to explain fully how these special alloca
tions are structured to all of the participants.
12 See note 8 and accompanying text, supra.
13 Id.
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rata, and is not part of a liquidating payment. Under
either alternative, there is a question of whether
investment tax credits must be recaptured, as noted
below.
One other simple solution to the bunching
problem may exist if the partnerships engage in two
different types of businesses. Regs. Sec. 1.4461 (d)(1) permits a taxpayer operating more than one
business to have different accounting methods for
the different businesses. Thus, following the merger
of two partnerships with different businesses, one
partnership could continue to use the cash method
for one business and the accrual method could be
used by the other business. If the partnerships are
in the same business or a functionally integrated
business, however, the resulting partnership would
probably be required to employ the same account
ing method in both businesses.

Effect of Sec. 754 election. If the merging
partnership has made a Sec. 754 election, several
issues must be examined before the merger, and
addressed in the merger agreement. For example,
the terminating partnership may have previously
made the Sec. 754 election, giving a partner or
partners (hereinafter partner) a stepped-up basis
for their interest in certain partnership assets, or the
partnership a stepped-up basis in its assets related
to a distribution to a liquidated partner. Several
problems exist when this partnership is merged.
Problems related to accounts receivable occur only
if the receivables on hand at the time of the election
remain uncollected at the time of the merger.

The Sec. 734(b) adjustment. If the partnership
made a Sec. 734(b) adjustment, the receivables will
have a stepped-up basis. This step-up in the ter
minating partnership’s basis will be carried over to
the resulting partnership, whether or not the result
ing partnership makes a Sec. 754 election. A spe
cial allocation under Sec. 704 should be made so
that the new partners of the resulting partnership do
not recognize income from the collection of the re
ceivables.
The Sec. 743(b) adjustment. Different problems
arise, however, if one partner has a stepped-up
basis because of a Sec. 743(b) adjustment. In this
situation, the partner has purchased, exchanged or
inherited the partnership interest. The basis in the
accounts receivable would have been adjusted
(stepped up) at the time of acquisition of the in
terest. If these assets had been transferred to the
resulting, partnership, the adjustment would not
carry over to the resulting partnership, for several
reasons: First, the adjustment is for the benefit of
the one partner only. It is not entered on the partner
ship books but is usually noted in a memo format.

Second, under the Sec. 743 regulations, when
assets for which a partner has received a basis
adjustment are transferred to another partner, the
basis adjustment is to be reallocated to other
partnership property of a like kind.14 In a merger,
there would be no remaining partnership property
except the interest in the resulting partnership, and
the basis adjustment for the benefit of the one part
ner would therefore be lost.
When receivables are transferred, the excess of
the fair market value over the adjusted basis on the
terminating partnership’s books will, at some point,
be treated as income. Since the Sec. 743(b) ad
justment is not entered on the partnership books,
the basis of the receivables will be zero. Thus, the
entire fair market value of the receivables will even
tually be income to the continuing partnership. Even
if a special allocation were made allocating the in
come to the partners of the terminating partnership,
the partner who had received the step-up in basis
would not benefit. The entire amount of the income
would have to be allocated to someone and the
other partners would probably not volunteer to rec
ognize the income without a corresponding cash
distribution. Hence, the partner would end up includ
ing in ordinary income an amount for which consid
eration had already been paid. This is exactly what
the Sec. 743(b) adjustment is intended to avoid.

Planning alternatives. As the discussion above
suggests, a partner who has made a Sec. 743(b)
adjustment for accounts receivable faces signifi
cant problems if a partnership merger takes place.
In this situation, the best approach may be to take
the accounts receivable out of the merger, at least in
connection with that partner.
The best way to accomplish this will probably
involve taking this partner out of the merger and
using a form different than that prescribed in Rev.
Rul. 68-289. For example, the partner’s interest
could be liquidated in a pro rata distribution of ac
counts receivable, other Sec. 751 property and
other partnership property. Under Regs. Sec.
1.743-1 (b)(2)(ii), the partner would allocate the Sec.
743(b) basis adjustment to the receivables re
ceived, even though they may not be the ones for
which the adjustment was made. Next, the part
ner contributes all of the property to the continu
ing partnership under Sec. 721. Thus, the
stepped-up basis of the accounts receivable would
carry over to the continuing partnership and no in
come would be recognized upon collection. All of
the other assets of the terminating partnership
could then be transferred to the continuing partner

14 Regs. Sec. 1.743-1(b)(2)(ii).

ship in accordance with the form prescribed in Rev.
Rul. 68-289.
Alternatively, the terminating partnership could
sell sufficient accounts receivable for cash to the
continuing partnership so that the partner received
the full benefit of the Sec. 743(b) adjustment. The
cash proceeds could then be contributed to the
continuing partnership as part of the merger. Under
this method, however, the other partners of the
terminating partnership would recognize ordinary
income from the sale.
In a third approach, the uncollected receivables
would remain in the terminating partnership until
they were collected. The partner would receive the
benefit of the stepped-up basis and avoid recogniz
ing the income.

Continuing
cash
method partnership.
Different problems occur when the terminating
partnership is on the accrual method of accounting
and the resulting partnership is on the cash method.
The income from the accounts receivable will have
already been recognized by the terminating
partnership; no income will be recognized on their
collection by the resulting partnership. No special
allocation is needed, since the capital accounts of
the incoming partners would reflect the prior income
recognition. However, the incoming partners may
still want a special allocation for the unrealized re
ceivables on the books of the cash basis partner
ship as of the merger date. Under the special alloca
tion, the income from those receivables and the
related cash collections would be attributed to the
“old” partners.
Depreciation and cost recovery deductions

The depreciation and cost recovery deductions of
the continuing partnership are not affected by the
merger. The deductions for property acquired be
fore 1981 and transferred to the continuing partner
ship will be determined using the “anti-churning”
rules of Sec. 168(e)(4). Under Sec. 168(e)(4)(C),
property acquired by the taxpayer in a transaction
described in Sec. 721 or 731 is not “recovery prop
erty” in the hands of the transferee. Hence, property
of the terminating partnership acquired before Jan.
1, 1981, that is transferred to the continuing
partnership does not qualify for ACRS. The provi
sion also states that rules similar to those contained
in Sec. 381 (c)(6) will apply to the property. Under
this provision, the acquiring corporation will be
treated as the transferor corporation for purposes of
computing depreciation under Sec. 167. Applying
the “rules similar” language of Sec. 168, the con
tinuing partnership must compute depreciation on
the contributed property using the same method as
the terminating partnership. Accordingly, the
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partnership merger will not result in the loss of first
user status with respect to the terminating partner
ship’s property, contrary to pre-ACRS law.15
For property acquired by the terminating partner
ship after Dec. 31, 1980, and transferred to the
continuing partnership, the cost recovery deduction
will be computed under the rules set forth in Sec.
168(f)(10). This provision, which covers Sec. 721 or
731 transactions, requires the transferee (continu
ing partnership) to be treated as the transferor (ter
minating partnership) for purposes of computing the
cost recovery deduction for the part of the trans
feree’s basis in the property that does not exceed
the basis in the hands of the terminating partner
ship. Thus, the ACRS period and method selected
by the terminating partnership must generally be
adhered to by the continuing partnership.
An additional complication, in determining cost
recovery deductions, was added by the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).16
Future deductions may increase because of the
cancellation (upon the merger) of part or all of the
required investment tax credit (ITC) basis reduc
tions. If the merger triggers ITC recapture, the can
cellation of the basis reduction will result in an in
crease in the basis of the property of the terminating
partnership or the continuing partnership, depend
ing upon which partnership is subject to ITC recap
ture. This increased basis will, in turn, require a
calculation of increased cost recovery amounts,
using the cost recovery method currently in use, the
remaining life of the property and the basis reduc
tion cancellation. To recover the full amount of the
basis reduction cancellation, the taxpayer should
use the ACRS tabular percentage for each year
over the sum of the remaining tabular percentages.
Adherence to the ACRS tabular percentages with
out the above calculations would result in an incom
plete writeoff.17
The merger of two or more service partnerships
will usually not trigger depreciation recapture. Secs.
1245(b) and 1250(d) list a contribution of assets to a
partnership covered by Sec. 721 and a distribution
of assets by a partnership covered by Sec. 731 as

15 Regs. Sec. 1.167(c)-1(a)(6).
16 Sec. 48(q), added by TEFRA, requires a reduction in the basis
of Sec. 38 property by 50% of the investment tax credit (ITC).
Under Sec. 48(q)(2), if Sec. 38 property (which has had its
basis reduced) is subsequently disposed of in an event trigger
ing ITC recapture, 50% of the recapture amount will be added
to the basis of the Sec. 38 property prior to the disposition. The
recapture amount includes changes in carrybacks and car
ryovers.
17 The procedure for recalculating deductions after the cancella
tion of the basis reduction was not specified in the TEFRA
amendments. Until regulations or further legislation clarifies
the proper approach, taxpayers are apparently free to adopt
the suggested method.
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exceptions to the recapture rules.18 Recapture in
come would be recognized, however, if there was a
recognized gain upon the termination of the
partnership and the subsequent contribution to the
resulting partnership. Gain would be recognized if
the liabilities exceeded the basis of the assets of the
terminating partnership. As discussed above, this
situation is unlikely to occur in a merger of service
partnerships. Under Secs. 1245 and 1250, how
ever, the recapture potential carries over to the
resulting partnership.
Investment tax credit

Because the property acquired by the resulting
partnership from the terminating partnership is
used, it does not qualify for the investment tax credit
since it was not acquired by purchase. Thus, the
main issue connected with the investment tax credit
is the possible recapture of investment tax credits
by the terminating partnership. In general, invest
ment tax credits are recaptured when Sec. 38 prop
erty is disposed of or when property ceases to be
Sec. 38 property before the close of its estimated
useful life.19 An exception to this general rule pro
vides that
property shall not be treated as ceasing to be section 38
property with respect to the taxpayer by reason of a mere
change in the form of conducting the trade or business so
long as the property is retained in such trade or business
as section 38 property and the taxpayer retains a substantial
interest in such trade or business.20

In the context of a partnership merger, the phrase
“retains a substantial interest” may present defini
tional problems.
The regulations21 expand upon the phrase “sub
stantial interest” and set forth additional criteria.
Under these criteria, a partner will be considered as
retaining a substantial interest if (1) the interest is
substantial in relation to the total interest of all per
sons, or (2) the interest is equal to or greater than
the interest before the change in form. In the
partnership merger area, the first condition will ap
ply. Two examples in the regulations22 indicate that
a 45% or 50% interest in the assets will constitute a
substantial enough interest to satisfy the require
ments. The regulations do not indicate, however,
how far below 45% an interest can decrease to, and
still be considered substantial.
The term “substantial interest” appears to relate
to the percentage interest in capital and profits,
rather than the dollar amount of investment. In

18 Secs. 1245(b)(3) and 1250(d)(3).
19 Sec. 47(a)(1).
20 Sec. 47(b).
21 Regs. Sec. 1.47-3(f)(2).
22 Regs. Sec. 1.47-3(f)(6), Examples 1 and 5.

Soares,23 the Tax Court indicated that a 7.22%
retained interest was not a substantial interest,
even if the value of the interest was unchanged after
the transfer. This decision suggests that the value of
the interest is not critical, and that the Tax Court
does not view 7.22% as substantial.
The Sec. 47 regulations24 also require that (1)
substantially all of the assets necessary to operate
the trade or business be transferred to the trans
feree, and (2) the basis of the property in the hands
of the transferee be determined in whole or in part
by reference to the transferor’s basis in the prop
erty. This second condition should be satisfied in a
partnership merger that follows the form of Rev.
Rul. 68-289.
The Service interpreted the “substantially all
assets” requirement in Rev. Rul. 76-514.25 A dentist
transferred his dental and office equipment to a
corporation in a Sec. 351 exchange, but retained
ownership of the dental office building and leased it
to the corporation. The Service ruled that the build
ing was a part of the dental practice, and therefore,
substantially all of the assets necessary to carry on
the dental practice were not transferred. The ITC
previously taken on certain items of dental and of
fice equipment was recaptured.26
In structuring a partnership merger, practitioners
must consider whether ITC recapture would occur if
certain assets, such as accounts receivable or in
stallment obligations from the sale of the accounts
receivable, were not transferred to the resulting
partnership. The retained properties do not have to
qualify for the ITC; they must merely be “necessary
to operate such trade or business.” Rev. Rul.
76-514 does not provide guidance on this issue
because it states that each situation will be
examined individually. Further, no definition of
“necessary” is provided.
The IRS has issued two rulings involving ITC
recapture in a partnership merger.27* In both situa
tions, the members of the terminating and resulting
partnerships were the same, and there was no

23 James Soares, 50 TC 909 (1968).
24 Regs. Sec. 1.47-3(f)(1)(ii)(c) and (d).
25 Rev. Rul. 76-514, 1976-2 CB 11. (Editor’s note: Rev. Rul.
83-65, 1983-16 IRB 6, revoked Rev. Rul. 76-514 and stated
the Service’s acquiescence to Loewen, note 26, infra.)
26 The Tax Court has held that a fanner could transfer Sec. 38
property, but not title to the farm land, to a wholly owned
corporation, and could still satisfy the “substantially all” re
quirement. George Loewen, 76 TC 90 (1981). See also IRS
Letter Ruling 8016047 (1/22/80), in which the Service ruled
that a lawyer could transfer Sec. 38 property to his wholly
owned corporation, but not the building in which the law office
was located, and could satisfy the "substantially all” require
ment.
27 Rev. Rul. 77-458, note 3, and IRS Letter Ruling 7805028, note
3.

change in any partner’s economic interest in the
assets of either partnership. Therefore, no ITC re
capture occurred.
ITC recapture may also occur if a partner’s prop
ortionate interest in the resulting partnership’s pro
fits or property is reduced. Under Regs. Sec. 1.476(a)(2), if a partner has taken the basis of partner
ship Sec. 38 property into account in computing his
qualified investment, and before the end of the es
timated useful life of the property, the partner’s
proportionate interest in partnership profits (as de
fined in Sec. 702(a)(8)), or in a particular piece of
property, is reduced below a specified percentage,
the partner will have to recapture a portion or all of
the ITC. The reduction can result from a sale, a
change in the partnership agreement or the admis
sion of a new partner. The reduction will result in the
partnership property ceasing to be Sec. 38 property
to the extent of the actual reduction.
Regs. Sec. 1.47-6(a)(2)(ii) provides that the part
ner’s interest must be reduced below 66%% of his
proportionate interest in the year the asset was
placed in service in order to trigger recapture. If this
large a reduction in the partner’s interest occurs, an
amount of ITC proportionate to the reduction in
interest must be recaptured and the corresponding
part of the ITC basis reduction must be restored. For
example, if a partner’s interest in partnership profits
is reduced from 60% to 30%, one-half of any
partnership property that was Sec. 38 property for
this partner would cease to be Sec. 38 property. The
amount of the ITC recapture would depend upon
the original estimated life, the time elapsed before
the reduction in interest, the cost of the property and
the amount of reduction in interest.
The preceding discussion is illustrated in the fol
lowing example.
Assumptions

1. ABC partnership is going to merge with XYZ partnership;
ABC will continue.
2. The net worth of ABC is $60,000 and the net worth of XYZ
is $40,000.
3. ABC purchased qualified new Sec. 38 property four
years ago (prior to 1983). Cost: $3,000. Estimated life:
eight years. There were six equal partners who remain
as equal partners. (Assume 10% ITC was taken.)
4. XYZ has four equal partners.
5. The new ABC partnership will have 10 equal partners.
Conclusions

1. The partners of ABC will have their proportionate interest
in the Sec. 38 property reduced from 100% to 60%.
2. Property ceasing to be Sec. 38 property is calculated as
follows: $3,000 x 40% = $1,200.
3. Recaptured ITC for each partner of old ABC is calculated
as follows:
Total amount recaptured: $1,200 x 10% x ⅔ = $80
Recapture per partner:
$
80 x 1/6 = $13.33

Once a reduction below 66%% of the partner’s
interest occurs, subsequent reductions in interest
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will not trigger additional recapture of ITC until the
remaining interest is below 33⅓% of the original
interest.28 To illustrate, assume that in the example
above, in year 5, two new partners, with interests
equal to each of the current partners in new ABC
are admitted to the ABC partnership. This would
reduce the interest of the original partners of ABC
from an original 100% to 50% (six of 12). Under the
regulations, this reduction would not trigger any
additional ITC recapture. However, if the original
partners’ aggregate interests were reduced below
33⅓% before the seventh year, additional ITC re
capture would occur.
Qualified retirement plans
If the terminating partnership has a qualified re
tirement plan, the partners may choose from three
possible approaches:
— terminate the plan and distribute the trust’s
assets;
— undertake a plan-to-plan transfer; or
— continue the plan and trust until the last
beneficiary’s rights are exhausted.
The factors to consider in making this decision in
clude anticipated future administrative costs, timing
of income recognition and marginal tax rates of the
participants, difficulty of determining rights of par
ticipants and preference of participants for current
distributions of funds.
Under the first alternative, the beneficiaries of the
plan would either recognize income when the plan
was terminated and the assets were distributed, or
defer recognition of income by a rollover of the
amounts received (to the extent possible) into an
Individual Retirement Account. No further adminis
trative costs would be incurred in connection with
the plan, and the participants would receive the
plan’s assets immediately.
In a plan-to-plan transfer, contributions to the old
plan would cease, the trust assets would be trans
ferred to the continuing partnership’s comparable
plan and the participants in the old plan would be
come participants in the comparable plan. The
rights of the participants in the terminated plan can
not be altered, which could result in substantial
administrative costs and could raise difficult ques
tions on the rights of individual participants in plan
assets. With this procedure, the participants in the
terminated plan do not have to recognize income
immediately.
Under the third alternative, the old plan continues
until all participants have received their benefits or
until the plan would otherwise be terminated. The
plan would continue to incur administrative costs,

28 Regs. Sec. 1.47-6(a)(2)(b)(ii).
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which could become very substantial as the number
of beneficiaries and the dollar amount of plan assets
decreased.

Optional basis adjustment election
When a terminating partnership has a Sec. 754
optional basis adjustment election in effect, the
election will not carry over to the continuing partner
ship. Instead, the continuing partnership will have to
make a new election for either the partners of the
continuing partnership or the partnership to be af
fected by future basis adjustments. As the discus
sion below suggests, it is not clear whether a Sec.
743(b) adjustment to basis will survive a merger.
A Sec. 734(b) adjustment to basis, however, should
survive a merger since the adjustment would be
recorded on the books of the terminated partner
ship.
The proper treatment of a Sec. 743(b) adjustment
by the terminating partnership in a merger is not
addressed in the regulations. As previously men
tioned,29 the regulations under Sec. 743 indicate
the procedure for allocating the adjustment when
there is a subsequent distribution of property for
which an adjustment has been made.30 The regula
tions do not explicitly discuss a situation in which all
of the partnership property is contributed or trans
ferred to another partnership, but they do require
the partner with the basis adjustment to reallocate it
to other partnership property of a “like kind.” Likekind property is defined as “property of the same
class, that is, stock in trade, property used in the
trade or business, capital assets, etc.”31 The follow
ing examples illustrate the unresolved issues under
these regulations.
Assume that a Sec. 743(b) adjustment has been
made for unrealized receivables and the receiva
bles are then contributed to the resulting partner
ship, as required under Rev. Rul. 68-289. Under the
regulations, the partner would have to wait until the
terminating partnership acquired property similar to
the unrealized receivables, which will never occur.
Thus, the adjustment made for the benefit of the
partner in connection with the unrealized receiva
bles is lost. This adjustment cannot be carried over
to the new partnership for the benefit of the partner,
and, even worse, the partner will recognize ordinary
income when the unrealized receivables are col
lected by the resulting partnership.
Now assume that a Sec. 743(b) adjustment has
been made for capital assets or Sec. 1231

29 See text accompanying note 14, supra.
30 Regs. Sec. 1.743-1(b)(2)(ii).
31 Id.

property of the terminated partnership. This ad
justment may survive the merger. If the interest in
the resulting partnership can be classified as an
investment by the terminating partnership, it can be
argued that like-kind property has been received by
the terminating partnership.32 Thus, the adjustment
can be allocated to the partner’s share of the in
terest in the continuing partnership. The adjustment
would not result in an increase in the basis of the
assets in the continuing partnership, as existed
under the Sec. 743(b) adjustment in effect prior to
the merger. The partner could therefore lose the
benefit of depreciation deductions based upon the
basis adjustment. To minimize this adverse result,
the terminating partnership may distribute the prop
erty to the partner before the merger, and then
have the partner lease the property to the continu
ing partnership. The partner’s basis in the property
would then include the special basis adjustment,
but this approach could result in ITC recapture.
As these examples illustrate, the partner who had
the benefit of the Sec. 743(b) adjustment will either
lose this adjustment or experience a material
change in the adjustment as a result of the merger.

Other problems

Partnerships may have special allocations of in
come, gains, deductions, losses or credits included
in the partnership agreement. A special allocation in
the partnership agreement of a terminating partner
ship will generally not survive a merger. If the con
tinuing partnership has the special allocations,
however, they may survive the merger, and benefit
(or harm) the partners, unless the allocations are
modified. Thus, partners who could be affected by
special allocations must consider their potential
value when a new partnership agreement is
negotiated.
A terminating partnership may have assigned a
value to goodwill on its books. In the merger format
of Rev. Rul. 68-289, the goodwill of the terminating
partnership is transferred to the resulting partner
ship. Thus, goodwill survives the merger and ap
pears on the books of the resulting partnership. If
goodwill was created by a Sec. 734(b) adjustment
entered on the books of the terminating partnership,
this goodwill would also survive the merger.
Many partnerships have installment obligations
as assets, raising the question of whether the trans
fer of the installment obligations from the terminat
ing partnership to the resulting partnership triggers

32 It may be difficult to sustain this argument, however, since the
interest in the resulting partnership is retained only momentar
ily by the terminating partnership, before it is distributed to the
partners.

recognition of income. The Installment Sales Revi
sion Act of 1980 did not alter the statute in this
area.33 Thus, the existing regulations remain in ef
fect, and provide that a contribution of installment
obligations to a partnership under Sec. 721 does
not trigger recognition of income.34
Another potential problem involves disallowed
losses under Sec. 704. Sec. 704(d) limits the
amount of losses that a partner can deduct to the
adjusted basis of the partner’s interest at the end of
the partnership year in which the loss occurred. Any
losses in excess of this limitation are carried over in
a “suspense” account. They are deductible at the
end of the first succeeding partnership year, to the
extent that the partner’s adjusted basis for the
partnership interest at the end of that year exceeds
zero. The issue raised by a partnership merger is
whether the “suspense” account is lost during the
merger. Willis35 suggested that the suspense ac
count is lost at the time of the merger because the
partner or partners have not met the prerequisites of
Sec. 704(d) for deducting the losses in the sus
pense account at the time of the termination of the
partnership. There does not appear to be any judi
cial authority on this issue, however.
A last problem involves payments to a retired
partner made by a terminating partnership. For the
terminating partnership, these payments are consi
dered deductible under Sec. 736(a). If the partner
ship terminates and the continuing partnership as
sumes the obligation, will these payments by the
resulting partnership be deductible? It appears that
the merger should not affect the deductibility of the
payments by the resulting partnership.36

Conclusion
Sec. 708 provides an apparently straightforward
rule for partnership mergers. The regulations under
that section are not extensive and provide only
limited guidance on the Service’s view of the tax
consequences of mergers. As a result, substantial
uncertainty still exists as to income tax treatment of
partnership mergers. Partners considering mergers
should consult various other Code sections, regula
tions, revenue rulings and procedures, and should
consider obtaining advance rulings on significant
items not covered by the Code or regulations.

33 Former Sec. 453(d) is now contained in Sec. 453B and is
virtually unchanged. P.L. 96-471 (10/19/80), Section 2(a).
34 Regs. Sec. 1.453-9(c)(2).
35 Willis, Partnership Taxation (2d Ed., 1976), at §23.04.
36 In Rev. Rul. 75-154, 1975-1 CB 186, a series of proprietor
ships that succeeded a partnership were permitted to deduct
payments made to a former partner of the individuals if the
payments were deductible by the prior partnership. See also
IRS Letter Ruling 7748032 (8/31/77).
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Some of the problems facing potential merger
candidates are discussed in various Code sections
and regulations. These provisions, summarized be
low, may not supply definitive answers, but they do
give some guidance.
• Which partnership, if any, is the resulting part
nership and which partnership(s) are terminated?37
• When does the terminating partnership’s tax
year end, and when does the resulting or new
partnership’s tax year end?38
• Should some or all of the receivables be distri
buted to the partners before the merger in a pro rata
or non-pro rata fashion?39
• Can two different methods of accounting be
employed if the resulting partnership engages in
two different businesses?40
• If a Sec. 734(b) adjustment to assets (related
to a distribution to a liquidated partner) has been
made, will the adjustments carry over to the result
ing partnership?41
• What changes in depreciation deductions and
cost recovery deductions will take place after the
merger?42 Will depreciation recapture be triggered
by the merger?43

37 Sec. 708.
38 Secs. 708 and 706(b), and Rev. Proc. 72-51, note 6.
39 Secs. 731, 736 and 751(b).
40 Sec. 446.
41 Secs. 734(b), 754 and 755.
42 Sec. 168(e)(4) and (f)(10).
43 Secs. 1245(b)(3) and 1250(d)(3).
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• Will investment tax credits be recaptured with
respect to the terminating partnership’s Sec. 38
property?44
• Will transfer of installment receivables from a
terminating partnership to another partnership trig
ger recognition of income?45
• Will payments made to a retired partner of a
terminated partnership be deductible when made
by a resulting partnership?46
Several potential issues, listed below, receive lit
tle or no coverage in the Code, regulations, revenue
rulings or procedures.
• If a Sec. 743(b) adjustment has been made
with respect to a partner in the terminated partner
ship (partner has purchased, exchanged or inher
ited the partnership interest), will the partner receive
the benefit or detriment of the adjustment in the
resulting partnership?47
• Will partnership losses, disallowed to a partner
because his share of losses exceeds the basis of
his interest, be lost during a merger or be carried
over to the interest in the resulting partnership?48
Partnership mergers require careful planning so
that anticipated tax outcomes are achieved. Particu
lar attention should be directed to the issues listed
above; the uncertainties surrounding these ques
tions create the potential for adverse conse
quences. tta
44
45
46
47
48

Sec. 47(b).
Regs. Sec. 1.453-9(c)(2).
Rev. Rul. 75-154, note 36.
Secs. 743(b), 754 and 755.
Sec. 704(d).
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Controversies surrounding the
self-employment tax

Introduction

Earnings from self-employment are subject to the
“regular” income tax and the self-employment (SE)
tax. The computation of the SE tax appears straight
forward, but there are many hidden complexities, as
indicated by the more than 200 revenue rulings
issued by the Service in this area.1
Sec. 1402 defines net earnings from SE as “the
gross income derived by an individual from any
trade or business carried on by such individual, less
the deductions allowed by this subtitle which are
attributable to such trade or business, plus his dis
tributive share (whether or not distributed) of in
come or loss described in section 702(a)(8) from
any trade or business carried on by a partnership of
which he is a member. . . .” “Individual” includes
all U.S. citizens, resident aliens and residents of
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam and Amer
ican Samoa1
2; nonresident aliens, estates and trusts
are excluded.
In computing “gross income,” certain items are
excluded: a limited partner’s distributive share3;

1 These rulings involve issues arising under Secs. 1401,1402
and 1403.
2 Sec. 1402(b).
3 Sec. 1402(a)(12).
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rentals from real estate and from personal property
leased with the real estate4; dividends on shares of
stock and interest on corporate debt instruments5;
and, certain gains and losses.6 Rental income
earned by a real estate dealer7 and dividends and
interest earned by a dealer in stocks and securities
in the course of their businesses are not excluded
from gross income, however.89
Retirement payments to partners are excluded
from gross income if the following conditions are
met: (1) The retired partner renders no services to
the partnership in the taxable year of the partner
ship ending in or with the retired partner’s tax year9;
(2) no obligation exists from the other partners to the
retired partner1011
; (3) the retired partner’s share of
the partnership’s capital has been paid to him in full
within the partnership’s tax year11; and (4) the
retirement plan itself meets certain requirements.

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Sec. 1402(a)(1).
Sec. 1402(a)(2).
Sec. 1402(a)(3).
Sec. 1402(a)(1).
Sec. 1402(a)(2).
Sec. 1402(a)(10)(A).
Sec. 1402(a)(10)(B).
Sec. 1402(a)(10)(C).
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Under Regs. Sec. 1.1402(a)-17, the retirement
payments must be made on a periodic basis, pur
suant to a written plan, and on account of the part
ner’s retirement. Further, the payments must consti
tute bona fide retirement income. The retirement
benefits must therefore be based on conditions
used by other businesses in developing their re
tirement plans (e.g., years of service, compensation
received, eligibility requirements).
In Brandschain,12 the Tax Court held that an
attorney who had formally retired from the full-time
practice of law could not exclude from income sub
ject to self-employment tax the retirement pay that
he received from his former firm. The Court rea
soned that a portion of the pay was attributable to
the arbitration fees that he continued to turn over to
the firm pursuant to a partnership agreement. The
taxpayer served as a labor arbitrator both before
and after his retirement, and this activity was part of
the trade or business carried on by his firm; accord
ingly, he was rendering some service to the firm
during the year and did not comply with Sec.
1402(a)(10).
The regulations also state that the payments
must continue at least until the partner’s death and
must be paid on a periodic basis at regularly recur
ring intervals, not exceeding one year.13 Payments
that are made shortly beyond a one-year interval
may still be acceptable, however.14 Other special
rules on exclusion apply to agricultural activities,
income subject to community property laws and
ministers and members of religious orders.
Three of the more controversial issues that arise
in connection with the SE tax are the determination
of a trade or business; the self-employed versus
employee classification; and the rentals from real
estate exclusion. Each of these issues is discussed
separately below.

Trade or business
The term “trade or business” as used in the SE
Code sections has the same general meaning as in
Sec. 162, except that certain activities are ex
cluded: the services performed by (1) public office
holders15; (2) employees, as defined in the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act16; (3) persons covered
under the Railroad Retirement System17; and (4)
members of religious orders who have taken a vow

12
13
14
15
16
17

Joseph Brandschain, 80 TC 746 (1983).
Regs. Sec. 1.1402(a)-17(b)(2)(iii).
Rev. Rul. 79-34, 1979-1 CB 285.
Sec. 1402(c)(1).
Sec. 1402(c)(2).
Sec. 1402(c)(3); Samuel J. Cox, 60 TC 461 (1973).
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of poverty.18 Christian Science practitioners, minis
ters, members of religious orders (other than those
who have taken a vow of poverty) and members of
religious sects who are conscientiously or religi
ously opposed to the acceptance of public insur
ance can seek to exclude their services under this
section by applying for an exemption from the SE
tax.19
As mentioned above, Sec. 1402 states that
“trade or business” will have the same meaning as
in Sec. 162. Neither the Code nor the regulations
precisely defines “trade or business,” however, and
the determination of whether an activity constitutes
a trade or business for purposes of the SE tax has
therefore been the subject of controversy. This de
termination depends on all the facts and circum
stances in the particular case. In Rev. Rul. 57235,20 the IRS indicated that a person regularly
engaged in an occupation for profit which consti
tutes, in whole or in part, his livelihood may be
considered as conducting a trade or business. The
Service also suggested that tests such as con
tinuity, regularity and purpose of livelihood or profit
may be helpful in determining the existence of a
trade or business.
Continuity of the activity and performance of the
service on a regular basis are two criteria that have
been emphasized by the IRS in rulings on this issue.
For example, professional executors, trustees and
administrators are considered to be in a trade or
business, but an individual acting in this capacity
one time is usually not considered to be engaged in
a trade or business if (1) he performs no “extensive
management activities” over a “long period of time”
or (2) the fees he receives are not related to a trade
or business that was included in the assets of the
estate and in which the individual did not actively
participate. (If a nonprofessional fiduciary receives
more than the normal fee set by the state, however,
the excess may be considered SE income.21) Simi
larly, a person who regularly receives fees for, or is
known to seek or be available for speaking
engagements, must include these fees in comput
ing SE income; in contrast, a person who only ac
cepts occasional invitations to speak for a fee is not
considered to be in a trade or business and can
therefore exclude the income for SE tax purposes.22
Performance of a single service, such as a corpo
rate officer negotiating the sale of his employer’s

18
19
20
21
22

Sec. 1402(c)(2).
Regs. Sec. 1.1402(e)-2A.
Rev. Rul. 57-235, 1957-1 CB 275.
Rev. Rul. 58-5, 1958-1 CB 322.
Rev. Rul. 55-431, 1955-2 CB 312, amplified by Rev. Rul.
77-356, 1977-2 CB 317.

stock, is not treated as a trade or business.23
In determining whether the taxpayer is engaged
in a trade or business, the courts and the IRS have
also examined whether services are performed for
others. The winnings from gambling activities,24
wagering25 and participation in prize contests 26
even on a regular basis, have been held to be
excludible from SE income since no services are
rendered, even though a profit motive and con
tinuity exist. In Ditunno,27 however, the Tax Court
held that a full-time gambler was engaged in a trade
or business. The Court rejected, as too restrictive,
the definition of trade or business as holding one’s
self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods
or services. Although this decision appears to
broaden the trade or business definition, four
judges dissented,28 and the issue will probably con
tinue to be litigated.
The IRS sometimes uses different criteria in simi
lar situations, which increases the uncertainty sur
rounding the application of the SE tax. For example,
fees received by members of a board of directors
are normally considered SE income, because the
directors are not employees.29 The Service has
reached the same result, however, based on the
rationale that a director is engaged in a trade or
business since his services are rendered on a regu
lar and continuing basis.30 Even “honorary” direc
tors, who have no duties or voting powers and are
paid regardless of whether they attend meetings,
may not escape the tax. The IRS has ruled that
payments to a former director, who upon retirement
was named an “honorary” director, were attributa
ble to services rendered in prior years.31
Another criterion employed in the trade or busi
ness determination is whether the taxpayer was
“holding himself out as being in a trade or busi
ness.” In O’Connell,32 the taxpayer provided tax
services for only one client, his brother, during a
period of less than four months and earned a net
profit of $814.71. The Tax Court noted that O’Con
nell had listed himself as a “tax consultant” and
“self-employed” on his tax return, and held that the
income was subject to the SE tax. The Court ig
nored the continuity and regularity criteria, and
stated that multiple clients is not a requirement for
being in business for tax purposes.
Two other cases illustrate some of the additional

23 Rev. Rul. 58-112, 1958-1 CB 323.
24 Alfred A. Gentile, 65 TC 1 (1975).
25 Rev. Rul. 75-15, 1975-1 CB 317.
26 Rev. Rul. 55-258, 1955-1 CB 433.
27 Anthony J. Ditunno, 80 TC 362 (1983).
28 Judges Tannenwald, Sterrett, Chabot and Cohen.
29 Rev. Rul. 68-597, 1968-2 CB 463.
30 Rev. Rul. 72-86, 1972-1 CB 273.
31 Rev. Rul. 80-87, 1980-1 CB 189.
32 Paul J. O’Connell, TC Memo 1974-128.

complexities of the trade or business issue. In Bar
rett,33 an executive entered into an agreement with
his employer, a manufacturer, that upon his retire
ment he would not compete (either directly or indi
rectly) with the company and would render advisory
and consulting services as reasonably requested
for a period of 10 years. In return, Barrett received
$12,000 a year. The Court and both parties agreed
that noncompetition does not constitute the carrying
on of a trade or business, and the Court viewed the
fact that Barrett had neither competed nor rendered
any services as immaterial. The Court held that the
payment was not SE income, reasoning that the
taxpayer was not carrying on a trade or business
since he did not offer his services as an adviser or
consultant to others.
In Barnett,34 the Tax Court noted that the facts
were similar to those in Barrett, but concluded that
Barnett was engaged in a trade or business from
which he received SE income. Barnett had also
signed an agreement with his employer, a bank,
that upon retirement he would not act in a similar
capacity for any business enterprise that competed
to a substantial degree with the bank and would not
engage in any activities involving substantial com
petition with the bank. He also agreed to provide
advisory and consulting services as needed in re
turn for $1,000 a month for five years. Although
Barnett performed services only for the bank, he
conceded his “availability” as a bank consultant
outside of the general geographical area. In the
absence of any evidence to prove that the taxpayer
never actually held himself out to others as offering
his services, the Court ruled against him.
In Steffens,35 the Tax Court followed Barrett, and
held that the petitioner was not in a trade or busi
ness. Steffens was a retired executive and he had
entered into an exclusive contract with his former
employer to perform consulting services. The Tax
Court relied on two factors: Steffens was not al
lowed to compete and did not hold himself out as a
consultant to the general public. The Eleventh Cir
cuit subsequently reversed, and held that Steffens
was engaged in a trade or business and was there
fore subject to self-employment tax.
In Grosswald,36 the Second Circuit rejected the
Tax Court’s reasoning in Barrett and concluded that
there is no distinction between a retiree-consultant
who is contractually bound to a single client and one
who is not bound to one client. Since Steffens was
decided after Grosswald, it appears that the Tax
Court’s view conflicts with that of the Second Circuit

33 Herbert R. Barrett, 58 TC 284 (1972).
34 Burleigh F. Barnett, 69 TC 609 (1978).
35 Fred W. Steffens, 707 F2d 478 (11th Cir. 1983)(52 AFTR2d
83-5227, 83-1 USTC ¶9425), rev’g TC Memo 1981-637.
36 Grosswald v. Schweiker, 653 F2d 58 (2d Cir. 1981).
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(and the Eleventh Circuit).* Thus, taxpayers in simi
lar circumstances may be treated differently; pre
sumably, a taxpayer will receive favorable treat
ment in the Tax Court, but can expect a reversal in
the Second Circuit. The IRS has indicated that it will
follow Grosswald, and not Barrett.37

Self-employed vs. employee
Another controversial and unresolved issue in
determining a worker’s liability for the SE tax con
cerns the relationship between the individual and
the organization for which he performs services. If
the individual is considered to be self-employed or
an independent contractor of the organization, then
his earnings are subject to the SE tax. If the person
is treated as an employee, however, the earnings
are not SE income, but instead, are “wages” sub
ject to employer withholding. The courts and the
IRS have used several criteria, most of which are
taken from Sec. 3401, to determine a worker’s
status: (1) who has the right and responsibility to
direct and control the person; (2) on whose pre
mises is the activity performed; and (3) whose
equipment is used. In addition, the IRS has adopted
20 factors to be used to determine whether workers
are employees.38
Because of the low compliance rate of self
employed individuals, it would be more advantage
ous for the government if more workers were classi
fied as employees subject to withholding. Thus, the
IRS takes the position that a large percentage of the
workers now filing returns as independent contrac
tors are actually employees of the companies that
pay them, and that these companies should be
making income tax, social security payroll tax and
unemployment compensation tax payments, as re
quired for all employees. This position has frequent
ly been taken in audits, resulting in the reclassifica
tion of many workers as employees. In turn, the
companies receive tax assessments, sometimes in
the millions of dollars, for previous years.39
37 Rev Rul. 82-210, 1982-2 CB 203.
38 See Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Treatment of Em
ployees and Self-Employed Persons by the Internal Revenue
Service: Problems and Solutions, Comptroller General of the
United States, November 1977, Washington, D.C., U.S. Gen
eral Accounting Office.
39 Former IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz has indicated that in
two districts of one region alone, there are three potential
assessments against taxpayers ranging from $6 million to $60
million. Such a reclassification can result in deficiency as
sessments of $107 million annually. See North, “The Em
ployment Tax Morass,” 11 Creighton Law Rev. (March 1978),
at 775-806.

*On Nov. 7,1983, the Tax Court, in Hornaday, 81 TC No. 51,
clarified and expanded its position on the determination of
trade or business status. This decision, which suggests a
change in the Tax Court’s approach, will be discussed in an
addendum in the January issue of TTA.
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Along with increased tax assessments, the re
classification of independent contractors can have
other negative consequences. For example, when
an independent contractor is reclassified as an
employee, existing qualified pension, profitsharing or stock bonus plans may no longer satisfy
minimum participation requirements, resulting in a
disallowance of deductions for contributions to the
plan.
The Service’s approach was not well-received by
business, and the Revenue Act of 1978 provided
some relief by temporarily imposing a moratorium
on IRS action on this issue until Congress enacted
specific guidelines. The 1978 legislation prohibited
the IRS from issuing regulations or rulings on the
employment status of any individual, for purposes
of the employment taxes, prior to July 1,1982. The
June 30, 1982 expiration date was the third exten
sion of the moratorium, and “many sources saw
little hope that Congress could act by that dead
line.”40
Because the moratorium on the issuance of rul
ings and regulations expired, Section 269 of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 pro
vided for an indefinite extension of the interim relief
provisions of the 1978 legislation. In addition, Sen
ator Dole introduced the Independent Contractors
Tax Classification and Compliance Bill of 1982.41
The bill, which would be effective for services per
formed after June 30,1982, would establish a statu
tory safe harbor for independent contractors who
can meet a five-part test. Specifically, the test would
be based on (1) control of hours worked, (2) place of
business, (3) amount of investment or fluctuation of
income, (4) use of a written contract and notice of
tax responsibilities and (5) the filing of information
and income tax returns. The bill would allow tax
payers who do not qualify under the five-part test to
rely on common-law standards. In testimony before
the Senate Finance Committee, Assistant Treasury
Secretary Chapoton announced the Administra
tion’s general support for the measure, but urged
that the safe harbor be narrowed. He recommended
that the test focus on “cases in which withholding on
gross remuneration would not be sensible.” Al
though this bill would reduce some controversy if
enacted, some taxpayers would still have to look to
common-law standards, resulting in continued
litigation.
The SE provision of TEFRA does not include any
of the safe harbor tests listed above. However, Sec
tion 269 does provide that direct sellers and certain

40 Schmedel, “More Moratorium,” The Wall Street Journal (4/7/
82), at 1.
41 S. 2369.

licensed real estate agents will be treated as inde
pendent contractors, rather than employees, for
federal employment tax purposes.

Rentals from real estate
Income from the rental of real estate may be
excluded from the SE tax if the landlord performs
services only to maintain his investment, rather than
performing services for the convenience of the ten
ants. Regs. Sec. 1.1402(a)-4(c) states that “ [p]ay
ments for the use or occupancy of entire private
residences or living quarters in duplex or multiple
housing units are generally rentals from real es
tate.” However, payments for the use or occupancy
of rooms or other space where services are also
rendered to the occupant—i.e., for the use or occu
pancy of rooms or other quarters in hotels, boarding
houses or apartment houses furnishing hotel serv
ices, or in tourist camps or tourist homes, or for the
use or occupancy of space in parking lots, ware
houses or storage garages—do not constitute ren
tals from real estate and are subject to the SE tax.
Payments for nonresidential rentals can also be
excluded, depending on whether services are ren
dered. The regulation indicates that services are
considered rendered to the occupant if they are
“primarily for his convenience and are other than
those usually or customarily rendered in connection
with the rental of rooms or other space for occu
pancy only.” In a ruling, the IRS applied this regula
tion and concluded that providing maid service, de
livering messages and furnishing bus schedules for
renters of beach houses was for the convenience of
the occupants; thus, the rental income could not be
excluded from the SE tax.42 Similarly, making
change and supervising play in a coin-operated
amusement center will prevent exclusion of the ren
tal income.43
The Tax Court has also adopted a narrow con
struction of the rental exclusion. In Johnson,44 the
Court denied an exclusion for boat shed rents,
based on its finding that services such as loaning
boat paddles and giving fishing tips were provided
for the renters’ convenience, and were not essential
for the conservation of invested capital. However,
providing heat, water, electricity and garbage col
lection, and employing a janitor for a rental office
building were not considered as services rendered
to occupants by the Service 45 Similarly, the obliga
tions of a gas station owner, who leased his property

42
43
44
45

Rev. Rul. 57-108, 1957-1 CB 273.
Rev. Rul. 64-64, 1964-1 (Part 1) CB 320.
David E. Johnson, 60 TC 829 (1973).
Rev. Rul. 55-559, 1955-2 CB 315.

to a petroleum company which leased the property
back to him, were found to be “those commonly
incurred by the owner of rental property,” and the
rental income was therefore excludible.46
Although both the Tax Court and the IRS have
strictly interpreted the regulation on services
and rentals, they do not always agree. In Rev. Rul.
72-331 47 the IRS held that a trailer park owner who
maintained grounds, sewerage and laundry
facilities was providing services other than those
usually or customarily provided in connection with
the rental of space only for occupancy; thus, the
exclusion of rentals from SE income was denied. In
Bobo,48 however, the Tax Court rejected Rev. Rul.
72-331 and held that payments received by the
owner of a mobile home park were rentals from real
estate and were excludible. The Court stated that
the utilities, sewerage, trash collection and grounds
maintenance were required to maintain the property
for occupancy. The Court further noted that laundry
facilities provided for the convenience of the occu
pants were not substantial enough to override this
result.

Conclusion
Earnings from carrying on a trade or business are
generally subject to the SE tax. Determining what
constitutes a trade or business has been the source
of controversy, and the courts and the IRS have
considered many factors, including the continuity of
the service performed; whether the service is per
formed on a regular basis; whether the service is (or
will be) performed for others; and whether the tax
payer “holds himself out” as being in a trade or
business. In addition, the issue of whether or not the
taxpayer is self-employed (independent contractor)
or an employee has generated litigation. Generally,
the degree of control over the taxpayer is the major
factor in resolving this issue, but this determination
can be difficult. Presumably, the IRS will not issue
any further rulings on the issue of employee status
until Congress enacts some guidelines. Because of
Congress’ inaction, the moratorium on IRS rulings
was extended indefinitely, resulting in continued
uncertainty on this issue. Congress’ failure to in
clude any safe harbor tests in TEFRA exacerbated
the uncertainty and controversy over this issue. Fi
nally, rentals from real estate may be excluded from
income for purposes of the SE tax as long as serv
ices are rendered solely to maintain the taxpayer’s
investment, and not for the convenience of the
renters. tta

46 Rev. Rul. 60-112, 1960-1 CB 354.
47 Rev. Rul. 72-331, 1972-2 CB 513.
48 Fabian Bobo, 70 TC 706 (1978).
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Sale-leaseback of a dwelling unit
and Sec. 280A

Introduction

Under an amendment to Sec. 280A, enacted as
part of H.R. 5159 (P.L. 97-119), property rented at
fair value for use as a principal residence by family
members or by certain persons with a qualified
ownership interest in the property no longer bears
the “vacation home taint.”1 This change in Sec.
280A provides an attractive opportunity for a high
tax bracket individual to purchase the principal resi
dence of a low bracket family member and then
lease it back to the former owner. The seller can
receive cash for the appreciation in the value of his
home and still retain his place of residence. The
buyer can realize the customary tax and nontax
benefits associated with investment in rental prop
erty. In addition, the buyer’s tenant will be more
likely to maintain the property than an unrelated
tenant.
A sale-leaseback transaction between related
parties may be attacked by the IRS as a sham.
Avoiding the problem of a sham characterization is
the primary issue addressed in this article; in partic
ular, the article examines whether, and under what
conditions, a sale-leaseback transaction between

1 P.L. 97-119, Section 113(a)(1), adding new Sec. 280A(d)(3).
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related parties involving the seller’s residence will
be respected by the Service.

Background of Sec. 280A
Generally, a taxpayer is allowed a deduction for
ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in carry
ing on a trade or business, under Sec. 162,2 or for
the management, conservation or maintenance of
property held for the production of income, under
Sec. 212.3 A deduction under these provisions is
not allowed, however, if the activity engaged in by
the taxpayer is not for profit. In that situation, certain
deductions, subject to specific limitations, are
allowable under Sec. 183.
In 1976, Congress established separate rules for
determining whether the rental of a “vacation
home” is engaged in for profit. “[T]here are no
definitive rules relating to how much personal use of
vacation property will result in a finding that the
rental activities of vacation homes are not engaged
in for profit.”4 The Senate Finance Committee Re
port stated that “frequently personal motives pre-

2 Sec. 162(a).
3 Sec. 212.
4 S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1976).
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dominate [in engaging in a vacation home rental
activity] and the rental activities are undertaken to
minimize the expenses of ownership of the property
rather than to make an economic profit.”5 There
fore, “definitive rules should be provided to specify
the extent to which personal use would result in the
disallowance of certain deductions in excess of
gross income.”6
To provide these rules, Sec. 280A was enacted
as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.7 Under this
provision, taxpayers cannot take deductions in ex
cess of gross income for vacation homes if personal
use days exceed the greater of 14 days or 10% of
the number of days during the year for which the unit
is rented at a fair rental.8
Before 1981, a “personal use day” was defined
as a day during which the unit was used by (1) a
person (taxpayer or otherwise) having an interest in
the unit, (2) a family member, (3) an individual who
used the unit under an arrangement that enabled
the taxpayer to use some other dwelling unit or (4)
an individual who did not rent the unit at a fair
rental.9 In 1981, Congress reconsidered the first
two categories. The chairman of the Senate Fi
nance Committee argued that
[i]n an arm’s-length transaction, expense deductions under
the Tax Code should not depend on whether a taxpayer
rents to a stranger or to a relative. If a taxpayer in an
arm’s-length transaction rents a dwelling unit to a relative at
fair rental, for use as a principal residence, the Tax Code
should not treat him any differently than it would had he
rented to a stranger.1011
(Emphasis added.)

To address this problem, the definition of per
sonal use days was changed; days during which a
dwelling is rented at fair rental for use as a principal
residence by either a member of the taxpayer’s
family or by a person having a qualified ownership
interest in the unit no longer constitute personal use
days.11 This amendment created new family
income-shifting opportunities in which high tax
bracket family members could rent homes to low
bracket members. One such opportunity is the
sale-leaseback transaction.

Sale-leaseback between low bracket retired
parents and high bracket children
A sale-leaseback of a personal residence be
tween related parties is often most beneficial for

5 Id., at 151-2.
6 Id., at 152.
7 P.L. 94-455, Section 601, adding new Sec. 280A.
8 Sec. 280A(a) and (d).
9 Sec. 280A(d)(2).
10 Cong. Rec. S15484 (12/16/81) (remarks of Sen. Dole, R.Kans.).
11 See note 1.

retired parents, acting as seller-lessee, and their
child and his or her spouse, acting as buyer-lessor.
Suppose that the parents (P) wish to increase their
immediate and future cash flow by taking advan
tage of their home equity, and the children (C) want
to invest in residential rental property. P could cash
in on the home appreciation either by selling the
home to a third party or by obtaining a home-equity
loan. If P chose the first alternative, the parents
would have to seek shelter elsewhere; the second
alternative would involve qualifying for a loan as
well as paying relatively high interest costs.
If C’s tax rate is higher than P’s, a sale-leaseback
agreement could achieve the objectives of both par
ties and also reduce overall family income taxes.
The owner-financing of a major portion of the equity
results in a shifting of income because the interest
income reported byP is deductible by C. In addition,
as an owner of rental property, C will be able to
claim depreciation deductions, unlike owners of a
personal residence. The example below provides
an illustration of a sale-leaseback agreement. The
example is based on assumed taxable incomes,
prior to the agreement, of $8,000 for P and $65,000
for C.12
Example of sale-leaseback agreement

P’s home is appraised for $90,000 and is en
cumbered by a $17,000 outstanding 10% mortgage
with a 20-year remaining term. The home has a
$30,000 tax basis. C agrees to pay $7,000 in cash,
assume the $17,000 mortgage and pay the remain
ing portion ($66,000) to P over a 20-year period at
the prevailing interest rate (e.g., 16% per annum).
C agrees to rent the home back to P at its fair
rental value of $600 per month. The lease agree
ment is for 10 years, but either party can terminate
the lease on an anniversary date by giving 30 days
notice. The lease agreement does not include any
repurchase options, but does provide for yearly rent
increases based on the annual consumer price in
dex. The costs of maintenance, taxes and insur
ance are to be paid by C; utility costs are to be paid
by P.
Table I, page 58 , illustrates the tax conse
quences, for P and C, of the agreement over a
10-year period. Table II, page 59 , provides a cash
flow analysis of C’s investment assuming it is liqui
dated after 10 years. The following conclusions
should be noted.
• The family tax savings over the 10-year period
equal $11,050. It is assumed that P excludes the

12 For the 1983 tax year, the 44% tax bracket for married individ
uals filing joint returns includes taxable incomes between
$60,000 and $85,600.
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Table I
Family tax decrease as a result of the sale-leaseback agreement
6 x 44%
(7)
C’s
decrease
(increase)
in taxf

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

2 - (3 + 4 + 5)
(6)

Year

Rental
incomea

Interest on
parent noteb

Interest
on first
mortgagec

Depre
ciationd

Net decrease
(increase) in
C’s incomee

1
2
3
4
5

$ 7,200
7,500
7,900
8,300
8,800

10,500
10,400
10,300
10,200
10,100

1,700
1,700
1,600
1,600
1,600

4,500
4,200
3,900
3,700
3,500

9,500
8,800
7,900
7,200
6,400

4,200
3,850
3,500
3,150
2,800

1,950
1,750
1,600
1,600
1,600

2,250
2,100
1,900
1,550
1,200

39,700

51,500

8,200

19,800

39,800

17,500

8,500

9,000

9,200
9,600
10,100
10,600
11,200

9,900
9,700
9,500
9,200
8,900

1,500
1,500
1,400
1,400
1,300

3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500

5,700
5,100
4,300
3,500
2,500

2,500
2,250
1,900
1,550
1,100

1,550
1,500
1,450
1,400
1,350

950
750
450
150
(250)

Sum:
6-10

50,700

47,200

7,100

17,500

21,100

9,300

7,250

2,050

Total

90,400

98,700

15,300

37,300

60,900

26,800

15,750

$11,050

Sum:
1-5

6
7
8
9
10

(8)

7-8
(9)

P’s
increase
in taxg

Net decrease
(increase) in
family tax

a Assumes a rent increase of 5% a year.
bRepresents the approximate interest portion of a $66,000 16% loan (calculated on a yearly basis) amortized over 20 years with
payments of $11,100 per year.
c Represents the approximate interest of a $17,000 10% loan (calculated on a yearly basis) amortized over 20 years with payments of
$2,000 per year.
d Represents depreciation expense using the 125% declining-balance method. The dwelling is assumed to represent 80% of the total
value of the property. Also, component depreciation is ignored for simplicity.
eFor simplicity, insurance and real estate taxes have been omitted from the calculation of income.
fFor simplicity, it is assumed that C remain in the 44% tax bracket.
9 Represents the extra tax P must pay as a result of the interest income on the note. P's taxable income before interest is assumed to be
$8,000. Year 1 is assumed to be 1983.

$60,000 capital gain on the sale by electing the
one-time exclusion under Sec. 121.13
• In this example, the cash flow position of P is
favored at the expense of the government and C.
The loan amortization payments to P and the bank
are $11,100 and $2,000, respectively, while the
initial rental income is only $7,200. Consequently,
C’s net after-tax cash outlay, including the $7,000
down payment, over the 10-year period is $20,800
(see Table II). However, this negative cash flow
has amortized the debt obligations on the property

13 If a loss had been realized on the sale of P’s personal resi
dence, however, no deduction would be allowed. Sec. 262.
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by approximately $17,000 and has increased P's
after-tax cash flow by $31,850 ($20,800 +
$11,050). Assuming a 5% appreciation rate on the
property, C’s after-tax internal rate of return on the
disposition of the property after 10 years approxi
mates 16%.
• The tax savings in the earlier years are much
greater than in the later years. In fact, most of the tax
savings occur in the first five years, due to the
combination of the declining interest and deprecia
tion deductions used in calculating the change in
C’s taxable income.
• Since P has owned the house for many years,
C is prevented from using the accelerated cost re
covery system by the anti-churning rules of Sec.

Table II
Cash flow analysis of C

(1)

(2)
Rental
income

Item

Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(3)
Debt
payments

(4)
Down
payment

2 - (3 + 4)
(5)
Before-tax
cash flow

(6)
Tax savings
(cost)

(7)
After-tax
cash flow

4,200
3,850
3,500
3,150
2,800
2,500
2,250
1,900
1,550
1,100

(8,700)
(1,750)
(1,700)
(1,650)
(1,500)
(1,400)
(1,250)
(1,100)
(950)
(800)

$ 7,200
7,500
7,900
8,300
8,800
9,200
9,600
10,100
10,600
11,200

13,100
13,100
13,100
13,100
13,100
13,100
13,100
13,100
13,100
13,100

7,000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
______ 0

(12,900)
(5,600)
(5,200)
(4,800)
(4,300)
(3,900)
(3,500)
(3,000)
(2,500)
(1,900)

90,400

131,000

7,000

(47,600)

26,800

(20,800)

146,600a
(66,000)

(16,850)b

129,750
(66,000)

33,000

9,950

$ 42,950

Cash flow
before sale
Sale proceeds
Loan liquidation
Net cash from investment
Internal rate of return

____ 8%

16%

a Represents sales price on a $90,000 investment assumed to appreciate 5% a year for 10 years.
b Represents the tax on a $92,600 capital gain and a $1,300 ordinary gain (depreciation recapture) assuming C’s tax rate is
44%.

168(e)(4)(B)(i). Instead, the 125% declining-bal
ance method can be used, provided that the dwell
ing is depreciated over at least 20 years.14
Validity of sale-leaseback transaction
Introduction. The form of the sale-leaseback
transaction described above will be respected for
tax purposes provided that dominion and control of
the property passes from P to C. In the example,
however, some indicia of ownership are conveyed
while other indicia are retained (or given back in the
form of the leasehold). Aware of the tax benefits that
may accrue to the parties (whether or not related)
who engage in a sale-leaseback transaction, the
Service has attacked the form of these transactions
using two theories.
First, the Service may contend that the trans
action is a sham, conceived solely for tax benefits.

14 Sec. 167(j)(5)(B). For simplicity, it is assumed that component
depreciation is not used by C.

The theory underlying this argument is that the pur
ported seller-lessee’s economic position has not
been affected by the “transaction”; the risks, bur
dens and benefits of ownership have not shifted
from seller to buyer. A transaction is particularly
susceptible to attack where the seller-lessee is
given repurchase options. In that situation, the Serv
ice is likely to argue that the transaction is, in sub
stance, a mere financing arrangement.
Second, although not applicable to the trans
action in the example, where the leaseback is for a
period of at least 30 years and the seller realizes a
loss on the sale, the Service has argued that the
transaction is a single integrated transaction involv
ing a Sec. 1031 like-kind exchange.15 Under Sec.
1031, the loss has not been recognized.
On the other hand, the IRS has occasionally ar
gued that a valid sale-leaseback has occurred. The
Service adopts this position when the selling price
of the property (without regard to the leasehold) is

15 See Regs. Sec. 1.1031 (a)-1 (c); Rev. Ruls. 60-43,1960-1 CB
687, and 76-301, 1976-2 CB 241. See also note 38, infra.

59

less than its fair market value. The Service may
contend that the buyer-lessor must include in in
come, as prepaid rent, the capital value of the
leasehold (generally equal to the excess of the
property’s fair market value over its selling price). In
addition, the Service may argue that the seller
should include the capital value as an amount
realized on the sale.
Dominion and control. A critical issue in a sale
leaseback transaction, especially between related
parties, is whether the form of the transaction will be
respected for tax purposes or whether, in sub
stance, the transaction was merely a sham or
subterfuge, which will not be respected. To satisfy
this substance requirement, dominion and control
of the property must pass to the “buyer.”
In Frank Lyon Co.,16 the Eighth Circuit examined
the “bundle of rights” associated with property
ownership and analyzed whether the seller or the
buyer had the larger stack. The Supreme Court
adopted the Eighth Circuit’s approach, but not its
conclusion; the Court examined the objective
economic realities of the transaction, stating that
“the Court has refused to permit the transfer of
formal legal title to shift the incidence of taxation
attributable to ownership of property where the
transferor continues to retain significant control
over the property transferred.”17
In Sunnen,18 an earlier decision, the Supreme
Court examined whether “significant control” of
property had passed to the transferee. Mr. Sunnen
held 89% of the stock of Sunnen Products Com
pany, and his wife held 10%. Sunnen had entered
into several nonexclusive agreements under which
Sunnen Products was licensed to manufacture and
sell various devices for which he had applied for
patents. In return, Sunnen was to receive royalties
equal to 10% of the gross sales from the devices.
Sunnen assigned to his wife as gifts all his rights,
title and interest in these license contracts, as well
as in the royalties accruing under the agreements.
The wife received the royalties from the contracts
and reported these payments as income. The gov
ernment argued, however, that the payments
should be included in Sunnen’s income.
The Supreme Court agreed with the government,
reasoning that if Sunnen had retained the licenses
and assigned the right to the royalties to his wife, the

16 Frank Lyon Co., 435 US 561 (1978)(41 AFTR2d 78-1142,
78-1 USTC ¶9370), rev'g 536 F2d 746 (8th Cir. 1976)(38
AFTR2d 76-5060, 76-1 USTC ¶9451).
17 Id., 435 US at 572-3, citing Joseph Sunnen, 333 US 591
(1948)(36 AFTR 611, 48-1 USTC ¶9230), and George B.
Clifford, Jr., 309 US 331 (1940)(23 AFTR 1077, 40-1 USTC
¶9265).
18 Sunnen, id.
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royalty payments would have been taxable to him.19
The more difficult issue was whether the result
should be different because the taxpayer had as
signed the underlying contracts, as well as the right
to receive the royalties.
The taxpayer contended that the license con
tracts, rather than the patents, were the ultimate
source of the royalty payments. Because he had
relinquished both the fruit—the royalties—and the
tree—the license contracts—he argued that he
should not be taxable on the royalties.
The Supreme Court did not address the taxpayer’s
contention. Instead, the Court stated that “[t]he
crucial question remains whether the assignor re
tains sufficient power and control over the assigned
property or over receipt of the income to make it
reasonable to treat him as the recipient of the in
come for tax purposes.”20 The Court concluded that
Sunnen retained substantial interests in both the
contracts and the royalty payments, and therefore
could not successfully assign the income to his wife.
Specifically, the Court held that all the facts and
circumstances indicated that the transfer of the con
tracts did not effect any substantial change in the
taxpayer’s economic status. Despite the assign
ments, the license contracts and royalty payments
remained within the family group. Thus, Sunnen
was able to enjoy, at least indirectly, the benefits
received by his wife.
It is important to note that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sunnen did not characterize all intra
family transactions as shams. Instead, the Court
stated that special scrutiny is necessary in this
situation “lest what is in reality but one economic
unit be multiplied into two or more by devices which,
though valid under state law, are not conclusive so
far as [Sec. 61 ] is concerned.”21 (Footnote omitted.)
If dominion and control of property pass to the pur
ported transferee, however, the conveyance will be
respected for federal income tax purposes, even if
the transferee is related to the transferor.
For example, in the landmark Culbertson22 case,
the taxpayer decided, for nontax reasons, to sell an
undivided one-half interest in a herd of cattle to his
four sons, who executed a note in payment for the
cattle. The taxpayer and his sons “contributed” their
cattle to a purported partnership. One-half of the
note to the father was paid through gifts by the
father; the other one-half was paid through loan
proceeds obtained by the partnership. This loan

19 See Lucas v. Guy C. Earl, 281 US 111 (1930)(8 AFTR 10287,
2 USTC ¶496), and Paul R. Horst, 311 US 112 (1940)(24
AFTR 1058, 40-2 USTC 519787).
20 Sunnen, note 17, at 604.
21 Clifford, note 17, at 335.
22 William O. Culbertson, Sr., 337 US 733 (1949)(37 AFTR 1391,
49-1 USTC ¶9323).

was later repaid from proceeds from the cattle busi
ness. The IRS argued that the entire income from
the “partnership” should be taxed to the father.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Tax Court to determine which, if any, of the tax
payer’s sons were bona fide partners. The Court
rejected the idea that a gift to a family member could
never be made without retaining the essentials of
ownership, if the gift was then invested in a family
partnership.23 “If the donee of property who then
invests it in the family partnership exercises domin
ion and control over that property—and through that
control influences the conduct of the partnership
and the disposition of its income—he may well be a
true partner.”24
The principle of Culbertson that taxability de
pends upon true ownership, no matter how at
tained, has been codified in the family partnership
rule of Sec. 704(e)(1): “A person shall be recog
nized as a partner for purposes of this subtitle if he
owns a capital interest in a partnership in which
capital is a material income-producing factor,
whether or not such interest was derived by pur
chase or gift from any other person.” The Commit
tee Reports accompanying the predecessor of Sec.
704(e)(1) stressed that “however the owner of a
partnership interest may have acquired such in
terest, the income is taxable to the owner, if he is the
real owner. If the ownership is real, it does not
matter what motivated the transfer to him or
whether the business benefited from the entrance
of the new partner.”25 Similarly, the regulations
state: “To be recognized, a transfer must vest
dominion and control of the partnership interest in
the transferee.”26 The regulations also state: “If the
reality of the transfer of interest is satisfactorily es
tablished, the motives for the transaction [e.g., the
presence or absence of a tax avoidance motive or of
a business purpose] are generally immaterial.”27
Like the treatment of other property transfers, a
sale-leaseback transaction will be respected for tax
purposes if dominion and control pass to the buyer.
Specifically, the seller must transfer the property in
fee to the buyer, and the buyer must convey a
leasehold interest to the seller. Thus, the seller’s
economic interest must change from ownership in
fee to possession of a leasehold. Indicia of this
change have been developed in cases that are
discussed in the next three sections.

23 Id., at 747. See also note 17.
24 Id., at 747.
25 S. Rep. No. 781,82d Cong., 1 st Sess. 39 (1951); H. Rep. No.
586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1951).
26 Regs. Sec. 1.704-1(e)(1)(iii).
27 Regs. Sec. 1.704-1(e)(2)(x). See also John R. Hudspeth, 509
F2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1975)(35 AFTR2d 75-676, 75-1 USTC
¶9224), aff’g in part and rev’g in part TC Memo 1972-253.

No repurchase option; lease term of less than
30 years. An early sale-leaseback case in which the
IRS advanced the “sham” transaction doctrine is
Standard Envelope Manufacturing Co.28 The tax
payer entered into a transaction in which it sold
property at a loss to an unrelated party for $70,000
cash. The buyer agreed to lease the property back
to taxpayer for one year at an annual rent of $6,000,
with an option to renew for an additional 24 years.
One year later, the taxpayer exercised this option.
The Service disallowed the loss and attacked the
transaction as a sham. The Tax Court disagreed,
however, and held that, in an arm’s-length trans
action, the taxpayer had conveyed substantially all
its rights in the property, and had therefore mate
rially changed its economic position. The taxpayer’s
good faith belief that the selling price represented
fair market value led the Court to view the trans
action as bona fide. Further, the lease agreement
provided for a fair rental and contained neither re
purchase nor renewal options, reinforcing the view
that the transaction was valid.
In contrast, where the transaction has not pro
duced a material change in the economic position of
the purported seller-lessee, the courts have re
jected the validity of the sale-leaseback. In
Schaefer,29 the taxpayer “conveyed” hotel property
for $200,000; the buyer paid nothing down and gave
the taxpayer a $200,000 promissory note that pro
vided for $10,000 annual principal payments plus
interest at 8%, with the first year’s interest to be
prepaid immediately. The buyer could, at any time,
resell the property to the taxpayer for $200,000, but
he could sell to someone other than the taxpayer
only for a sales price of at least $240,000, of which
$40,000 would go to the taxpayer.
The buyer leased the property back to the tax
payer on a year-to-year basis. The taxpayer could
sublet if he chose to, but he was required to pay
all operating expenses, real estate taxes and fire
insurance premiums, and to assume full control of
the premises, holding the buyer harmless in all re
spects. The buyer had the right to inspect twice a
year. The taxpayer also agreed to pay the buyer the
first $10,000 in operating profits plus 50% of any net
profit above $20,000, with a $10,000 guarantee.
The Tax Court agreed with the Service that the
purported sale-leaseback was actually a financing
arrangement. The taxpayer’s dominion and control
over the hotel were not altered by the execution of
the sale-leaseback agreement, and his actions
went beyond those normally associated with a mere
lessee. The risks, burdens and benefits of owner

28 Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15 TC 41 (1950), acq. 1950-2
CB 4.
29 Cynthia Schaefer, TC Memo 1980-440.
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ship did not pass to the buyer: The put option
shielded him from any risk, and he could reap a
profit only by selling the property for more than
$240,000, an unlikely occurrence considering past
economic problems with the property. Moreover,
the buyer had made no real economic investment in
the hotel; there was no down payment and the
$10,000 principal was offset by the $10,000 mini
mum lease payment.
When the parties to a sale-leaseback are related,
courts scrutinize the validity of the transaction even
more closely in order to prevent the parties from
engaging in income splitting. Even in the relatedparty context, however, the form of the transaction
will be respected if properly structured.
In Carroll,30 the taxpayer operated a sole pro
prietorship that constructed sewer lines and sew
age treatment plants. For apparently valid business
reasons, the taxpayer formed a corporation and
transferred the construction equipment used by the
proprietorship to the corporation in exchange for its
stock and the assumption of certain liabilities of the
proprietorship. Some of the liabilities were then
guaranteed by the taxpayer. Simultaneously with
the transfer, the corporation entered into a net lease
of the equipment to the proprietorship, which con
tinued to use the equipment as before. The Service
argued that the “sale-leaseback” lacked economic
substance and a business purpose and therefore
disallowed a deduction for the rental payments.
The Tax Court disagreed, however, and sus
tained the form of the sale-leaseback transaction,
relying on the following facts:
• The taxpayer (seller-lessee) retained no direct
interest in the assets.
• The net lease provisions were customary in
the industry.
•
The rent was reasonable.31
• The terms of the lease were essentially
adhered to.
• Throughout the lease term, the buyer-lessor
corporation received substantial rental payments,
which resulted in substantial profits on which sub
stantial taxes were paid.
• Profits were used by the buyer-lessor to pur
chase additional equipment for use in its business.
• All relevant third parties were notified of the
transaction and were given an opportunity to re
structure their arrangements with the taxpayer and
the corporation to protect their interests.

30 Preston W. Carroll, TC Memo 1978-173.
31 See T.R. Vardeman, Sr., 209 F Supp 346 (E.D. Tex. 1962)(10
AFTR2d 5591, 62-2 USTC ¶9711), where the District Court
emphasized the fair rentals paid by the related party seller
lessee and the substantial business purpose for the trans
action.

62

The Court also stated that the taxpayer’s guaran
tee of certain corporate obligations did little to
strengthen the Service’s case, because such a
guarantee is customarily required of a shareholder
of a closely held corporation.
Summary and tax tips. Whether or not the parties
are related, courts have generally looked at all of the
facts and circumstances in order to determine
whether a sale-leaseback should be respected for
federal tax purposes. Taxpayers will have a better
argument for a valid transaction if the selling price
and the rentals are at fair market value (Standard
Envelope). The risks, burdens and benefits of
ownership should pass to the buyer (Schaefer), but
a net lease may be acceptable if it is a customary
commercial practice (Carroll).32 Repurchase op
tions and extended renewal options exercisable by
the seller-lessee (Standard Envelope) and put op
tions exercisable by the buyer-lessor (Schaefer),
although not necessarily fatal (see infra), may indi
cate that dominion and control have not been con
veyed to the buyer and that the transaction is actu
ally a financing arrangement. The terms of the lease
should be consistent with commercial practice and
should be adhered to by the parties (Carroll); the
seller-lessee should not be accorded rights greater
than those of the usual lessee (Schaefer). Finally,
there should be a legitimate nontax purpose for the
transaction (Vardeman33 and Carroll).
Capital value of a leasehold. The preceding
discussion indicated the importance of passing the
risks, burdens and benefits of ownership to the
buyer in a sale-leaseback. Another factor ana
lyzed in the cases is whether the selling price,
without regard to the leasehold, of the property
equals its fair market value, and whether the les
sees pay a fair market rental to the buyer. In other
words, the sale-leaseback between P and C dis
cussed in the above example (page 720) should be
structured so that the leasehold has a zero capital
value. If the selling price is less than the fair market
value of the property, the transaction may be con
strued as either a conveyance of a remainder inter
est with retention of a possessory term or as a sale
of the entire fee interest followed by a leaseback
which has a positive capital value.
To illustrate, assume that A conveys property
with a fair market value of $100 to B for $75 cash
and a rent-free “leasehold” interest of a certain

32 See also Carol W. Hilton, 671 F2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982)(49
AFTR2d 82-1060, 82-1 USTC ¶9263), aff'gper curiam 74 TC
305 (1980), discussed infra.
33 Vardeman, note 31.

term. Two interpretations of this transaction are
possible: (1) A conveyed a remainder interest in the
property to B for $75, reserving a possessory term
interest. (If A must pay “rent” under the leasehold, A
may have conveyed a future interest to B for $75
minus the present value of the rentals, and reserved
a term interest. The present value of the rents may
be construed as a loan made on the security of the
reserved term interest.) (2) A conveyed the entire
fee interest to B for $100, followed by a leaseback to
A. Thus, $25 ($100-$75) of the property is received
by B as prepaid rent and A may amortize this $25
over the lease term.34 If the term of the lease is 30
years or more, Sec. 1031 may apply to deny A a loss
or to restrict the gain recognized to the boot ($75)
received.35
In the companion cases of Alstores Realty36 and
Steinway & Sons,37 Steinway owned certain real
property that it used in its manufacturing operations.
Steinway wanted to move its operations to another
location and therefore wanted to sell the realty, but it
temporarily required the use of the premises. Con
sequently, Steinway offered to sell the property for
$1 million to Alstores, conditioned on a leaseback
for 2½ years. Eventually, the two parties agreed
that Alstores would pay $750,000 cash for title to the
property, and Steinway would retain occupancy for
2½ years under a space occupancy agreement that
did not require Steinway to pay rent. The space
occupancy agreement provided that Alstores would
pay Steinway the use value of the property in case it
was damaged or destroyed so as to make it unsuit
able for use by Steinway in its business operations.
Also, Alstores agreed to pay for and supply to
Steinway heat, electricity and water. The difference
between $1 million and $750,000 (i.e., $250,000)
was the fair rental value of the property for 2½
years. If Steinway vacated the premises after two
years, Alstores agreed to pay Steinway 6¼¢ per
square foot for each month vacated until the
agreement expired at the end of the 2½ years.
The Service contended that the transaction was
actually a conveyance by Steinway of the entire fee
for $750,000 cash and a $250,000 leaseback. The
$250,000 received by Alstores represented prepaid
rent. Alstores argued, however, that Steinway had
conveyed a future interest for $750,000 cash, and
had reserved a 2½-year possessory term.

34 See especially, Alstores Realty Corp., 46 TC 363 (1966), and
Steinway & Sons, 46 TC 375 (1966), acq. 1967-2 CB 3,
discussed infra.
35 Century Electric Co., 192 F2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951)(41 AFTR
205, 51 -2 USTC ¶9482), aff’g 15 TC 581 (1950), cert. denied,
342 US 954 (1952).
36 Alstores Realty, note 34.
37 Steinway & Sons, note 34.

The Tax Court agreed with the Service’s theory
for the following reasons:
1. Alstores provided Steinway with electricity,
water and heat.
2. “Of key significance” was the fact that Al
stores agreed to reimburse Steinway for loss of
occupancy by act of God or if Steinway vacated
during the last six months of the agreement. If
Steinway had actually reserved a term interest, the
Court reasoned, why would Alstores agree to pay
Steinway in the event of nonoccupancy? Instead,
the Tax Court concluded that this provision repre
sented reimbursement of prepaid rent for nonoccu
pancy under the terms of the agreement.
Because Alstores (the purchaser) had assumed
and retained the risks, burdens and benefits of
ownership during the seller’s possessory term, the
Tax Court held that, in substance, a sale followed by
a leaseback had occurred.38 Correlatively, the
Court held that Steinway must include the $250,000
leasehold as an amount realized, to be amortized
over the lease term.39
In Ashlock,40 however, the Court concluded that
the seller retained the risks, burdens and benefits
during the possessory term. The seller offered to
sell real property to the taxpayer for $75,000, but the
property was subject to a lease to a third party. The
taxpayer rejected the offer. The seller and taxpayer
then agreed to a contract of sale under which the
taxpayer would pay $40,000, but the seller would
retain “possession” of the property and all rights to
the rental income from the third-party lessee until
the expiration of the primary term of the existing
lease. During this term, the seller agreed to pay
property taxes, insurance premiums and all normal
maintenance expenses related to the property. The
seller also agreed to bear the risk of loss of rental

38 Sec. 1031 was not an issue in Alstores since the lease term
was for only 2½ years. However, if the leasehold were for a
term of at least 30 years, then a like-kind exchange might have
been deemed to have occurred pursuant to Regs. Sec.
1.1031(a)-1(c). Where the leasehold had a nonzero capital
value, the government was successful in disallowing a loss
incurred by the seller in a purported sale-leaseback under the
theory that the transaction in substance was a tax-free, likekind exchange under Sec. 1031. Century Electric, note 35.
However, the government has been singularly unsuccessful in
its Sec. 1031 argument whenever the leasehold did not have a
separate capital value. Leslie Co., 539 F2d 943 (3d Cir.
1976)(38 AFTR2d 76-5458, 76-2 USTC ¶9553), aff’g 64 TC
247 (1975), nonacq. 1978-2 CB3; Crowley, Milner & Co., 689
F2d 635 (6th Cir. 1982)(50 AFTR2d 82-5795, 82-2 USTC
¶9612), aff’g 76 TC 1030 (1981). See also Jordan Marsh Co.,
269 F2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959)(4 AFTR2d 5341, 59-2 USTC
¶9641).
39 See also Rev. Rul. 77-413, 1977-2 CB 298, in which the
Service adopted the risks, burdens and benefits theory of
Alstores.
40 McCulley Ashlock, 18 TC 405 (1952), acq. 1952-2 CB 1.
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income in case the property was damaged or de
stroyed. Any insurance proceeds were to be used to
restore and repair the property.
The IRS contended that the taxpayer had pur
chased the property in fee for $75,000, paying
$40,000 down, with a deferred obligation of
$35,000. The Tax Court rejected this argument,
however, and concluded instead that the seller had
reserved an estate for years. Thus, the rents re
ceived from the lessee were income to the seller.
The Court reasoned that the seller retained the
control and benefits of ownership, not only because
the seller had agreed to pay all property taxes,
insurance premiums and normal maintenance
costs, but also because it bore the risk of loss of
rental income.41

Summary and tax tips. If the seller intends to convey
only a remainder interest in property, he should
retain the risks, burdens and benefits of ownership
during the possessory term (Alstores, Ashlock, El
ler42). This intent should be clearly expressed in the
lease agreement (Kruesel,43 Eller).
Repurchase option. A court is more likely to find
that dominion and control have not passed to the
buyer-lessor in a purported sale-leaseback when
the seller-lessee is given an option to repurchase
the property. In this situation, the Service will prob
ably contend that the transaction is a mere financing
arrangement, especially when the option price plus
the rent to be paid by the seller are calculated to
approximate the buyer’s “purchase price” plus in
terest.44
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Lazarus 45 The taxpayer conveyed legal title to
property worth $6 million to a bank for $3,250,000.
Contemporaneously, the bank net leased the prop
erty back to taxpayer for 99 years; the lease was
renewable, with an option to purchase at a stated

41 See also J.J. Perkins, 301 US 655 (1937)(19 AFTR 538, 37-2
USTC ¶9315), where the Supreme Court held that an assign
ee of oil interests was not taxable on income retained by the
assignor. Instead of a risks, burdens and benefits test, the
Court in Carl Kruesel, DC Minn., 1963 (12 AFTR2d 5701,63-2
USTC ¶9714), adopted an intent test to determine whether a
fee or remainder interest had been sold. Recently, in Walt E.
Eller, 77 TC 934 (1981), the Tax Court had an opportunity to
consider which of these tests should be used. The Court
declined to choose one test over the other, however, because
under either test the government would have prevailed.
42 Eller, id.
43 Kruesel, id.
44 See, e.g., Rev. Ruls. 68-590, 1968-2 CB 66, and 72-543,
1972-2 CB 87.
45 F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 US 252 (1939)(23 AFTR 778, 39-2
USTC ¶9793), aff’g 101 F2d 728 (6th Cir. 1939)(22 AFTR 585,
39-1 USTC ¶9305), aff’g 32 BTA 633 (1935).
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price. The entire transaction was engaged in for
legitimate business reasons: The taxpayer wanted
to obtain a long-term loan, using the security of its
property. The IRS disallowed the depreciation de
ductions taken by the taxpayer on the ground that
the statutory right to depreciation follows legal title.
The Board of Tax Appeals found that the deed was,
in substance, no more than security for a loan on the
property and that the “rent” was actually interest on
the loan. The Supreme Court agreed, using a sub
stance versus form rationale.46
The principles of Lazarus and the risks, burdens
and benefits test were adopted by lower courts
when they analyzed purported sale-leasebacks
with repurchase options.4748
In 1978, however, the
Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s deci
sion in Frank Lyon 48 In that case, Worthen Bank
and Trust Company wanted to finance and build its
own multi-story bank and office building, but was
unable to do so because of certain interest and
investment restrictions imposed by state and fed
eral regulations. The regulators agreed to a sale
leaseback arrangement with Frank Lyon Company.
Worthen and Lyon entered into a lease of the land
for 76 years and a sale of the building for
$7,640,000. Lyon then net leased the building back
to Worthen for a primary term of 25 years. Lyon
financed all but $500,000 through a 25-year fully
recourse mortgage from a third-party lender.
Worthen’s rent payments to Lyon equalled the
mortgage amortization payments. The lease
agreement contained eight five-year renewal op
tions, a repurchase option available at four times
during the primary lease term and provisions to
cover condemnation or destruction. As a result of
these lease provisions, Lyon’s $500,000 invest
ment would be returned to him with 6% compound
interest.
The government contended that the transaction
was not, in substance, a sale-leaseback, but in
stead was an elaborate financing scheme designed
to provide economic benefits to Worthen and a
guaranteed return to Lyon, who was simply a con
duit used to forward the mortgage payments, dis
guised as rent, to the mortgagee.
The Eighth Circuit agreed and concluded that
“the benefits, risks, and burdens which taxpayer
has incurred with respect to the Worthen building
are simply too insubstantial to establish a claim to

46 Although not couched in terms of a risks, burdens and benefits
theory, Lazarus is consistent with it. In fact, the Service cited
Lazarus as authority for the theory in Rev. Rul. 68-590, note
44.
47 See, e.g., Sun Oil Co., 562 F2d 258 (3d Cir. 1977)(40 AFTR2d
77-5737, 77-2 USTC ¶9641), and Frank Lyon, note 16.
48 Frank Lyon, note 16.

the status of owner for tax purposes.”49 Specifically,
the Eighth Circuit noted that
—the lease agreement limited Lyon’s right to prof
it from its investment,
—the option prices did not take into account pos
sible appreciation in value,
—any condemnation award in excess of the
mortgage and Lyon’s investment would be paid to
Worthen, and
—Worthen controlled the building’s disposition
through its repurchase and lease renewal options.50
The Supreme Court also analyzed the attributes
of ownership in the transaction, but the Court re
versed the Eighth Circuit and held that Lyon had
obtained dominion and control of the property. Un
fortunately, the decision discusses so many factors
that it is difficult to determine their relative impor
tance. Four factors seemed to be particularly impor
tant, however.
• The three-party character of the transaction .51
• Lyon’s personal liability on the note to the in
surance company and its investment of $500,000 of
its own money “up front.”52
• Lyon’s willingness to “gamble” that the rental
value of the building during the last 10 years of the
ground lease would be sufficient to recoup its in
vestment.53 Unlike the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme
Court apparently viewed Lyon as exposed to some
“downside” risk. Similarly, the Court apparently be
lieved that there was an “upside” potential for prof
its if the rents during the last 10 years were suffi
ciently high.
• The fact that Worthen was not acquiring an
equity in the property during the term of the lease.54
The Supreme Court characterized as pure specula
tion the possibility of a growing equity, since the trial
court had determined that the rents and option
rights were reasonable.
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded,
where. . . there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with
economic substance which is compelled or encouraged by
business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-indepen
dent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoid
ance features that have meaningless labels attached, the
Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties
effectuated by the parties. Expressed another way, so long
as the lessor retains significant and genuine attributes of the
traditional lessor status, the form of the transaction adopted
by the parties governs for tax purposes.55

49 Id., 536 F2d at 754.
50 Id., at 752-753.
51 Id., 435 US at 574-576. This factor, according to the Court,
distinguished Frank Lyon from Lazarus and Sun Oil.
52 Frank Lyon, id., at 576-9.
53 Id., at 579.
54 Id., at 581.
55 Id., at 583-584.

In Hilton,56 decided two years later, the Tax Court
attempted to provide some guidance on the signifi
cance of the various factors mentioned in Lyon.
Broadway, a large department store chain, financed
the construction of a new store by using a single
purpose financing corporation. The financing cor
poration sold its corporate notes to certain insur
ance company lenders. The proceeds from the
notes were used to purchase the department store
from Broadway, and the entire cost of the purchase
was funded by the notes. Simultaneously, the
corporation leased the property back to Broadway,
and then transferred its interest in the property to a
multi-tiered partnership syndicate.
The lease agreement was structured as a triple
net lease; the initial lease term was 30 years, with
three renewal options that added 68 years to the
lease. Rental payments for the initial term equalled
the periodic payment of principal and interest on the
debt plus administrative expenses. If a bona fide
offer for the property was made by a third party, and
the lessor decided to accept, the agreement pro
vided that Broadway could repurchase the property
for $50,000 plus the unpaid balance on the notes. In
the event of partial destruction or condemnation of
the property, any proceeds were to be applied first
to the restoration of the property. Any balance of the
proceeds would go to Broadway.
The Court stated that the central issue was
whether the sale-leaseback was bona fide. To re
solve this issue, the Court reasoned that, under
Lyon, a sale-leaseback must be tested to determine
whether the transaction
—is genuinely multiple-party,
—has economic substance,
—is compelled or encouraged by business
realities, and
—is imbued with tax-independent considerations
that are not shaped solely by tax avoidance fea
tures.57
The Tax Court conceded that the financing
technique chosen by Broadway was compelled by
business realities and that there was at least a
two-party transaction between Broadway and the
insurance companies. The Court then examined
the buyer-lessor (the investors) to determine
whether a true three-party situation existed, i.e.,
whether the buyer-lessor had made an actual
economic investment in the property. To determine
this, the Court focused on whether the buyer
lessor’s method of payment for the property was
expected, at the outset, to quickly yield an equity
interest that the buyer-lessor could not abandon

56 Hilton, note 32.
57 Id., 74 TC at 347.
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prudently.58 The Court concluded that the buyer
lessor failed this test, after an elaborate analysis
that involved expert testimony, economic projec
tions and statistical and present-value theories.
The Tax Court’s decision in Hilton was significant
in two respects. First, in analyzing whether the
buyer-lessor could not prudently abandon its in
vestment, the Court assumed facts most favorable
to the investors and calculated that the net present
value of their investment was negative at a 6%
discount rate.
Second, the Court mentioned four factors that it
viewed as insignificant in determining whether the
transaction was bona fide:59
1. The existence of a net lease when it is a cus
tomary commercial practice.60
2. The existence of a nonrecourse mortgage
when that is a customary commercial practice.61
3. The fact that rent during the primary term was
equal to the debt service, again, if that was custom
ary practice.62
4. The fact that the transaction was put together
by a promoter.
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming Hilton “clari
fied” two points made by the Tax Court. First, the
appellate court suggested that the 6% discount rate
used by the Tax Court in its present value analysis
was for illustrative purposes only, and that it was not
intended to suggest a minimum required rate of
return. Second, the Ninth Circuit stated that al
though the balloon payment in Hilton was cited by
the Tax Court as a distinguishing factor from Lyon,
no negative inference should be drawn on the use of
balloon notes.

Summary and tax tips. A sale-leaseback in which
the seller-lessee is given an option to repurchase is
particularly prone to attack by the Service as a mere
financing arrangement. Like the sale-leaseback
without repurchase option, discussed above, how
ever, the ultimate issue is whether dominion and
control of the property have been conveyed to the
buyer-lessor. All facts and circumstances must be
considered in order to determine whether this test
has been met. In the context of a repurchase option,
the following factors are particularly significant:

58 Id., at 350. See also Est. of Charles T. Franklin, 544 F2d 1045
(9th Cir. 1976)(38 AFTR2d 76-6164, 76-2 USTC ¶9773), aff’g
64 TC 752 (1975), and David L. Narver, Jr., 670 F2d 855 (9th
Cir. 1982)(49 AFTR2d 82-1030, 82-1 USTC ¶9265), aff’gper
curiam 75 TC 53, 98-99 (1980).
59 Hilton, note 32, 74 TC at 348.
60 See also Carroll, note 30.
61 See also Paul D. Dunlap, 670 F2d 785 (8th Cir. 1982)(49
AFTR2d 82-667, 82-1 USTC ¶9195), rev’g on other grounds
74 TC 1377, 1435(1980).
62 Id., 74 TC at 1436.
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• The purchase price should represent fair mar
ket value. This factor is the “first step” in establish
ing the validity of the sale-leaseback. If the “pur
chase price” unreasonably exceeds fair market
value, the purported buyer-lessor will have no im
mediate equity in the property, and principal pay
ments will not yield an equity in the future (Lyon, Est.
of Franklin and Narver).62a If the fair market value
exceeds the “purchase price,” however, the trans
action may be construed as either a loan (especially
if the “seller” holds a repurchase option for the
amount of the “purchase price” less amortization)
or as a sale of a remainder interest in the property
with a term reserved. (Lazarus, Alstores, Ashlock,
Eller and Kruesel).
• The purported buyer-lessor should make a
“real investment” in the property. This investment
can be in the form of a significant down payment
and/or a right to future appreciation (Lyon and Hil
ton).
• The transaction should have economic sub
stance apart from the tax benefits. For example,
although rentals do not need to exceed debt service
for the initial term of a lease, the longer there is a
lack of (or negative) cash flow to the buyer-lessor,
the more difficult it will be to show that future ben
efits from appreciation or from higher renewal rents
will generate an overall positive return on his in
vestment, before tax considerations. Also, lengthy
lease terms for fixed amounts may severely deflate
the potential selling price, thus restricting the les
sor’s opportunities for appreciation in value.
• If possible, the sale-leaseback should involve
at least three parties: the seller-lessee, the buyer
lessor and a financial lender (Lyon).
• Neither the rentals nor the repurchase option
rights should give the seller-lessee an equity in
terest; rentals and option rights should be fair and
reasonable (Lyon).
In addition to these factors, the Tax Court has
held that certain factors are neutral in determining
whether a purported sale-leaseback is bona fide.
• The existence of a net lease, nonrecourse
debt and/or rent during the primary term equal to the
debt service is regarded as insignificant when this is
a customary commercial practice (Hilton, Dunlap63
and Carroll).
• The fact that the transaction is put together by
a promoter is not fatal to the transaction (Hilton).
• No negative inference should be drawn from
the use of balloon notes (Hilton, Ninth Circuit).

62a If the debt is with recourse and the parties are related, the
excess of purchase price over fair market value may be
characterized as a gift or as a loan (to be paid back with
inflated rentals).
63 Dunlap, note 61.

Specific guidelines for sale-leaseback of a
dwelling unit to a related party

Based on the factors discussed above, the follow
ing specific guidelines should be considered by re
lated parties, such as parents and children, when
they structure a sale-leaseback transaction:64
1. A market analysis or appraisal of the property
should be prepared to establish its fair market value
(at the beginning of the transaction and at the end of
lease) and the fair rental value of the property.65
Although fair rental was not a critical factor in the
most recent sale-leaseback decisions, a net loss
from the rental of a dwelling unit to a related party is
allowed only if the dwelling is rented at a fair rental
value to a family member for use as the tenant’s
principal residence 66
2. Lengthy lease terms and repurchase options
should be avoided. The leaseback should always
be for a term less than the economic life of the
property. For example, the typical lease agreement
for residential rental property rarely exceeds one
year. If the tenant insists on a purchase option, the
lease agreement should specify the purchase price
as the fair market value of the property at the option
date as determined by an independent appraisal.
3. A down payment (e.g., 5%) should be re
quired. This requirement will not only help to show
that the purchase is a “real investment,” but will also
conform to the rules governing most real estate
transactions that require a minimum down pay
ment.
4. Gifts by the seller-lessee to the buyer-lessor
may cast doubt on the validity of the transaction.67
In addition, the Joint Committee Report accom
panying the 1981 amendments explains that gifts
made by the taxpayer-owner to the family member
tenant at or about the time of the lease or periodi
cally during the year might jeopardize compliance
with the fair rental requirement.
5. The lease agreement should provide that the
lessor is entitled to the proceeds from condemna
tion or destruction (after satisfaction of encum
brances). In addition, the lessor should pay the
home insurance premiums and real estate taxes.68
64 Although we focus on the sale-leaseback of a dwelling unit to a
related party here, these guidelines have a more general
applicability.
65 Although the Tax Court examined sophisticated economic
projections submitted by the taxpayer and the IRS in Hilton,
such costly and detailed forecasts should not be necessary to
establish the economic substance of a sale-leaseback of a
personal residence. Instead, an appraiser or realtor should
prepare a narrative about the residential area indicating, inter
alia, its potential for growth and appreciation in value.
66 Sec. 280A(a) and (d)(3)(A).
67 See, e.g., Hudspeth, note 27.
68 See Lazarus, note 45, and Rev. Rul. 77-413, note 39. Also see
Alstores Realty, note 34, Ashlock, note 40, Kruesel, note 41,
and Eller, note 41.

Although a net lease may be a typical commercial
practice, and therefore a neutral factor in certain
real estate transactions, when the principals are
related and the property involved is a simple dwell
ing unit, net leases should be avoided.
6. To satisfy the economic substance require
ment, careful planning is necessary to assure that a
profit motive other than tax benefits can be dem
onstrated.

Analysis of case example

The tax consequences of a sale-leaseback will
ultimately turn on the economic substance of the
transaction, but it is the form of the transaction that
the courts will examine initially. An intrafamily sale
leaseback of a personal residence is likely to be
scrutinized more carefully by the IRS and the
courts. Under the guidelines discussed above,
however, it appears that the P-C transaction has
economic substance, apart from tax benefits, and
that C has retained “significant and genuine attri
butes of the traditional lessor status.”69 Therefore,
the form of the transaction (i.e., sale-leaseback)
should govern for tax purposes. Particularly sig
nificant in the P-C transaction are these factors:
• The fair market value of the property has been
used as the selling price.
• The lease agreement contains no repurchase
options, long lease terms, or other provisions that
would inhibit C from benefiting from the apprecia
tion in the value of the property.
• The presence of a third-party bank mortgagee
seems to meet the multiple-party criterion of Lyon.70
• A significant down payment (7.8%) has been
made. In addition, a fair rental has been charged,
and the expected return on investment before tax
considerations is approximately 8% (Table II).
Conclusion
A recent amendment to Sec. 280A provides an
attractive opportunity for family members to engage
in the sale-leaseback of a principal residence in
order to realize both tax and nontax benefits. Care
ful planning is essential, however, in order to ensure
the conveyance of dominion and control to the
buyer-lessor. If this requirement is satisfied, the
sale-leaseback form should be respected by the
IRS and the judiciary. tta

69 See Frank Lyon, note 16, 435 US at 584.
70 Recently, many lending institutions have inserted a due-onsale clause in the mortgage agreement. Consequently, P's
existing mortgage may not be assumable, or the rate on the
existing mortgage may increase.
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The taxation of social security and
railroad retirement benefits: statutory
application and planning alternatives

Introduction

The Social Security Amendments of 1983 pro
vide that, beginning in 1984, certain monthly ben
efits received under Title II of the Social Security Act
must be included in gross income for federal income
tax purposes.1 Tier I benefits provided under the
Railroad Retirement Act are also includible be
cause they are essentially equivalent to social se
curity benefits.1
2 Under the legislation, a portion of
the benefits will be included in gross income if onehalf of the benefits received, increased by a revised
measure of adjusted gross income, exceeds a
specified floor. In determining the revised adjusted
gross income, the full amount of tax-exempt interest
received or accrued by the taxpayer is added.

1 Prior to 1984, all social security and railroad retirement ben
efits were excludible from gross income. See I.T. 3447,1941-1
CB 191.
2 The Social Security Amendments of 1983, H. Rep. No. 98-25
to accompany H.R. 1900, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), as
reported in 11 P-H Federal Taxes (1983), at 59,304.24.
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These changes will have a significant effect on the
tax liability of many retirees. Moreover, the ap
proach used to determine the dollar amount of ben
efits includible in gross income is contrary to several
established tax law principles. This article will illus
trate the application of the new rules, discuss the
important tax policy issues raised by the provisions
and offer some planning suggestions to mitigate
their impact.
Determination of the benefits taxable
Beginning in 1984, monthly social security ben
efits, which are defined to include railroad retire
ment benefits, must be included in gross income to
the extent of the lesser of
—one-half of the benefits received during the
year, or
—one-half of the excess of modified adjusted
gross income plus 50% of the benefits received
over a “base amount.”3

3 Sec. 86(a)(1) and (2).
THE TAX ADVISER, MARCH 1984

Social security benefits received. A taxpayer is
required to include only those social security ben
efits that he is legally entitled to receive.4 The
Committee Reports indicate that benefits received
on behalf of a child are includible in the child’s
separate calculation. Social security benefits re
ceived also include any workmen’s compensation
benefits, if the receipt of these benefits reduced the
social security disability benefits otherwise receiv
able.5
Social security benefits received during the tax
able year may be reduced by the amount of benefits
repaid by the taxpayer during the year, regardless
of when the benefits were originally received.6 The
taxpayer is allowed an itemized deduction under
Sec. 165 for social security benefit repayments, if
the benefits had previously been included in gross
income and they exceed benefits received for the
taxable year, but not repaid.7 Alternatively, if the
amount repaid and previously included in gross in
come exceeds $3,000, the taxpayer can use the
special tax computation available under Sec. 1341
to reduce his tax liability.8
If a taxpayer receives a lump-sum payment of
social security benefits attributable to earlier years,
he may elect to allocate the lump-sum payment to
the applicable years.9 He will then determine his tax
for the year when the lump-sum payment is re
ceived by increasing his gross income by the sum of
the increases in gross income calculated separately
for each of the earlier years affected.10 This election
will be particularly beneficial if the lump-sum pay
ment is attributable, in whole or in part, to a pre1984 tax year when social security benefits were
nontaxable.

Modified adjusted gross income. “Modified ad
justed gross income” is defined as adjusted gross
income (calculated without regard to social security
benefits) plus the following adjustments, if applica
ble:11
• Tax-exempt income received or accrued.
• Deduction for two-earner married couples
(Sec. 221).

• Exclusion for foreign-source income (Sec.
911).
• Exclusion for income from U.S. possessions
(Sec. 931) and Puerto Rico (Sec. 933).
Base amount. The “base amount” is $25,000 for
single taxpayers. For married taxpayers filing a joint
return, the base amount is $32,000; married tax
payers who file separately have a zero base amount
unless they have lived apart from their spouse for
the entire taxable year, in which case the base
amount is $25,000.12 The zero base amount re
flects Congress’ intent to treat a family as an integral
unit. The Committee Reports indicate that a positive
base amount for married taxpayers filing sep
arately was avoided to prevent a substantial and
unwarranted reduction in the amount of benefits
subject to tax.13 The following example illustrates
the application of the rules discussed above to cal
culate the social security benefits includible in gross
income.
Example 1. T and his wife, W, are both 67 years old. Both are
retired, but in 1984 T received $4,500 of net income from
consulting activities and W received $3,000 from a part-time
job. Their 1984 adjusted gross income (before social secur
ity benefits) is $25,700. In addition, they received $12,000 of
social security benefits and earned $12,000 of tax-exempt
interest income. Nondeductible expenses incurred in
generating the tax-exempt income amounted to $3,000.
They file a joint federal income tax return in 1984, have no
dependency exemptions and do not itemize.
T and W’s modified adjusted gross income for 1984 is
$38,000 ($25,700 adjusted gross income, plus $12,000 of
tax-exempt income, plus the $30014 deduction for the twoearner married couple). Their base amount for 1984 is
$32,000 since they are filing a joint return.
They must include in gross income the lesser of:

1. One-half of the $12,000 of social
security benefits received
or
2. Modified adjusted gross income
Plus one-half of the social security
benefits received

Less the base amount

Excess
Percentage

$ 6,000

38,000

6,000
44,000
(32,000)

12,000
0.50

$ 6,000

4
5
6
7
8

Sec. 86(d)(1).
Sec. 86(d)(3).
Sec. 86(d)(2)(A).
Sec. 86(d)(2)(B).
The Social Security Amendments of 1983, S. Rep. No. 98-23
to accompany S. 1,98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), as reported
in 11 P-H Federal Taxes (1983), at 59,306.17.
9 The Social Security Administration and Railroad Retirement
Board are required to notify the recipients of the taxable years
to which the payments are attributable. See S. Rep. No. 98-23,
id., in Federal Taxes, at 59,306.17.
10 Sec. 86(e)(1).
11 Sec. 86(b)(2).

Since both computational procedures produce the
same result, $6,000 of the $12,000 of the 1984
social security benefits received by T and W must be
included in their 1984 adjusted gross income. They
will therefore report adjusted gross income of
$31,700 on their 1984 Form 1040. The inclusion of

12 Sec. 86(c).
13 See note 2.
14 Ten percent of the lesser of $4,500 or $3,000. Sec. 221.
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$6,000 of social security benefits in their adjusted
gross income increases their tax liability by
$1,413.15
The taxation of tax-exempt interest

Because the inclusion of tax-exempt interest is
likely to be the most frequent and significant ad
justment, it will be used to explore some tax policy
issues raised by the new law.
Sec. 103 provides, in part, that interest paid by a
state or any of its political subdivisions is not includ
ible in gross income.16 The Committee Reports
state that the inclusion of tax-exempt interest in the
calculations, for purposes of determining the tax
able portion of a taxpayer’s social security benefits,
does not affect Sec. 103.17 This assertion is errone
ous, however. Many social security recipients will
be taxed on a portion of their benefits simply be
cause they receive tax-exempt interest, which
amounts to an indirect tax on tax-exempt interest for
a large class of taxpayers.
To illustrate, in Example 1, the taxpayers would
not have been taxed on any of their social security
benefits if they had not received tax-exempt interest
in 1984. Without the receipt of this interest, modified
adjusted gross income would have been $26,000.
This amount plus $6,000 (one-half of the social
security benefits received) would exactly equal the
$32,000 base amount. Because of the inclusion of
tax-exempt interest, however, the effective tax rate
on total tax-exempt interest received is approxi
mately 12%.18
Moreover, the effective rate rises to 16% in the
example if an inherent inequity in the computation of
modified adjusted gross income is considered.19
The new rules do not allow the taxpayer to reduce
gross tax-exempt interest received by the expenses
incurred in generating it. This approach runs con
trary to the basic principle that the federal income
tax should not be levied on gross income.20 If taxexempt interest is used in a tax computation, the
figure incorporated should be net of allowable ex
penses incurred.21 Congress’ failure to adhere to
this principle will add to the tax burden created

15 Their 1984 tax liability is $4,240. Excluding the $6,000 of social
security benefits from their 1984 adjusted gross income would
result in a tax liability of $2,827.
16 Sec. 103(a)(1).
17 See note 8, Federal Taxes, at 59,306.16.
18 $1,413 incremental tax liability
------ --------------------------------------- — = 11.78%.
$12,000 total tax-exempt interest
19 $1,413 incremental tax liability
------ ---------------------------------------— = 15.7%.
$9,000 net tax-exempt interest
20 Charles V. Doyle, 231 F2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956) (49 AFTR 491,
56-1 USTC ¶9441).
21 An argument can be made, however, that the 50% limitation
effectively mitigates this problem.
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through the inclusion of the tax-exempt interest
earned by some social security recipients. The new
rules may also lead to significant economic distor
tions if the expenses involved are relatively high in
relation to the tax-exempt interest received or ac
crued.
Basis recovery considerations

Because social security benefits are similar to
other retirement benefits, Congress determined
that it was appropriate to subject social security
benefits to taxation to the extent the benefits ex
ceeded the recipient’s lifetime FICA contributions.22
In drafting the legislation, however, Congress did
not adhere to this basis recovery approach. Instead
of adopting the conventional exclusion ratio nor
mally applied to annuity payments received under a
typical employer-employee financed plan,23 Con
gress required an exclusion of at least 50% of the
payments received, since one-half of social security
benefits are financed by after-tax employer con
tributions. This approach may be inequitable, how
ever, because it discriminates against taxpayers
who would have a relatively high exclusion ratio,
under a Sec. 72 system, compared with other social
security recipients. This group includes many re
tirees who were self-employed, and whose con
tribution rate exceeded that of common-law em
ployees. It also includes those retirees who have
made a larger proportion of their contributions in
recent years, when FICA rates and the earnings
base have increased at an accelerating rate. To
illustrate, as late as 1949, the FICA rate and earn
ings base were 1% and $3,000, respectively; for
1984, these figures are 6.7% and $37,800.24 Thus,
retirees who made contributions over the last two
decades are receiving a much lower tax-free return
on their social security contributions than earlier
retirees. Further, this disparity will increase over
time as scheduled increases in FICA contributions
are implemented and growth in benefit payments is
curtailed.
Legislation may be appropriate to provide more
tax equity. The adoption of the exclusion ratio ap
proach to the taxation of social security benefits
would provide one solution to these problems. This
approach would also individualize the calculations,
because the taxpayer’s actual lifetime social secur
ity contributions would be considered. The current
problems could also be remedied by excluding
FICA taxes from adjusted gross income.
22 See note 8, Federal Taxes, at 59,306.15.
23 Sec. 72(b) and (d).
24 Of the total of 6.7%, 5.4% is attributable to old age, survivors
and disability insurance (OASDI); the remaining 1.3% applies
to hospital insurance (HI). In 1949, only OASDI coverage was
included.

Avoiding the tax on social security benefits
Taxpayers and their advisers must deal with the
existing statutory approach for taxing social security
benefits unless or until a legislative change is made.
Practitioners should attempt to avoid or reduce the
tax on social security benefits received to the extent
possible, giving due consideration to the client’s
overall tax situation. In some cases, this objective
can be achieved by shifting income from tax years in
which modified adjusted gross income would
otherwise exceed the base amount to years in
which the base amount exceeds modified adjusted
gross income. Installment sale reporting and care
fully timed asset dispositions can be particularly
helpful. Cash basis taxpayers may choose to accel
erate gain recognition on year-end security trans
actions by electing out of installment sale report
ing.25 This approach is illustrated in the following
example.
Example 2. J, a single retired taxpayer, has modified ad
justed gross income for 1984 and 1985 (exclusive of gains
and losses from security transactions) of $16,000 and
$21,000, respectively. He receives $8,000 of social security
benefits in each of the two years. He sold securities on the
last business day of 1984 at a gain of $20,000. He will
receive the proceeds from the sale in 1985. If he does not
elect out of installment sale reporting, he will be taxed on
$4,000 of the total social security benefits received in the
two-year period, calculated as follows:

Limitations

1984

2. Modified AGI exclud
ing capital gain
Net LTCG
Modified AGI
One-half of social
security benefits
received

Base amount

Excess
Percentage

Taxable social security
benefits (lesser of 1
or 2 above)
Total social security
benefits taxable
in both years

0.50 x $8,000 0.50 x $8,000
= $4,000
= $4,000
or

or

$16,000
—

21,000
8,000*

29,000

16,000

4,000

4,000

20,000
(25,000)

33,000
(25,000)

8,000
0.50

0
0.50
None

4,000

None

4,000

$4,000

*$20,000 - $12,000 long-term capital gain deduction =
$8,000.

25 IR 83-52 (3/22/83).

Limitations

1984

1985

Lesser of:

1. One-half of social
security benefits
received

0.50 x $8,000 0.50 x $8,000
= $4,000
= $4,000

or

or

2. Modified AGI exclud
ing capital gain
Net LTCG
Modified AGI
One-half of social
security benefits
received
Base amount
Excess
Percentage

Taxable social security
benefits (lesser of 1
or 2 above)

Total social security
benefits taxable
in both years

$16,000
8,000

21,000
—

24,000

21,000

4,000

4,000

28,000
(25,000)

25,000
(25,000)

3,000
0.50

0
0.50

1,500

None

1,500

None

$1,500

1985

Lesser of:
1. One-half of social
security benefits
received

If J elects out of installment sale reporting, however, only
$1,500 of the social security benefits he receives in 1984
and 1985 will be taxable.

The offsetting cost of removing $2,500 of social
security benefits from J’s taxable income is the
present value of a one-year acceleration in the
payment of tax on the net long-term capital gain
recognized. In this example, that cost is far out
weighed by the tax savings that result from the
permanent reduction in taxable income.
There is another aspect of income shifting that
may make it less desirable in some situations, how
ever. Shifting income may cause a portion of the
taxpayer’s income to be taxed in a different year at a
higher incremental rate than would otherwise apply.
The application of a higher rate would reduce the
net tax savings from income shifting. This undesir
able result, even when combined with the negative
consequences of income acceleration, would still
be unlikely to totally outweigh the potential tax sav
ings. Nevertheless, proper planning by tax advisers
will include a consideration of these factors.

The new rules and investment decisions
The investment decisions of many retirees,
whose social security benefits are now potentially
subject to tax, will be affected by the new legislation.
Debt obligations that generate tax-exempt interest
will be less desirable for this group of taxpayers,
because they may be indirectly taxed on a portion of
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the tax-exempt interest received. This tax would
reduce the net after-tax rate of return. Unless there
is a large enough increase in the market rate of
interest on tax-exempt obligations to make up for
the smaller rate of return, many social security recip
ients will have an incentive to realign their invest
ment portfolios. They may benefit from investing a
greater share of their capital in taxable debt instru
ments, which normally provide a significantly higher
pre-tax rate of return than tax-exempt obligations.
Some retirees may also benefit from adjusting
their stock portfolio mix, to place less emphasis on
current cash flow from dividends and more on capi
tal appreciation. A smaller dollar amount of annual
dividend income will reduce modified adjusted
gross income and may reduce or eliminate the taxa
tion of social security benefits in any given year. In a
later year when the appreciated stock is sold, how
ever, modified adjusted gross income will increase
by 40% of the net long-term capital gain recognized.
This gain may trigger or increase the tax on social
security benefits. Thus, changes in investment
strategy will probably produce mixed results, but the
careful timing of income recognition can provide
favorable tax consequences in many of the years
affected.
The purchase of Series EE United States savings
bonds may offer another way for many social secur
ity recipients to avoid being taxed on their benefits.
Unlike all other taxable investments, the interest
earned on these obligations (represented by the
annual increase in their redemption value) is not
normally included in the gross income of a cash
basis taxpayer.26 Unless the holder makes a bind
ing election to report the increase in redemption
value as current income,2728
all income recognition is
deferred until the year in which a Series EE bond is
presented for redemption. Thus, a bond holder can
control the year in which he reports the taxable
income earned on the bond, and use this flexibility
to increase or decrease his modified adjusted gross
income, in order to minimize the taxation of social
security benefits. This relatively straightforward
strategy is illustrated in the following example:
Example 3. H and his wife are retired taxpayers who file a
joint federal income tax return in 1984. They received
$11,000 of social security benefits and had modified ad
justed gross income from dividends and interest of $30,000
in 1984. They will be taxed on $1,750 of the social security
benefits they receive, calculated as follows:

26 Sec. 454(a).
27 Hegs. Sec. 1.454-1(a)(iii). The election applies to all savings
bonds currently held by a taxpayer and those subsequently
acquired by him. The election is binding unless the IRS per
mits a change in accounting method.
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Limitations

Lesser of:

1. One-half of the social security
benefits received

0.50 x $11,000
= $5,500

or

2. Modified AGI
One-half of social security
benefits received

Base amount

Excess
Percentage

$30,000
5,500

35,500
(32,000)
3,500
0.50
1,750

Taxable social security benefits
(lesser of 1 or 2 above)

$1,750

Alternatively, if the taxpayers had generated $3,500 of
their interest income from an investment in savings bonds,28
they could have completely avoided taxation of their social
security benefits.
Limitations

Lesser of:
1. One-half of the social security
benefits received

0.50 x $11,000
= $5,500

2. Modified AGI
One-half of the social security
benefits received

$26,500

or

Base amount

5,500

32,000
(32,000)

Excess

None

Taxable social security benefits

None

To achieve this result, the taxpayers must be able
to forgo the after-tax cash flow that they would
otherwise realize. They may also have to accept a
lower rate of return than would otherwise be avail
able. Due to recent legislative changes, however,
the rates of return on savings bonds are very com
petitive with the rates for other comparable short
term market instruments.29
The income deferral inherent in the taxation of
savings bonds may result in a bunching of taxable
income when the bonds are redeemed, but signifi
cant tax savings should still be possible. In most
cases, the permanent reduction in gross income will
outweigh the amount of incremental income tax

28 At current interest rates, approximately $41,000 of savings
bonds, held five years or more, will produce this increase in
value annually.
29 Currently, savings bonds held for at least five years earn
interest at a rate equal to 85% of the average yield on five-year
Treasury marketable securities. The minimum guaranteed re
turn is 7.5% compounded semiannually. If the bonds are re
deemed before five years, they earn 5.5%, compounded
semiannually, after one year, rising 0.25% each six months to
the minimum guaranteed yield.

resulting from this bunching. The bunching problem
can also be mitigated by purchasing savings bonds
in small denominations and timing their redemption
in order to minimize taxes.
If a taxpayer dies holding Series EE savings
bonds, the difference between the redemption
value at the date of death and the purchase price is
income in respect of a decedent (IRD).30 When the
decedent’s estate or heirs redeem the bonds, the
full amount of interest received will be included in
their gross income even though it may also be sub
ject to estate tax, as part of the decedent’s gross
estate. The estate or heirs may be entitled to a
deduction for the amount of incremental estate tax,
if any, attributable to the inclusion of the interest in
the decedent’s taxable estate.31 If the executor
wants to avoid IRD, he can make the election on the
decedent’s final Form 1040 to report savings bond
interest annually as it accrues.32 When this election
is made, the final income tax return includes, as
interest income, the entire increment in value real
ized since the decedent acquired the bonds. There
is no IRD to report; thereafter, the decedent’s estate
annually reports all increases in redemption value
as interest income.

benefits before considering any earned income reduction.
He does not itemize and has no dependency exemptions.
As a result of earning the $10,000 salary, his social secur
ity benefits decline by $1,520 (50% x ($10,000 - $6,960)).
He will also pay increased federal income taxes of $3,930 on
the earned income and taxable social security benefits,
calculated as follows:

Taxable social security benefits

Limitations

Including
Excluding
earned income earned income

Lesser of:
1. One-half of social
security benefits
received

2. Modified AGI
One-half of social
security benefits
received
Base amount

Excess
Percentage

Taxable social secur
ity benefits (lesser
of 1 or 2 above)

0.50 x $6,480 0.50 x $8,000
= $3,240
= $4,000

or

or

$31,000

21,000

3,240

4,000

34,240
(25,000)

25,000
(25,000)

9,240
0.50

0
0.50

4,620

None

3,240

None

21,000
—

The new rules and employment decisions

Income tax liability

The earnings test, which resulted in a decrease in
social security benefits for those recipients who re
ceive earned income above a specified base
amount, continues in effect for 1984 and future
years. For every dollar of earned income in excess
of the applicable base amount, social security ben
efits will decrease by 50 cents if the recipient is
under age 70. The base amounts in effect for 1984
are:33

Pension benefits
Earned income
Taxable social security
benefits

21,000
10,000
3,240

—

Adjusted gross income
Exemption

34,240
(2,000)

21,000
(2,000)

Taxable income

32,240

19,000

6,875

2,945

Age of recipient

Base amount

65 and under
66 to 70

$5,160
6,960

The combined effect of the possible taxation of
social security benefits in 1984, coupled with the
reduction in benefits as a result of excess earned
income, provides a significant disincentive for re
tirees to continue employment. The following
example illustrates the overall “cost,” in terms of
additional taxes and lost benefits, that can result
from continued employment:
Example 4. M, a 66-year-old single taxpayer, receives
$21,000 of fully taxable pension benefits in 1984. He also
earned a $10,000 salary from working part-time for his old
employer. He is entitled to receive $8,000 of social security

30
31
32
33

Sec. 691(a).
Sec. 691(c).
Sec. 454(a).
The base amounts are adjusted annually.

Federal income tax
Incremental federal
income tax

$3,9303435

M will also pay FICA taxes of $670 on earned income (6.7%
x $10,000). Taking the social security benefit reduction and
additional taxes into account, M's net compensation
amounts to only $3,880 ($10,000 - $1,520 - $3,930 $670).35

Net compensation should be calculated early in
the taxable year for any client who receives social
security retirement benefits and continues his em
ployment activities. The high “cost” of employment
may lead many retirees to terminate or curtail their
employment activities. The potential taxation of so
cial security benefits resulting from continued em
ployment reinforces this possibility.

34 The $1,102 (of the total additional tax of $3,930) results from
taxing the $3,240 of social security benefits ($3,240 x 0.34 =
$1,102).
35 The presence of a state income tax, which is not considered
here, will further reduce net compensation.
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Conclusion
Beginning in 1984, many recipients of social se
curity and railroad retirement benefits will be con
fronted with the possibility of being taxed on a por
tion of the benefits they receive during the year. As
this article suggests, proper planning may help
some taxpayers minimize or eliminate the potential
additional income tax burden. Practitioners need to
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identify clients who are affected by the new legis
lation, and begin working with them to develop a
strategy for minimizing taxes. In order to ac
complish this result, the client may be forced to
accept a smaller annual cash flow or an increased
investment risk. Ultimately, each client must decide
if the benefits from a particular tax-minimizing strat
egy outweigh these costs. tta

estate planning
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Private annuities and estate planning

Introduction

Estate owners generally have two objectives: to
minimize estate taxes and maximize after-tax cash
flow to the family unit. To accomplish these goals,
estate planners must consider the income, gift, and
estate tax consequences of all proposed transfers
to family members. By shifting income-producing
property to low-income family members, avoiding
gift taxes, and reducing estate taxes, estate plan
ners can maximize the after-tax cash flow of the
family unit. A properly constructed private annuity
can lower income, gift, and estate taxes, and help to
accomplish the estate owner’s objectives. Thus, the
private annuity can be a useful estate planning de
vice.
To set up a private annuity, property is ex
changed for a noncommercial annuity; an older tax
payer (annuitant) transfers appreciated property
and/or income-producing property to a younger
taxpayer (promisor) in return for the promisor’s un
secured promise to make periodic payments during
the annuitant’s life. Because the promise is unse
cured, the parties are usually related. Variations of
this transaction include joint and survivor private
THE TAX ADVISER, FEBRUARY 1983

annuities, private annuities with domestic or foreign
trusts, private annuities with corporate promisors,
and reverse private annuities. Only the last two
variations are discussed in this article.

Tax considerations
Although private annuities offer the potential for
tax savings, the law governing the taxation of pri
vate annuities is not precise. Most of the governing
principles come from judicial decisions and revenue
rulings, rather than specific Code provisions. Con
sequently, the estate planner must carefully struc
ture the transaction in order to avoid unexpected tax
consequences.1

The annuitant. The income tax consequences of
a private annuity differ for the annuitant and prom
isor. Rev. Rul. 69-742 governs the taxation of the
1 For example, the effect of the Installment Sales Revision Act
of 1980 on private annuities is uncertain. Sec. 453 and the
corresponding regulations could be applied to private annuity
transactions, but this issue is unresolved.
2 Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 CB 43.
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annuitant; Rev. Rul. 55-1193 outlines the tax treat
ment of the promisor. In addition, several other
revenue rulings and court decisions discuss the
taxation of private annuities.
Sec. 72 provides the general rules for annuities.
The annuitant must compute an exclusion ratio,
which equals his investment in the contract divided
by the expected return of the contract.4 The exclu
sion ratio is then multiplied by the annuity payment
to determine the annuitant’s return of capital per
payment and that amount is excluded from gross
income. The investment in the contract is defined as
the consideration paid for the annuity contract; the
expected return is computed by multiplying the
annuity payments and the annuitant’s life expec
tancy.5 Rev. Rul. 239 stated that the consideration
paid was the fair market value of the transferred
property. In Rev. Rul. 69-74, however, the IRS indi
cated that the investment in the contract equals the
basis of the transferred property, rather than its fair
market value, resulting in a smaller exclusion ratio.6
The more recent ruling also requires that capital
gains from the transaction be included in income
ratably over the annuitant’s life expectancy. If the
annuitant lives beyond his life expectancy, the re
turn of capital portion of the annuity payments be
comes taxable as ordinary income.
Establishing a private annuity results in several
tax advantages for the annuitant: the transferred
property (and all future appreciation and/or income)
is removed from his estate, and part of the gain from
the annuity payments is recognized over the an
nuitant’s life, rather than at the time of the transfer.
To achieve these benefits, several steps must be
taken.
First, the annuity must not be secured.7 Providing
security closes the transaction, and produces im
mediate recognition of gain.8 It is unclear whether

3 Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 CB 352.
4 Sec. 72(b).
5 The tables provided in Regs. Sec. 1.72-9 are used to deter
mine life expectancy.
6 The IRS does not consider Rev. Rul. 239,1953-2 CB 53, to be
controlling. The validity of Rev. Rul. 69-74 is uncertain, how
ever, and the estate planner should therefore be aware of
Rev. Rul. 239 and use the fair market value rule if it produces
more advantageous results than Rev. Rul. 69-74. Relying on
Rev. Rul. 239 would probably lead to litigation, and the validity
of Rev. Rul. 69-74 has not been established. Certain au
thorities suggest, however, that the ruling may be invalid. See,
e.g., Est. of Lloyd G. Bell, 60 TC 469 (1973), and Regs. Sec.
1.1011-2(c), Example 8. The examples in this article rely on
the rule of Rev. Rul. 69-74.
7 If the annuity is unsecured, the annuitant does not recognize
gain upon the transfer because the annuity lacks an ascer
tainable fair market value. J. Darsie Lloyd, 33 BTA 903 (1936).
The Board of Tax Appeals relied on the open transaction
doctrine of Burnet v. Logan, 283 US 404 (1931) (9 AFTR
1453, 2 USTC ¶736).
8 Est. of Bell, note 6, and 212 Corporation, 70 TC 788 (1978).
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partially secured annuities or third-party guarantees
would close the transaction, and it is therefore best
to avoid any type of security. Second, the present
value of the annuity payments must equal the fair
market value (FMV) of the property transferred. If
the FMV of the property exceeds the value of the
annuity, the excess is a gift subject to gift tax.9 In
addition, if the gift and annuity transactions are not
treated separately and the transfer occurs within
three years of the annuitant’s death, then all ap
preciation, both the “gift” and annuity portions, must
be included in the gross estate.1011
Accordingly, the
property should be appraised at date of transfer to
establish FMV. The tables contained in Regs. Sec.
20.2031-10 should be used to value the annuity. If
the values of the property and the annuity are not
equal, the taxpayer should treat the gift transfer and
private annuity transfer as separate transactions.11
If the likelihood of payment by the promisor is so
suspect or tenuous that the chances of payment
appear uncertain, the transfer of property by the
annuitant may be classified as a gift. The third step
in establishing a private annuity is to obtain a written
report on the annuitant’s health, so that the compu
tations discussed above reflect economic realities.
For example, the normal life expectancy tables
would not be appropriate for a terminally ill annu
itant. Even if the annuitant is not terminally ill, he
might still have a shorter than average life expec
tancy due to a history of heart attacks or early
deaths in the family. A private annuity transaction
under this situation is ideal: Since death is not immi
nent, the annuitant is not prevented from using the
annuity tables; he is not required to compute the
ratio using a shorter life expectancy. Accordingly,
the transferred property is excluded from the estate
without raising the possibility of a transfer in con
templation of death. As a final step in setting up an
annuity, the annuitant should not be permitted to
retain any control over the property after it is trans
ferred, and no restrictions should be placed on the
promisor’s use of the property. Also, the annuity

9 Regs. Sec. 25.2512-8 provides that a transaction which is
bona fide, at arm’s length and free from any donative intent will
not be treated as a gift, even if the FMVs differ. These re
quirements would be hard to satisfy, however, if related par
ties were involved.
10 Secs. 2035, 2043(a), and 2512.
11 Alternatively, the annuity contract may include a priceadjustment clause stating that no gift was intended, and that if
the IRS or a court finds that the FMVs are different, the annuity
payments will be adjusted accordingly. (Similar clauses are
often found in salary contracts whereby the employee agrees
to return to the corporation any compensation considered
unreasonable by the IRS or courts. The IRS sometimes inter
prets this “return agreement” as an indication that the parties
believe the compensation is unreasonable, and a similar ar
gument might be made regarding the price-adjustment clause;
i.e., it indicates that the parties believe the FMVs are unequal.)

payments should be made regardless of income
from the property. If these steps are not followed,
the property will be included in the annuitant’s gross
estate, defeating the purpose of the transaction.12
The income tax consequences to the annuitant
are illustrated in the following example.
Example. Mother, M, 61 years old, transferred land (held for
10 years) with a basis of $ 100,000 and a fair market value of
$400,000 to her daughter in exchange for a life annuity of
$38,833.06 payable yearly.13
M's investment in the contract is $100,000, the basis of
the property. Her expected return, $815,494.26 ($38,833.06
x 21.0), is determined using the life expectancy tables in
Regs. Sec. 1.72-9. The exclusion ratio is 12.262502%
($100,000 ÷ $815,494.26). Thus, of the $38,833.06 pay
ment, $4,761.90 ($38,833.06 x 12.262502%) is excluded
from gross income. M has a capital gain of $300,000
($400,000 - $100,000, the difference between the present
value of the annuity and the basis of the property), which is
recognized over the annuitant’s life expectancy. Thus,
$14,285.71 ($300,000
21.0) of each annuity payment is
treated as long-term capital gain. The remaining portion of
each annuity payment, $19,785.45 ($38,833.06 $4,761.90 - $14,285.71), is ordinary income.14 This tax
treatment, summarized below, will continue for 21 payments
(years).

Annual payment
1. Nontaxable recovery of costs $ 4,761.90
2. Long-term capital gain
14,285.71
3. Ordinary income
19,785.45

$38,833.06

$38,833.06

Several situations may change this tax treatment.
If M died after 10 years, the annuity payments
would stop. The estate would not receive the other
payments, and there would be no income with re
spect to a decedent.15 Although M would not re
cover all of her basis in the property (investment in
contract), she would recognize $142,857.10 of
long-term capital gain. The estate would not be
entitled to a loss deduction of $52,380.90
($4,761.90 x 11). Instead, the unrecovered basis is
lost.
If M lived for 30, instead of 21 years, the capital
gain portion would no longer apply. M could con
tinue (for nine more years) to exclude $4,761.90
from income as recovery of cost, even though she
had fully recovered her basis. The remaining
amount, $34,071.16 ($38,833.06 - $4,761.90)
would be taxed as ordinary income.
The transfer of depreciable property subject to
recapture could also alter the taxation of the an
nuity. In that situation, the annuitant would be re
quired to recapture depreciation as ordinary in
come. How or when the recapture would occur is

12 Sec. 2036 and Est. of Cornelia B. Schwartz, 9TC 229 (1947).
13 Using the applicable annuity factor (10.3005) in Regs. Sec.
20.2031 -10(f), Table A(2), the present value of the annuity
contract is $400,000.
14 Again, this is in accordance with Rev. Rul. 69-74.
15 Sec. 691.

uncertain, however; the Code and regulations do
not specify the appropriate treatment. Does the an
nuitant recapture the depreciation ratably over his
life or does he recapture all depreciation before
recognizing any Sec. 1231 gain (similar to install
ment sales treatment)? The IRS would probably
argue for treatment similar to installment sales,
even though the transactions are not governed by
similar provisions.
If the private annuity is properly structured, there
will be no gift tax consequences for the annuitant
(i.e., no gift tax liability), and the transferred property
will not be included in his gross estate at death,
even if transferred within three years of death.
To vary the example, if the annuity contract pro
vided annual payments of $30,000, the present
value of the annuity contract would be $309,015.
M's gain on the transaction would equal $209,015
($309,015 - $100,000). The excess of the fair mar
ket value of the land ($400,000) over the present
value of the annuity ($309,015), $90,985, would be
a gift to M’s daughter, subject to gift tax (after being
reduced by appropriate annual exclusions}. The
exclusion ratio (12.262502%) and nontaxable re
covery of cost ($4,761.90) would remain the same.
The long-term capital gain portion, however, would
be reduced to $9,953.10 ($209,015 ÷ 21.0) and the
ordinary income portion would equal $15,285.00.
Annual payments
1. Nontaxable recovery of cost
2. Long-term capital gain
3. Ordinary income

$30,000.00

$ 4,761.90
9,953.10
15,285.00

$30,000.00

The unequal fair market values of the property
and the contract would result in gift tax liability (ig
noring the unified credit) and a decrease in M’s
capital gain. Total tax payments would increase and
family net cash flow would decrease. If the land
increased in value to $500,000 and M died within
three years of the transfer, Secs. 2035 and 2043
might apply, requiring all $500,000 to be included in
M's estate. This undesirable situation would result
from failing to treat the annuity transaction sepa
rately from the gift transaction.
The promisor. In exchange for the promise to
make annuity payments, the promisor receives
property from the annuitant. The promisor has
complete control over this property; he may use it
for business or personal purposes, or sell it.16 The
promisor is entitled to all income from the property.
For the promisor, the tax “problems” from the
transaction primarily involve basis determinations.

16 It should be noted, however, that a transfer to the promisor
followed by an immediate sale of the property to a third party
under a prearranged agreement would probably be treated as
a sale between the annuitant and the third party.
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The promisor must determine a basis for deprecia
tion purposes, and for computing gain or loss on the
disposition of the property, using the principles of
Rev. Rul. 55-119.
In addition to the basis determination, the prom
isor must consider the proper tax treatment of each
annuity payment. Generally, the payments are
treated as capital expenditures. Because there is no
indebtedness, the promisor does not receive an
interest expense deduction (even though the an
nuitant has interest income). Even if the payments
exceed the FMV of the annuity contract at the date
of transfer, the promisor receives no interest deduc
tion; instead, he increases his basis in the property
by the amount of the excess. If the annuity contract
specifically provides for interest payments, the
promisor may be able to deduct the payments, but
there is little authority on this issue. The payments
might also be treated similarly to payments in ex
cess of the annuity contract’s FMV.
The promisor’s basis in the property he receives
equals the total amount of annuity payments
made,17 an amount which cannot be determined
exactly until the annuitant dies. For depreciation
purposes, however, the promisor must determine a
basis when the property is received. In addition,
basis will be important for determining gain or loss
when the promisor disposes of the property. The
promisor’s depreciable basis in the property equals
the value of the annuity contract (as determined by
the applicable tables) plus any payments made in
excess of the value of the contract. When the an
nuitant dies, the basis is recalculated, and becomes
the total amount of annuity payments made, less
any accumulated depreciation.18 If several assets
are acquired (e.g., land and building), basis must be
allocated between the separate assets according to
their FMVs. These basis rules necessitate accurate
records on depreciation taken, annuity payments
made, and the determination of initial depreciable
basis.
In a sale of the property after the death of the
annuitant, the promisor’s basis equals the total an
nuity payments made less any depreciation.19 Gain
or loss from the sale equals the selling price less this
basis. The nature of the gain (loss) depends on the

17 If the promisor dies before the annuitant, the promisor’s estate
is liable for the payments. For estate tax purposes, the prom
isor’s estate would receive a deduction equal to the value of
the remaining payments. See Est. of Charles H. Hart, 1 TC 989
(1943).
18 If the annuitant dies prematurely then it is possible that depre
ciation taken exceeds the sum of annuity payments made
(“true” basis). In this situation, the annuitant’s death will
produce income to the promisor to the extent of the excess
depreciation (over “true” basis).
19 Basis would also be adjusted for any capital improvements to
the property.
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character of the property in the promisor’s hands
(capital or ordinary) and the holding period. To de
termine the holding period, the promisor does not
tack on the annuitant’s holding period; instead, his
holding period begins on the day title passed.
If the promisor sells the property before the an
nuitant dies, the basis will depend on whether the
sale produces a gain or a loss. The basis for gain
equals the total annuity payments made to the date
of sale, less depreciation, plus the value of the
remaining annuity payments to be made. The basis
for loss equals the total annuity payments made,
less depreciation. Like gift transfers under Sec.
1015, the selling price may fall between the basis for
gain and basis for loss. In that situation, similar to
gift transfers, no gain or loss is recognized on the
sale.
After the sale of the property, the promisor re
mains legally bound by the terms of the contract,
and must continue making payments over the life of
the annuitant. How the promisor treats these pay
ments will depend on whether he sold the property
at a gain, a loss, or neither. If the property was sold
at a gain, once the total payments made before and
after the sale equal the basis used for gain determi
nation, then all subsequent payments are recog
nized as a loss in the year of payment.20 If the
property was sold at a loss, then all subsequent
payments are treated as losses in the year of pay
ment.21 If no gain or loss was recognized, then
once the total payments made before and after the
sale, reduced by depreciation deductions, equal the
selling price, all subsequent payments will be rec
ognized as a loss in the year paid.22
Selling the property before the annuitant’s death
produces some difficulties in determining basis.
Another complication would occur if the property
was sold before the annuitant died, but the annu
itant died prematurely (i.e., he did not live as long
as expected according to the tables). A sale of the
property at a loss would not alter the promisor’s tax
treatment. If the property was sold at a gain, how
ever, the promisor would recognize additional gain
to the extent that the basis used to determine gain
exceeded the actual payments made. Finally, if no
gain or loss was recognized, the promisor would
recognize gain to the extent that the selling price
exceeded actual payments made (less deprecia
tion). As these adjustments suggest, disposing of
the transferred property before the annuitant’s
death increases the complexity of the transaction,
and should therefore be avoided.

20 The nature of the loss is determined by the character of the
property sold at the time of the original sale.
21 Id.
22 Id.

The following example clarifies the promisor’s tax treatment:
Example. Father, F, 65 years old, transfers land and a building to his son, S, in return for annual
annuity payments of $74,670.52, payable for the remainder of his life. The land and building have a
FMV of $600,000; $450,000 is allocated to the building and $150,000 is allocated to the land. The
present value of the annuity contract is $600,000. S’s basis in the building is $450,000 and $150,000
for the land. The building has a remaining useful life of 20 years and no salvage value.

1. Assume no disposition; F dies after 15 years, his life expectancy at the date of
the annuity transaction.
Yearly straight-line depreciation expense: $450,000

= $22,500

20
Building
Depreciation taken
(15 x $22,500)
Payments made23

Basis for remaining 5 years*

($337,500.00)

Total

Land
—

(337,500.00)

840,043.35

280,014.45

1,120,057.80

502,543.35

280,014.45

$ 782,557.80

*Depredation expense for years 16-20 would be $502,543.35= $100,508.67

5

2.

Assume no disposition; F dies after three years.
Building

Depreciation taken
(3 x $22,500)
Payments made
Basis for remaining 17 years*

Land

($ 67,500.00)

—

Total

(

67,500.00)

168,008.67

56,002.89

224,011.56

100,508.67

56,002.89

$156,511.56

*Depreciation expense for years 4-20 would be $100,508.67 = $5,912.27

17

3.

Assume a disposition after 15 years (after F dies).
Building

Depreciation taken
Payments made
Adjusted basis for gain or loss

Land

Total

($337,500.00)
840,043.35

—
280,014.45

(337,500.00)
1,120,057.80

502,543.35

280,014.45

$782,557.80

a. The property is sold for $1 million; $600,000 is allocated to the building, and
$400,000 is allocated to the land.
Building

Selling price
Adjusted basis

Gain (loss)*

Land

Total

$600,000.00
502,543.35

400,000.00
280,014.45

1,000,000.00
782,557.80

97,456.65

119,985.55

$ 217,442.20

*Both gains are Sec. 1231 gains. Since straight-line depreciation was used, there is no Sec.
1250 recapture.

23 Each payment is allocated to the building and land according
to relative FMVs. Thus, three-fourths of each payment is
allocated to the building and one-fourth to the land.
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b. The property is sold for $700,000; $400,000 is allocated to the building, and
$300,000 is allocated to the land.
Building
Selling price
Adjusted basis

Gain (loss)*

Land

$400,000.00
502,543.35

300,000.00
280,014.45

( 102,543.35)

19,985.55

Total
700,000.00
782,557.80

($ 82,557.80)

*Sec. 1231 gain and loss.

4.

Assume a disposition after three years (F dies after 15 years).

Basis for gain:

Payments made to date of sale
Depreciation taken
Present value of remaining
payments24
Basis for gain
Basis for loss:

Payments made to date of sale
Depreciation taken
Basis for loss

Building

Land

Total

$168,008.67
( 67,500.00)

56,002.89
—

398,454.96

132,818.32

531,273.28

498,963.63

188,821.21

$687,784.84

Land

Building

224,011.56
( 67,500.00)

Total

$168,008.67
( 67,500.00)

56,002.89
—

224,011.56
( 67,500.00)

100,508.67

56,002.89

$156,511.56

a. The property is sold for $1 million; $600,000 is allocated to the building, and
$400,000 is allocated to the land.
Land

Building

Selling price
Basis for gain
Gain*

Total

$600,000.00
498,963.63

400,000.00
188,821.21

1,000,000.00
687,784.84

101,036.37

211,178.79

$ 312,215.16

*Both are Sec. 1231 gains.

Although S sold the property, he continues to make annual payments to F. Each
payment is applied to offset the basis used to determine gain. Once recovered, all
remaining payments are Sec. 1231 losses.
Building
Basis to recover
Payments to date of sale

$498,963.63
168,008.67

188,821.21
56,002.89

330,954.96

$132,818.32

Remaining unrecovered basis

The remaining unrecovered basis of the building is
recovered in the ninth year. In year 9, S has a
$5,062.38 loss and in years 10-15, he has a
$56,002.89 loss per year. The remaining unrecov

24 F is now 69 years old; the appropriate factor is 7.1149, taken
from Table A(1) of Regs. Sec. 20.2031-10(f).
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Land

ered basis of the land is recovered in the eleventh
year. In year 11, S has a $16,522.72 loss, and in
years 12-15, he has an annual loss of $18,667.63.

b. The property is sold for $100,000, which is allocated equally to the building and
land.
Building

Selling price
Basis for loss

Total

Land

$ 50,000.00
100,508.67

50,000.00
56,002.89

100,000.00
156,511.56

50,508.67

6,002.89

$ 56,511.56

Loss*

*Both are Sec. 1231 losses.

All subsequent payments are treated as Sec. 1231
losses in the year paid. In years 4-15, there is an
annual loss of $56,002.89 for the building and an
annual loss of $18,667.63 for the land.
c. The property is sold for $360,000; $300,000 is
allocated to the building and $60,000 is allocated to

the land.
For both assets, the selling price falls between
the basis for gain and the basis for loss; therefore,
no gain or loss is recognized at the time of the sale.
S continues to make payments, however, and the
payments are treated as follows:
Building

Total

Land

$168,008.67
( 67,500.00)

56,002.89
—

224,011.56
( 67,500.00)

Selling price

100,508.67
300,000.00

56,002.89
60,000.00

156,511.56
360.000.00

Remaining selling price to recover

199,491.33

3,997.11

$203,488.44

Payments made to date of sale
Depreciation taken

Subsequent annuity payments are first applied to
the unrecovered selling price. Once the selling price
is recovered, the remaining payments are treated
as Sec. 1231 losses in the year paid. In the seventh
year, the building’s selling price is fully recovered,
and S has a $24,502.23 loss. In years 8-15, S has
an annual loss of $56,002.89 for the building. The
land’s remaining unrecovered selling price is re

covered in year 4. In year 4, S has a $14,670.52
loss; in years 5-15, he has an annual loss of
$18,667.63.
5. Assume a disposition after three years (F dies
after five years).
a. The property is sold for the same amount as in
4a, above.

Building

Selling price
Basis for gain

Total

Land

$600,000.00
498,963.63

400,000.00
188,821.21

1,000,000.00
687,784.84

Gain (Sec. 1231)

101,036.37

211,178.79

312,215.16

Actual payments made
Basis for gain

280,014.45
498,963.63

93,338.15
188,821.21

373,352.60
687,784.84

Excess of basis for gain over
payments made

218,949.18

95,483.06

$ 314,432.24

S must recognize Sec. 1231 gain to the extent that
the basis for gain exceeds the actual payments
made. These gains are recognized in the year F
dies. Thus, in year 6, S has a $218,949.18 gain for
the building and a $95,483.06 gain for the land. F’s
premature death creates substantial unfavorable
income tax consequences for S.
b. The property is sold for the same price as in
4b, above.

In 4b, this sale produced losses in year of sale,
and subsequent payments in years 4 and 5 pro
duced Sec. 1231 losses. F’s death after five years
does not produce additional losses or gain recogni
tion.
c. The property is sold for the same selling price
as 4c, above.
In 4c, no gain or loss was recognized on the sale
of the assets.
Building

Selling price
Actual payments made, less
depreciation

Excess of selling price over
payments made

Total

Land

$300,000.00

60,000.00

360,000.00

212,514.45

93,338.15

305,852.60

87,485.55

—______$ 54,147.40
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When F dies after five years, S recognizes a Sec.
1231 gain of $87,485.55 in year 6. This amount
represents the unrecovered selling price of the
building. Because the selling price of the land has
been fully recovered, no gain is recognized on the
land. The revenue rulings do not indicate whether S
should treat the $33,338.15 payments in excess of
the selling price as a loss when the original sale
produced no gain or loss recognition. Presumably,
he is not entitled to a loss deduction under Sec.
165(c).
Advantages and disadvantages of private
annuities

Before discussing a final example, some of the
advantages and disadvantages of properly struc
tured private annuity transactions are summarized.
Advantages to the annuitant

1. The property transferred (and all future ap
preciation and income) is removed from the estate;
ownership is transferred to an individual who would
otherwise have inherited the property. As a result,
estate taxes and administrative expenses are re
duced and the annuitant is assured that the proper
individual receives the property. Thus, private an
nuities can be used as “estate-freezing” vehicles,
which work best if the annuitant transfers appreciat
ing property that yields a high rate of return. Also, if
income-producing property is transferred to a rela
tive in a lower tax bracket, a reduction in the family’s
income taxes can be achieved.
2. Because the transfer of property is a legiti
mate sale for full and adequate consideration, there
is no gift tax. Even if the annuitant dies within three
years of the transfer, the property will not be in
cluded in his estate; the private annuity transaction
avoids any “transfer in contemplation of death”
problems.
3. The income tax on the gain realized from the
sale of the property is deferred. The gain is recog
nized ratably over the annuitant’s life and if he dies
prematurely, some gain will never be recognized.
4. A private annuity transaction enables the fam
ily to retain specific assets, with minimal tax con
sequences.25
5.
The annuitant is relieved of the burdens of

25 For example, the annuitant could transfer his personal resi
dence in return for the annuity contract. The annuitant could
take advantage of the $125,000 exclusion under Sec. 121 (if
applicable), making the transfer more beneficial. The annu
itant might also continue to live in the transferred residence
(perhaps until his death). For a discussion of this planning
point, see Porcano, “Estate planning: planning for the transfer
of a personal residence,” TTA, Sept. 80, pp. 522-531, and the
addendum in TTA, Dec. 80, p. 716.
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managing the property.
6. The annuity serves as an alternative to an
installment sale, and avoids the problems of im
puted interest and income in respect of a decedent.

Disadvantages to the annuitant
1. The estate tax savings referred to above are
based on the assumption that the annuitant will
spend the annuity payments. If he lets them ac
cumulate, there will be no reduction in his estate.26
To avoid this accumulation, it might be advanta
geous to transfer property to a child who supports
the annuitant. The annuity payments would then
take the place of the support payments received
from the child. Although the child might lose an
exemption for a dependent, the benefits would
probably outweigh the loss.
2. The annuitant assumes a greater risk than in
an installment sale situation, because an install
ment sale can be secured, whereas a private an
nuity cannot. Accordingly, the annuitant must be
able to rely on the promisor’s ability to pay and
trustworthiness. Since the promisor is probably a
related party, the annuitant will know him quite well.
3. The private annuity transaction creates taxa
ble income for the annuitant. Some of this income is
treated as capital gain and some as ordinary in
come (interest). For annuitants in high tax brackets,
the income tax consequences can be significant.
4. The private annuity is somewhat inflexible be
cause the annuitant must deal with the promisor,
who has total control over the property, possibly to
the detriment of other family members.
Advantages to the promisor
1. No immediate cash outflow is required.
2. The promisor receives a stepped-up basis in
the property, allowing larger depreciation deduc
tions.
3. Although the property may continue to ap
preciate in value and the income from the property
may increase, the annuity payments remain fixed.
4. The promisor has total control of the property;
he manages the property and may dispose of it how
and when he chooses.
5. The promisor may be relieved of some sup
port obligations.
6. The annuitant’s death terminates the annuity
payments even if he does not reach his life expec
tancy. Although the promisor’s cash flow will in
crease, his basis will also be reduced.

26 In many situations involving affluent property owners, this
assumption may not be true. If the annuitant transfers highyielding property in exchange for an annuity yielding 6%,
however, some reduction in the estate will occur regardless of
whether or not the annuity payments are spent.

Disadvantages to the promisor
1. The promisor probably cannot deduct the in
terest portion of the annuity payments.
2. The promisor’s death does not terminate the
contract; his estate remains liable for the annuity
payments.
3. Premature death of the annuitant may pro
duce unexpected, adverse tax consequences.
4. The promisor must make payments for as long
as the annuitant lives. If the annuitant outlives his
life expectancy, the promisor must continue to
make annuity payments, possibly creating a finan
cial hardship for the promisor.
5. If the annuitant is very old, with a short life
expectancy, the required annuity payments may be
so large as to create a financial burden for the
promisor. Thus, the promisor must have liquid as
sets or receive high-yielding or readily marketable
property from the annuitant to overcome the cash
flow problem.
Example. F, a widower, is 52 years old. He is in the 50%
marginal tax bracket and has four children. F’s estate is
valued at $1,000,000, and includes 500 shares of stock in a
closely held corporation. The shares were acquired 15
years ago, and have a basis of $100,000. The stock’s FMV
is $500,000. F receives yearly dividends of $60,000 from the
stock. He would like ownership of the corporation to remain
within the family.
F enters into an annuity contract with each child, transfer
ring 125 shares of stock in return for their promises to make
annual payments of $11,439.87 for the remainder of F’s life.
(F’s life expectancy is 24.0 years and the present value of
the annuity payments is $125,000; there is no gift element in
the four annuity contracts.)

1. F’s investment in each contract is $25,000.
His expected return is $274,556.88 ($11,439.87 x
24.0). His exclusion ratio is 9.105581% ($25,000
$274,556.88).
2. F’s long-term capital gain is $100,000
($125,000 - $25,000).
3.
Annual payments per contract: $11,439.87.
a. Nontaxable recovery of cost
($11,439.87 x 9.105581%)
b. Long-term capital gain
c. Ordinary income

$1,041.67
4,166.67
6,231.53 $11,439.87

4. Because the children intend to keep owner
ship in the family, no disposition is expected and a
determination of their basis is not necessary.
5.
F lives for 24.0 years.
6. F spends the annuity payments received
from the children ($45,759.48 per year).
7. Although the age, filing status, and income
levels of the four children are likely to change over
the 24 years, a 30% tax rate has been used.
8. A growth rate for the assets—the stock and
F’s remaining assets—of 6% per year has been
assumed.

9.
F makes no taxable gifts before his death.
10. The current 60% long-term capital gain de
duction and the current estate and gift tax rate
schedule are used (based on the Economic Recov
ery Tax Act of 1981).
11. The $60,000 annual dividends remain con
stant for the 24-year period.
Income tax consequences

Children:
Net increase in yearly tax
payments ($15,000 x 30% x 4)
Father:
Increase in tax payments
Long-term capital gain
(($4,166.67 x 4)x 40%
x 50%)
Ordinary income
(($6,231.53 x 4)x 50%)

$18,000

3,333
12,463

Total increase
in tax payments
Decrease in tax payments
Dividend income no longer
received ($60,000 x 50%)

15,796

30,000

Net decrease in yearly
tax payments

14,204

Additional yearly income
tax payments (cash outflow)*

$ 3,796

*The present value of this amount is $47,641. Assuming a
6% interest rate for 24 years, the appropriate annuity factor
is 12.55036 (using conventional annuity tables) ($3,796 x
12.55036 = $47,641).

Estate tax consequences

Without a transfer, F’s estate would grow to $4,048,930
($1,000,000 x 4.04893) by the end of 24 years. With the
private annuity transfers, his estate would be $2,024,465.
Private
annuity
transfers
No transfer
$4,048,930
404,893

2,024,465
202,447

Adjusted gross estate
Taxable estate

3,644,037
3,644,037

1,822,018
1,822,018

Estate tax before credits

1,597,819

$ 700,708

Gross estate
Administrative expenses (10%)

Estate tax savings
Administrative expense savings
Additional cash flow to family

$ 897,111
202,446

$1,099,557*

*The present value of this sum is $271,569 ($1,099,557 x
0.24698).

The present value of the net after-tax cash flow to
the family is $223,928 ($271,569 - $47,641). Thus,
the private annuity transactions produced quite
favorable results.
Variations of the general approach

Reverse private annuities. In the examples dis
cussed above, the older taxpayer was the annu
itant. With the repeal of the carryover basis rules for
property received by inheritance, however, “re83

verse” private annuity transactions have become
advantageous. In this arrangement, a younger tax
payer transfers property to an older taxpayer in
exchange for annuity payments. This “reverse”
transaction can yield several benefits: Since the
annuitant is young and has a long life expectancy,
the annuity payments are smaller. The annuitant
also receives greater gain deferral. The age and
physical condition of the older taxpayer, the prom
isor, are not factors considered in the revenue rul
ings.
The transferred property becomes part of the
promisor’s estate, but there is a corresponding de
duction for the present value of the annuity obliga
tion under Sec. 2053. This “offset” generally results
in minimal additional estate taxes, provided that the
promisor does not live very long after the transfer.27
The annuity payments decrease the promisor’s es
tate, but the additional asset increases the estate’s
administrative expenses.
The annuitant receives annuity payments, which
will be recognized as ordinary income, in part, and
perhaps as capital gain. If the annuitant inherits the
transferred property, he receives a stepped-up
basis under Sec. 1014—FMV at date of promisor’s
death or the alternative valuation date, if elected.
Although this transaction appears to give the an
nuitant a stepped-up basis with minimal tax con
sequences, there is a potential drawback: the trans
fer of funds by the estate to the annuitant in settle
ment of the annuity contract is a taxable event for
the annuitant. Under Sec. 72(e), income must be
recognized to the extent that the amount received
(when added to amounts previously received under
the contract that were excluded from income) ex
ceeds the aggregate consideration paid; i.e., to the
extent the amount received exceeds the unrecov
ered basis. This provision may result in substantial
income tax liability for the annuitant. To avoid this
result, the promisor (or his estate) can agree not to
transfer the funds to the annuitant, but instead, to
continue the payments according to the contract.
The estate planner must carefully analyze all the
potential tax consequences before suggesting a
reverse annuity.
Example. J, 35 years old, owns property in California (not his
principal residence), which he purchased in 1971 for
$75,000. He is moving to New York and is considering
renting the property, which currently is worth $185,000. J's
father, E, a widower, is 68 years old, and because of health
problems, he may die within a few years. E has a $600,000
estate. His son, J, is the sole heir of his estate. In 1981, J
exchanges the property in return for his father's promise to
pay him $13,333 annually. (The present value of the annuity
contract is $185,000.)
J’s life expectancy is 42.8 years. His exclusion ratio is

27 The reverse private annuity works best if the promisor dies
within a few years of the transfer.

84

13.143276% ($75,000 ÷ $570,634). His long-term capital
gain is $110,000. J will treat each annuity payment as fol
lows:
Nontaxable recovery of cost
Long-term capital gain
Ordinary income

$ 1,753
2,570
9,010

Total annual payment

$13,333

E dies in 1983 (after two payments were made). At
the time of his death, the residence was valued at
$220,000 and his total estate was $888,000. There
are no income tax consequences for E. The estate
tax consequences are presented below.
Private annuity
transfer

No transfer

$696,000
69,000
—

Gross estate
Administrative expenses
Indebtedness

$888,000
78,000
179,444*

$627,000

Taxable estate

$630,556

$202,791

Estate tax before credits

$204,106

*The present value of the annuity contract.

The “reverse” private annuity results in additional
estate taxes for E of $1,315 and additional adminis
trative expenses of $7,000. There is a small reduc
tion in overall cash flow.
J receives a stepped-up basis in the property
($220,000), allowing substantially greater deprecia
tion deductions than the original $75,000 basis, and
smaller gain recognition when J eventually dis
poses of the property. J pays income tax on some of
the two payments he received. If J continues to
receive the annuity payments, he will have some
income tax liability for each annuity payment. If J
receives $179,444 in settlement of the annuity con
tract, however, he must recognize a $107,950 gain,
which will presumably be treated as long-term capi
tal gain. This gain would make the reverse private
annuity less attractive.
Corporate promisor. In several situations, a pri
vate annuity transaction with a corporate promisor
can be very beneficial. Generally, the promisor will
be a closely held corporation. Under Sec. 351, no
gain or loss would be recognized by the transferor
when he exchanged property in return for stock or
securities. The corporation would receive a carry
over basis in the transferred property. Sharehold
ers may prefer that the corporation receives a
stepped-up basis in the transferred property, how
ever, and a private annuity arrangement can be
used to accomplish this (and avoid Sec. 351). The
transfer of property is a legitimate sale and the
shareholders do not receive stock or securities in
return for the property. Thus, a private annuity with a
corporate promisor can be arranged to circumvent
Sec. 351.
An older shareholder might want to terminate his
interest in a closely held corporation without admit

ting “outside” shareholders. This objective could be
accomplished by a sale of his stock to the other
shareholders, but they might not have sufficient
cash. If a cash distribution from the corporation was
arranged, it could produce ordinary income. In addi
tion, the corporation might not have enough cash to
accomplish the sale. To avoid these problems, the
older shareholder could surrender his stock to the
corporation in exchange for a promise to make an
nual annuity payments for life. This arrangement
qualifies as a Sec. 302(b)(3) redemption (assuming
all the requirements are met), and the older
shareholder receives capital gain treatment on the
surrender of the stock, recognized as each annuity
payment is received, with minimal cash outflow for
the corporation and its other shareholders.
The corporate promisor private annuity transac
tion can also be structured to satisfy certain per
centage requirements of Sec. 303, while keeping all
the property in the family. Under Sec. 303, a re
demption qualifies for sale or exchange treatment
regardless of whether Sec. 302 requirements are
met. The amount treated as capital gains equals
the death taxes and funeral and administrative ex
penses. To qualify, the stock must exceed 35% of
the decedent’s adjusted gross estate. Although the
current composition of the shareholder’s estate
might fail this test, the estate may include certain
property that the shareholder wants to keep in the
family. By transferring the property to the corpora
tion in return for the private annuity, the estate com
position could be altered to meet the greater than
35% test, because the transfer increases the value
of the stock and increases the relative percentage
of the estate that it occupies.28
Under Sec. 6166, if a closely held business com
prises more than 35% of the adjusted gross estate,
the executor may elect to pay the estate tax over 10
years, after a four-year deferral, with a 4% interest
rate on the tax of the first $1 million, and 20%
interest on excess amounts.29 Like a Sec. 303 re
demption described above, the private annuity
corporate promisor arrangement can be used to
ensure that the stock equals or is greater than 35%
of the taxpayer’s estate.

28 This transfer is especially beneficial if the taxpayer believes
that none of his heirs is capable of managing the property.
After the transfer, the corporation will manage the property. If
the taxpayer has heirs who are capable of management re
sponsibilities, a properly structured private annuity transaction
between the taxpayer and his heir(s) could produce similar
results. A Sec. 351 transfer could also produce the same
results.
29 Sec. 6166, as amended by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, places certain limitations on this deferral. Also, the
corporation must satisfy the definition of “closely held busi
ness” in Sec. 6166(b).

Private annuity versus cancellable installment
sale notes
As the discussion above indicates, private an
nuities can be a useful estate planning device.
Another arrangement might be even more advan
tageous. In Moss,30 the taxpayer sold property
(stock and land) and received promissory notes that
contained a cancellation clause, which provided
that the principal and interest due under the notes
would be extinguished on the death of the prom
isee. The sale was a bona fide, arm’s-length trans
action for adequate and full consideration, and the
cancellation clause was included in the sale price.
The Tax Court held that the notes and remaining
interest were not includible in Moss’ estate.
This type of transaction can result in several
benefits: (1) the transferred property (and all future
growth and income) is removed from the seller’s
estate; (2) the notes are not included in the estate
(they have no value); and (3) recognition of gain is
spread over the life of the installment notes. These
results are similar to those achieved by private an
nuity plans; the “Moss” arrangement offers some
additional advantages: (1) the arrangement pro
vides greater flexibility in terms; (2) it is easier to
determine the basis of the property to the buyer; (3)
if the seller surpasses his life expectancy, no addi
tional payments by the buyer are required; once the
note is paid, the payments end; and (4) interest
expense is deductible by the maker of the note.
These advantages make the cancellable install
ment sale a viable alternative to the private annuity
transaction.

Conclusion

As the final example above illustrates, private
annuity transactions can provide clear benefits. The
after-tax cash flow increases significantly. F can
keep the corporation within the family with rather
favorable tax consequences. Careful planning of
the private annuity can result in lower income, gift,
and estate taxes while enabling the estate owner to
achieve his objectives. Many estate planners avoid
private annuity transactions because of their com
plexity and potential negative tax consequences.
Other practitioners are unfamiliar with private an
nuities. In addition, because the tax consequences
and requirements are outlined primarily in revenue
rulings, there is some uncertainty as to tax treat
ment. Private annuities also offer many potential
advantages, however, and the practitioner should
at least compare results with other transfer plans to
find the best estate planning tool. tta

30 Est. of John A. Moss, 74 TC 1239 (1980).
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The deductible interest expense of the not-so-crummy
“Crummey trust”

In the last few years, the “Crummey” trust has
captured the attention of estate planners. There is
good reason for this interest. Properly employed
and carefully drawn, an irrevocable trust with a
“Crummey” withdrawal right can result in substan
tial estate tax savings. Even more notable, these
estate tax savings can be obtained at little or no gift
tax expense, and with potential income tax benefits.
The trust derives its somewhat unfortunate name
from the Crummey1 case, which involved special
withdrawal rights held by minor and adult benefi
ciaries. These rights, described below, converted
contributions to an irrevocable trust from taxable
gifts of future interests into gifts of present interests
that qualified for the annual exclusion from gift tax.2
Apparently in response to the active interest in
Crummey trusts and the many unanswered ques
tions relating to the tax consequences of the with
drawal right, the IRS issued Rev. Proc. 81-37, an
nouncing that the Service would no longer issue
advance rulings on the income and gift tax conse
quences of certain types of Crummey trusts until
these issues were resolved through publication of a

revenue ruling, revenue procedure or regulations.3
Generally, the Service will not rule on any estate tax
issues relating to property or the estate of a living
person.4 Accordingly, absent the guidance of an
advance ruling, the cautious estate planner must
examine the statutes, regulations, cases and rul
ings in the income, gift and estate tax areas perti
nent to the Crummey trust and rely on his own
conclusions. This article provides practitioners with
some planning ideas to help avoid IRS challenges,
as well as some arguments to assist them if they
face litigation. These planning ideas and arguments
primarily relate to the income tax consequences of
the Crummey withdrawal right for the grantor of the
trust and the holders of the withdrawal rights.
Description of the Crummey trust

Crummey trusts typically have the following
characteristics. The grantor creates an irrevocable
inter vivos trust. The trust does not contain any
prohibited powers or assets from prohibited trans
fers that would cause the trust to be taxed to the
grantor’s estate at his death under Secs. 2033
through 2042.5

Copyright © 1982 by Beverly J. Greenley. All rights reserved.

1 D. Clifford Crummey, 397 F2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968)(22 AFTR2d
6023, 68-2 USTC ¶12,541), rev’g TC Memo 1966-144. All
references herein to the Crummey case, unless otherwise
noted, are to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision.
2 Sec. 2503(b) provides for an annual exclusion from gift tax of
$10,000 per donee.
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3 Rev. Proc. 81-37,1981 -1 CB 368, amplified Rev. Proc. 81-10,
1981-1 CB 647. See also Rev. Proc. 82-22,1982-1 CB 469.
4 Rev. Proc. 72-3, 1972-1 CB 698.
5 All section numbers referred to herein are sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless specifi
cally stated otherwise.
THE TAX ADVISER, AUGUST 1983

The trust property consists solely of life insurance
policies insuring the life of the grantor. These
policies may be transferred to the trust subject to
policy loans taken out by the grantor before the
transfer. The trustee is empowered to borrow
against the cash values of the trust policies.
During the life of the grantor, the trust may gener
ate little or no income, but any income that is gener
ated is used to pay life insurance premiums on the
policies owned by the trust. The income created by
the trust normally will not be sufficient to pay the
premiums in full.
To provide the balance of the funds necessary for
payment of the life insurance premiums, the grantor
(or another person) makes periodic contributions to
the trustee, who uses these funds to pay the pre
miums on the trust policies to the life insurance
company. These periodic contributions are not
characterized as future-interest gifts, taxable to the
person making the contributions, because the trust
provides that each beneficiary has a current right to
withdraw his share of the trust contribution. Thus,
the donor can take advantage of the annual gift tax
exclusion.
If the grantor funds the trust with income-pro
ducing assets, rather than cash contributions, the
trust normally provides that any income generated
by the trust in excess of the funds used to pay
premiums will be paid to the grantor’s spouse, chil
dren or others. These beneficiaries would have the
rights mentioned above to withdraw the periodic
contributions to the trust.
At the death of the grantor-insured, the proceeds
of the insurance policies flow into the trust, to be
invested and distributed by the trustee in accor
dance with the trust terms. These terms can be
tailored to the grantor’s particular situation, as long
as the trust provisions do not cause trust assets to
be includible in the grantor’s estate.6 For example,
the trustee can be empowered to pay income and
principal for the benefit of the grantor’s spouse and
children, to loan money to the grantor’s estate7 or to
use the life insurance proceeds to purchase non
liquid assets from the grantor’s estate, e.g., stock of
a closely held corporation or a family farm.
The unique characteristic of Crummey trusts is
the withdrawal rights given to the trust beneficiaries.
The following paragraphs describe the important
aspects of these rights:
1. The donee of the right can immediately de

6 Secs. 2033-2042.
7 A power to loan trust assets to the grantor’s estate assumes
that the dispositive provisions of the grantor’s will and the
dispositive provisions of the Crummey trust are identical and
that each instrument contains a merger clause so that the loan
disappears when the will trust and the Crummey trust are
merged.

mand withdrawal of contributions to the trust,
whether the contributions are in the form of insur
ance policies, other assets, or cash contributed in
order to make premium payments.8
2. The donee of the withdrawal right is notified
of his withdrawal right and is advised of each contri
bution to the trust.9
3. The trustee is instructed to notify the donee
of the withdrawal right within a reasonable period of
time after each contribution to the trust.10
4. The donee is given a reasonable period of
time in which to make demand upon the trustee
before the right to withdraw lapses.11
5. If the beneficiary does not exercise his with
drawal right within the prescribed time period, the
contribution is irrevocably added to the trust princi
pal.12
6. The trust instrument provides that the ben
eficiary or his natural guardian or a legally ap
pointed guardian of the beneficiary can receive
notice and exercise the withdrawal right.13
7. During the period in which the donees can
exercise their withdrawal rights, the trustee main
tains assets in the trust sufficient to satisfy these
rights. Accordingly, where the grantor or another
contributes cash to the trust to enable the trustee to
pay life insurance premiums, the cash is contributed
far enough in advance of the premium due date to
allow the funds to remain in trust during the period

8 Crummey, note 1. Although rulings cannot be used or cited as
precedent (Sec. 6110(j)(3)), it is helpful to read IRS Letter
Rulings 7826050 (3/29/78); 7922107 (3/5/79), 7947066 (8/
23/79); 8003033 (10/23/79); 8004172 (11/5/79); 8006048
(11/16/79); 8006109 (11/20/79); 8015133 (1/21/80); 8019038
(2/12/80); 8021058 (2/28/80); 8022048 (3/4/80). See also
Rev. Rul. 74-43,1974-1 CB 285; compare IRS Letter Rulings
(TAMs) 7905088 (11/1/78), 7946007 (7/26/79), and Rev. Rul.
81-7, 1981-1 CB 474, where withdrawal rights that are so
limited in time as to be “illusory” rights may be denied the
annual gift tax exclusion.
9 IRS Letter Rulings 8019038, 8015133 and 7946007.
10 Letter rulings have contained, without disapproval, a notice
provision requiring the trustee to give the donees notice within
seven days (LTR 8004172) and within 10 days (LTR 8015133)
of receipt of contributions to the trust.
11 Letter rulings have contained time limits of 30 days (LTR
8003033) and 90 days (LTR 8015133) between transfer to the
trust and the lapse of the right to withdraw and have contained
withdrawal periods of 30 days (LTR 8004172) and 60 days
(LTR 7947066) between notice to the beneficiary and lapse of
the right. See also IRS Letter Ruling 8047131 (8/29/80), ap
proving a six-week withdrawal period.
12 Crummey, note 1.
13 The donee of the withdrawal right must have the legal capac
ity, directly or indirectly, to exercise the right. If a minor or
incompetent donee is involved, there can be no impediment
under the legal instrument or local law to the appointment of a
guardian. Rev. Rul. 73-405, 1973-2 CB 321; IRS Letter Rul
ings 7922107; 8019039 (2/12/80); 8004172; 8015133; and
8022048.
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specified (by the trust terms) between notice to the
donees and the lapse of their rights of withdrawal.14
8. The amount of the gift subject to withdrawal
from the trust by a particular donee is ascertainable
without delay under the provisions of the trust15 and
can be withdrawn by each donee acting alone,
rather than in conjunction with the other donees.16
9. The grantor explains to the beneficiaries the
consequences of exercising their withdrawal rights
and encourages them not to do so. However, there
is no agreement between the grantor and the ben
eficiaries that they will not exercise their rights.17
10. The withdrawal right arises only when a
transfer is made to the trust, and thus becomes
effective only when it is necessary to qualify the
contribution to the trust as a present interest gift.
11. The right of withdrawal is limited in scope to
those assets transferred to the trust currently and
extends only to the value of assets equal to the
donor’s available gift tax exclusion. If the grantor or
other contributor to the trust wants the beneficiaries
to also avoid gift tax consequences, the contribu
tions to the trust for any one year and the right of
withdrawal should be limited to $5,000 per donee.18
12. Once the withdrawal period passes, the
donee of the right loses any demand right over
transfers made before the lapse. In other words, the
donee’s right is noncumulative.19
Although the withdrawal rights are placed in the
trust primarily to obtain favorable gift tax treatment
for the periodic contributions to the trust, the rights
also involve income tax consequences and perhaps
advantages.

14 IRS Letter Ruling 8112087 (12/29/80).
15 Rev. Rul. 80-261, 1980-2 CB 279, and IRS Letter Ruling
8022048.
16 Cf. Spyros P. Skouras, 188 F2d 831 (2d Cir. 1951)(40 AFTR
491, 51-1 USTC ¶10,805).
17 Cf. Cornelia Plassche Cook, TC Memo 1970-68; Gage B. Ellis
Jr. (exec. under will of George Banks Ellis), 280 F Supp 786
(DC Md. 1968)(21 AFTR2d 1635,68-1 USTC ¶12,517). Com
pare also Regs. Sec. 20.2056(b)-5(g)(2).
18 Although the donor to a trust can contribute $10,000 per year
per donee (beneficiary with a withdrawal right) without gift tax
liability, a donee who allows his withdrawal right to lapse will be
subject to gift taxes to the extent that his withdrawal right
exceeds $5,000 per year, unless he is the sole beneficiary of
the trust. Sec. 2514(b) and (e).
When the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) was passed
in August, 1981, Crummey trusts in effect generally contained
withdrawal rights drafted in terms of the $3,000 annual exclu
sion. Congress was concerned that donors would not want the
beneficiary’s withdrawal right to exceed $3,000. Accordingly,
the $10,000 exclusion does not apply to Crummey powers
granted under a trust created before Sept. 12,1981, and not
amended thereafter if (1) the power is exercisable after 1981,
(2) the power is defined in terms of the Sec. 2503(b) exclusion,
and (3) applicable state law does not construe the power as
referring to the $10,000 annual exclusion. ERTA §441 (c)(2).
19 Crummey, note 1.
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The income tax considerations to the grantor

The grantor of a Crummey trust will generally be
concerned about the following tax questions: (1) will
the trust generate taxable income? (2) will the trust
generate any deductions in excess of taxable in
come? (3) who must pay tax on any income gener
ated by the trust? and (4) who is entitled to deduct
any excess deductions?
The trust may generate taxable income from the
investrnent of cash contributions during the period
when the donees have been notified of their with
drawal rights, but before the premiums are paid to
the insurance companies after the lapse of the
rights. Taxable income may also arise when div
idends and other tax-free amounts received on par
ticipating insurance policies exceed the cost of the
policies.20 In addition, if the trust was funded with
income-producing assets, the assets could produce
taxable income, unless they consisted of taxexempt bonds or other tax-free investments.
The trust will generate deductions if it owns life
insurance policies and borrows against the cash
values of the policies. These loans can create valu
able interest deductions. Under Sec. 163, a deduc
tion for interest paid on life insurance policy loans is
generally allowed to the owner of the policy, unless
Sec. 264 bars the deduction. Sec. 264 provides that
interest will be deductible if no part of four of the
annual premiums due during the first seven years of
the policy’s life is paid by borrowing, including
borrowing against the policy.
The third and fourth questions, who will be taxed
on the trust income, and, assuming Sec. 264 is
avoided, who can take advantage of any excess
deductions, are more difficult to resolve. There are
several possible answers:21 the trust itself, the
grantor, the beneficiaries, or some combination of
these parties.
Ordinarily, all trust income, credits and deduc
tions are taxed to the trust itself and/or to its ben
eficiaries, depending on the specific trust terms.22
Thus, the provisions of the trust document and the
powers given to the trustee usually indicate whether
the trust or its beneficiaries will bear the tax burden
or derive the benefit of excess deductions. In some
situations, however, Secs. 671 through 679 over
ride these general principles. When the grantor (or

20 Sec. 72(e)(1); Regs. Sec. 1.72-11(b)(1).
21 Before Rev. Proc. 81-37, note 3, was issued, announcing that
the IRS would not rule on the income tax consequences of
certain Crummey trusts, the Service apparently viewed the
grantor alone as taxable on the trust income and entitled to the
deductions. IRS Letter Rulings 8008085 (11/29/79); 8014078
(1/10/80); 8112087; 8118051 (2/9/81); 8126047 (3/31/81);
7909031 (11/28/78); and 8103074 (10/23/80).
22 See Secs. 652 and 662 and related sections.

others) holds certain powers, the trust income will
be taxed to, and credits and deductions will be
passed to the grantor (and other persons) who are
treated as “owners” within the meaning of the
“grantor trust” rules.
In the context of an irrevocable life insurance
trust, if the policy loans generate interest deduc
tions in excess of trust income, the trust should be
structured to contain at least one power that causes
trust income and deductions to flow over to the
grantor without causing the trust assets to be in
cluded in his estate. This type of trust is often re
ferred to as a “defective trust,” and if the trust con
tains a Crummey withdrawal right, it is called a
“super trust.”
The grantor trust provisions that can be used to
create a defective “super” trust include Sec. 677(a),
Sec. 675 and Sec. 674. The following discussion
will examine these grantor trust powers, their estate
tax consequences and potential problems con
nected with their use in a Crummey trust.
Sec. 677(a) powers. Sec. 677(a) provides:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a
trust,. . . whose income without the approval or consent of
any adverse party is, or, in the discretion of the grantor or a
nonadverse party, or both, may be—
(1) distributed to the grantor or the grantor’s spouse;
(2) held or accumulated for future distribution to the grantor
or the grantor’s spouse; or
(3) applied to the payment of premiums on policies of insur
ance on the life of the grantor or the grantor’s spouse
(except policies of insurance irrevocably payable for a
purpose specified in section 170(c) (relating to definition
of charitable contributions)). . . .

In a typical life insurance trust, the trustee would
be a nonadverse party, as defined in Sec. 672, such
as a bank.23 The trustee would be directed to or
would have discretion to use the trust income to pay
the premiums on the policies owned by the trust
insuring the grantor’s life without the approval or
consent of an adverse party. Thus, Sec. 677(a)(3)
would come into play, and would cause the grantor
to be treated as the “owner” of the trust for income
tax purposes. As a result, the trust income and
deductions would flow to the grantor.
For estate tax purposes, the direction or discre
tion to use trust income to pay life insurance pre
miums on the life of the grantor should not result in
the trust to being included in the grantor’s estate.24*

23 Sec. 672(b) provides that a non-adverse party is any person
who is not an adverse party, and Sec. 672(a) defines an
adverse party as “. . . any person having a substantial ben
eficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected
by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which he pos
sesses respecting the trust.”
24 See First National Sank of Birmingham (exec. under will of
Harold R. Sanson), 36 BTA 651 (1937), where income from an

Although the issue is somewhat unclear, it appears
that if the grantor paid the premiums on the trust
policies insuring his life directly to the insurance
company, the payments would not be deemed an
incident of ownership and would not cause the pro
ceeds to be included in the gross estate under Sec.
2042.25 Accordingly, if the premiums are paid by the
trust, not the grantor, the proceeds should not be
included in the grantor’s estate. Further, even
though the premium payments might be directly
traceable to grantor contributions to the trust and
the trust might be deemed the “alter ego” of the
grantor, the beneficiaries have the power to inter
cept the premium payments by exercising their
withdrawal rights thus removing any connection be
tween the grantor’s contribution to the trust and the
payment of premiums for insurance on his life.
Thus, a trustee power to pay premiums should not
cause the trust to be taxed as part of the estate of
the grantor.
A second type of trust power that could be used to
create a defective trust involves the payment or
accumulation of trust income during the grantor’s
life for his own or his spouse’s benefit. For instance,
any one of the following powers in the trust (if exer
cisable without the approval or consent of an ad
verse party) would create a grantor trust under Sec.
677(a)(1) or (2), and would cause the grantor to be
taxed on the trust income and have the benefit of
trust deductions:
1. A direction to the trustee to pay trust income to
or accumulate it for the grantor.
2. A direction to the trustee to pay trust income to
or accumulate it for the grantor’s spouse.
3. A discretionary power in the trustee to pay
trust income to or accumulate it for the grantor.
4. A discretionary power in the trustee to pay
trust income to or accumulate it for the grantor’s
spouse.
To avoid the inclusion of the trust in the grantor’s
estate, a direction to pay or accumulate income
for the grantor could not be used because the trust
would be included in the grantor’s estate under Sec.
2036. In contrast, however, a discretionary power to
pay or accumulate income for the grantor should not
cause inclusion in the grantor’s estate.26 Similarly,
directing or allowing the trustee to pay or accumu
late income for the grantor’s spouse, numbers (2)
inter vivos trust, funded in part with insurance policies on the
decedent’s life, was used to pay premiums. At death the trust
was not includible in the decedent-grantor’s estate under the
precursor to Sec. 2036. No mention was made of a statute
similar to Sec. 2042.
25 See Federal Taxes (Prentice-Hall), ¶120,422.4, for an expla
nation of why the area remains unsettled.
26 Est. of Edgar M. Uhl, 241 F2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957)(50 AFTR
1746, 57-1 USTC ¶11,677); and IRS Letter Ruling 8037116
(6/23/80).
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and (4), should not cause the trust to be included in
the grantor’s estate as long as the trustee is not
required to use the income for her support and
maintenance.27
Notwithstanding that either a power directing the
trustee to pay income to or accumulate it for the
grantor’s spouse or a discretionary power to pay
income to or accumulate it for the grantor or his
spouse should cause trust income and deductions
to flow to the grantor, the grantor may nevertheless
still face a problem if he takes trust income tax
deductions in excess of trust income. To date, IRS
letter rulings have not raised this issue.28 However,
some commentators have expressed concern that
even though Sec. 677(a) powers make the grantor
taxable for the trust income, the Service may
somewhat inconsistently argue that the Sec. 677(a)
powers do not cause interest deductions generated
by nonincome-producing assets to flow over to the
grantor.29
This argument focuses on the “any portion” lan
guage of Secs. 677(a) and 671. Sec. 677(a) pro
vides that the grantor, for income tax purposes,
“shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a
trust. . . whose income . . .” is or may be distri
buted to the grantor or his spouse, held for future
distribution to them, or used to pay their life insur
ance premiums. (Emphasis added.) Sec. 671 pro
vides:
Where it is specified in this subpart [in Sec. 671, as well as
Secs. 672-679] that the grantor or another person shall be
treated as the owner of any portion of a trust, there shall then
be included in computing the taxable income and credits of
the grantor or the other person those items of income,
deductions, and credits against tax of the trust which are
attributable to that portion of the trust. . . . (Emphasis
added.)

27 Est. of Arthur S. Dwight, 205 F2d 298 (2d Cir. 1953)(44 AFTR
48,53-1 USTC ¶10,903), cert. denied 346 US 871 (1953). But
see Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co. (co-admin. de
bonis non of Est. of Paul F. Donnelly), 111 F2d 224 (8th Cir.
1940)(24 AFTR 897,40-1 USTC ¶9375), cert. denied 310 US
654 (1940). Cf. Est. of Payson S. Douglass, 143 F2d 961 (3d
Cir. 1944)(32 AFTR 1108,44-2 USTC ¶10,131), where trustee
was permitted to use trust income for the support and mainte
nance of a child that the grantor had a legal obligation to
support. The trust was not includible in the grantor’s estate by
reason of his retaining possession, enjoyment or a right to the
trust income under a constructive receipt theory.
28 IRS Letter Rulings 8126047; 8118051; 8014078; 8112087.
See also Rev. Rul. 77-402,1977-2 CB 222, where, although
the issue addressed is not directly on point, the IRS described
a grantor trust that invested in a partnership that generated
tosses apparently in excess of the trust’s income. The ruling
mentions that the grantor, as owner of the trust, deducted the
partnership tosses attributable to the partnership interest
owned by the trust.
29 Rocco, "Tax Benefits of ‘Super Trusts’,” National Law J. (11/
5/79), at 19; and Engel and Regenstreich, “The ‘Super
Trust’—Estate Planning for Life Insurance," 121 Trusts & Es
tates 61 (Feb. 1982).
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A comparison of the two provisions suggests that
giving a Sec. 677(a) power to the trustee to pay or
accumulate income or pay premiums for the grantor
or his spouse may result in the grantor being
deemed the owner of only the income-producing
“portion” of the trust, not the nonincome-producing
life insurance policies. Therefore, the income from
the income-producing portion of the trust would flow
over to the grantor, but the deductions from the
nonincome-producing assets would not, at least not
to the extent that the deductions exceeded the in
come.30
The IRS may draw an analogy to other instances
in the Code, regulations or cases that require “split”
tax treatment, depending on the interest over which
a taxpayer has a power or in which he has an
ownership right. For example, Regs. Sec.
20.2036-1 (a) recognizes that a grantor of a trust can
reserve a power over a portion of the trust, say
one-third, causing only that one-third portion to be
subject to estate taxes; the remaining two-thirds
portion would not be taxable. Similarly, Regs. Sec.
20.2041-1 (b)(3) recognizes that a power of ap
pointment may be held over an income interest or a
corpus interest, and only that part of the interest will
be subject to estate taxes. Accordingly, the IRS may
argue that splitting the assets in the trust into in
come and nonincome-producing assets and ac
cording different tax treatment to each is covered by
the “any portion” language of Sec. 677(a).
Although this argument appears to be without
merit, litigation may be necessary to decide the
issue. The taxpayer faced with litigation could as
sert that there is little support in Sec. 671 or 677(a)
or the accompanying regulations to indicate that the
“any portion” language can result in dividing the
trust into income and nonincome-producing assets.
The “any portion” language of Secs. 671 and
677(a) is interpreted in Regs. Sec. 1.671-3(a) and
(b).31 Regs. Sec. 1.671-3(a) defines “any portion”
by describing three types of vertical divisions of a
trust. Where the grantor’s power only extends to
certain assets or parts of the trust, the trust is di
vided into distinct portions that can be treated, for
income tax purposes, as separate trusts. For in
stance, Regs. Sec. 1.671-3(a)(1) describes a trust
in which the grantor’s power extends to all the
assets of the trust. In that case, the “portion” is the
entire trust, and the grantor is therefore taxed on the
income from the entire trust and is entitled to use the
deductions and credits from the entire trust.
Regs. Sec. 1.671-3(a)(2) illustrates the second
type of vertical division in which a power over

30 Id.
31 Regs. Sec. 1.677(a)-1(a)(2) provides a cross-reference to
Regs. Sec. 1.671-3(a) for a discussion of the “any portion”
language of Sec. 677.

specific trust property creates a “portion.” For in
stance, if a grantor had the power to direct dividends
from AT&T stock to himself, he would be deemed
the “owner” of that portion of the trust, and would be
taxed on the dividends from the AT&T stock. In
addition, if the trust generated any deductions or
credits with respect to the stock, they would also be
attributed to the grantor.
Regs. Sec. 1.671-3(a)(3) discusses the third
type of vertical division in which the grantor owns an
undivided fractional interest in the trust or a dollar
amount of the trust. For example, if a grantor had
the power to direct income from one-half of the trust
to himself, he would be deemed to be the owner of
one-half of the trust. One-half of the income would
be taxable to him, and one-half of the deductions
and credits would be attributable to him. Similarly, if
the grantor had the power to direct income from
$100,000 of the trust assets to himself, he would be
deemed the owner of the fraction of the trust equal
to $100,000 over the total value of the trust. That
portion of the income would be taxable to him and
he could take advantage of that portion of the de
ductions and credits.
In each example in the regulations, the "portion”
described is based on limitations imposed by the
grantor in the trust instrument. Thus, the regs.
suggest that the issue is, under the provisions of the
trust instrument, does the power held by the grantor
extend to all of the trust assets, or to only part of the
trust assets? In the Crummey trust, the grantor’s
power extends to all of the trust assets and there
fore the “portion” of the trust income, credits, and
deductions attributable to the grantor is all of the
trust income credits, and deductions.
Regs. Sec. 1.671-3(b) describes a horizontal di
vision of the income of the trust in which the portions
depend on whether the grantor’s power extends to
ordinary income, income allocable to corpus or
both. For example, the regs. state that if the grant
or’s power extends to ordinary income alone, the
grantor will be treated as owner of the ordinary
income and not any capital gains income, and de
ductions will be allocated to the grantor in accor
dance with Regs. Sec. 1.671-3(c). In the horizontal
division, each “portion” is again based on the limita
tions of the trust instrument. Thus, the proper in
quiry is: does the power held by the grantor only
extend to all ordinary income, or does it also extend
to all capital gains? In the typical Crummey trust, the
entire trust will be subject to satisfaction of the
trustee’s power to pay premiums. For instance, the
typical provision may state:
During the life of the grantor, the Trustee shall (or may in his
discretion) pay out of the income of the trust [to eliminate
doubt the drafter could add, “both ordinary income and in
come allocable to corpus”] and, to the extent that the in
come is insufficient, out of the trust principal, all premiums

on policies of insurance on the life of the grantor owned by
the Trustee.

This instruction does not extend to just one portion
of the trust, but extends to the entire trust.
Accordingly, the “any portion” language of Secs.
677(a) and 671 should not result in an artificial
division of the trust into income- and nonincome
producing assets. Since the grantor’s power ex
tends to the entire trust, the grantor should be enti
tled to all trust deductions, whether or not they ex
ceed trust income. This result is particularly war
ranted where the trustee has the power to surrender
policies for their cash value and invest the cash in
income-producing assets.
If the taxpayer can overcome an IRS argument
based on the “any portion” language, he may still
face a second argument if a Sec. 677(a)(3) power is
involved. A power in the trustee to apply income of
the trust to pay premiums for insurance on the life of
the grantor or the grantor’s spouse ordinarily would
cause the grantor to be deemed the owner of the
trust under Sec. 677(a)(3). As a result, all income,
deductions and credits would flow over to the grant
or. The IRS may argue, however, that such a power
does not cause interest deductions generated by
loans against the life insurance policies to flow over
to the grantor.
This Sec. 677(a)(3) argument, suggested by a
commentator,32 is as follows: Sec. 677(a)(3)
causes the grantor to be taxed on trust income
when trust income can be used to pay premiums for
insurance on the grantor’s (or his spouse’s) life,
regardless of whether or not the policies are owned
by the trust or by some third party. Presumably, in a
situation where a trust is empowered to pay pre
miums on a policy on the grantor’s life which is
owned by X, the trust income would be taxed to the
grantor even though the trust did not own the policy.
The mere fact that the grantor is insured under the
policy owned by X and the fact that the trust is
empowered to pay premiums on the policy owned
by X would be sufficient to cause income of the trust
to be taxed to the grantor. If X took out a loan against
his policy on the grantor’s life and paid the interest
on the loan, however, it can be argued that it would
be an unreasonable extension of the statute to in
voke Sec. 677(a)(3) and allow the grantor to deduct
the interest payments made by X on the loan
against the policy owned by X on the grantor’s life.
The commentator therefore concludes that be
cause ownership of the policy is irrelevant to
“grantor trust” status, the grantor should not “own”
the policy for income tax deduction purposes,
whether the policy was actually owned by the trust
or by a third party.
32 Rocco, note 29.
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This conclusion does not follow from the prem
ises. First, in the hypothetical posed above, a
deduction would be denied the grantor because the
grantor trust tax statutes simply do not apply. The
trust did not pay the interest and would not be enti
tled to a deduction, so the deduction would not flow
over to the grantor. Similarly, no income generated
on a policy owned by a third party would flow over to
the grantor under the grantor trust provisions. The
grantor can only take advantage of trust deductions
and trust income. The grantor trust is created by the
trust’s ability to pay premiums on insurance on the
grantor’s life. Similarly, the key under Sec.
677(a)(2) is the trust’s ability to accumulate income
for future payment to the grantor’s spouse. If either
of these facts is present, then asset ownership be
comes relevant to the tax consequences: Only in
come on assets owned by the trust is attributed to
the grantor under Sec. 671.33 Similarly, the grantor
would only be entitled to those deductions paid by
the trust.34 In the typical situation, the trust itself will
own the policy and pay the interest on the loan, and
the deduction will properly flow through to the
grantor under Sec. 677(a), just as any income from
the policy owned by the trust would be taxed to the
grantor.
Sec. 675 powers. One or more of the administra
tive powers set out in Sec. 675 can also be used to
achieve defective grantor trust status, causing the
income and deductions to flow over to the grantor.
For instance, if the grantor has the power to sub
stitute or replace an asset, such as an insurance
policy, previously transferred to the trust, with
another asset of equal value, the grantor will be
deemed the “owner” of the trust under Sec.
675(4)(C). Such a power should achieve the de
sired income tax consequences.
In the estate tax area, this type of power was
litigated in Jordahl.35 The Court did not view this
power as either an incident of ownership (by the
trust) in the insurance policies, within the meaning
of Sec. 2042(a), or a power to alter, amend or re
voke the trust within the meaning of Sec.
2038(a)(2). Accordingly, if a grantor is given a
Jordahl power, the trust should not be included in
the grantor’s estate.36
Other Sec. 675 powers that are “tainted” for in
come tax purposes must be carefully examined in
connection with estate taxes. Specifically, prac

33 William H. Simon, 36 BTA 184 (1937).
34 Agnes I. Fox, 43 BTA 895 (1941).
35 Est. of Anders Jordahl, 65 TC 92 (1954), acq. 1977-1 CB 1.
36 The Court in Jordahl did not discuss whether a power of
substitution would be deemed a retained power, and thereby
bring the person who is to possess or enjoy the property within
Sec. 2036.
92

titioners should consider whether the power, as it
relates to the insurance policies, is an incident of
ownership taxable under Sec. 2042 and whether
the power would cause Secs. 2033 through 2041 to
apply, making the trust taxable as part of the grant
or’s estate.37

Sec. 674 powers. A third type of power, one set
forth in Sec. 674, might result in a defective grantor
trust. Under Sec. 674(a), a grantor will be deemed
“owner” of a trust if the grantor or a non-adverse
party (without the approval or consent of an adverse
party)38 can affect the beneficial enjoyment of the
trust corpus or its income. Generally, this type of
power would be a Sec. 2036 or 2038 power if held
by the grantor himself, and would therefore cause
inclusion of the trust assets in his estate.39 By giving
a Sec. 674(a) power to a non-adverse trustee,
Secs. 2036 and 2038 should be avoided, but the
trust will still be “tainted” for income tax purposes.
Every power to affect the beneficial enjoyment of
the trust held by a non-adverse party will not create
a grantor trust. Sec. 674(b) lists specific powers that
are exceptions to the general rule. Regardless of
who holds these powers, income will not be taxed to
the grantor. Similarly, Sec. 674(c) lists powers that
are exceptions to the general rule of includibility in
the grantor’s income when these powers are held
by an independent trustee.40 Accordingly, if the
grantor wants to be treated as the owner of the trust
income, Sec. 674(c) powers should not be placed in
a trust with an independent trustee. To create a
grantor trust, practitioners should avoid the powers
contained in Sec. 674(b) and (c) or modify these
powers enough so that the Sec. 674(b) or (c) excep
tion would not apply.
One power listed in Sec. 674(c) can be modified,
if held by an independent trustee, so that Sec.
674(a) will apply to create a grantor trust, while
inclusion of the trust in the grantor’s estate under
Sec. 2038 can be avoided. Sec. 674(c) provides
that a power solely exercisable by an independent
trustee
(1) to distribute, apportion, or accumulate income to or

37 See Lauritzen, “Irrevocable Trusts and the Estate Tax,” 13
Tax Counselor’s Quarterly 135 (June 1969); Lieberman,
“Taxation of the Irrevocable Trust,” 116 Trusts & Estates 654
(Oct. 1977); Pedrick, “Grantor Powers and the Estate Tax:
End of an Era?” 71 Northwestern U. Law Rev. 704 (Jan.-Feb.
1977); Engel and Regenstreich, note 29.
38 Sec. 672(a) and (b).
39 Est. of William Winder Laird, 29 BTA 196 (1933); cf. Est. of
Pierre Jay Wurts, TC Memo 1960-102.
40 An independent trustee is “a trustee or trustees, none of whom
is the grantor, and no more than half of whom are related or
subordinate parties who are subservient to the wishes of the
grantor.” Sec. 674(c). Sec. 672(c) defines “related or subordi
nate party.”

for a beneficiary or beneficiaries, or to, for, or within a class
of beneficiaries; or
(2) to pay out corpus to or for a beneficiary or ben
eficiaries or to or for a class of beneficiaries (whether or not
income beneficiaries)

will not cause the trust to be deemed a grantor trust.
However, the section goes on to state:
A power does not fall within the powers described in this
subsection if any person has a power to add to the ben
eficiary or beneficiaries or to a class of beneficiaries desig
nated to receive the income or corpus, except where such
action is to provide for after-born or after-adopted children.

Accordingly, if an independent trustee holds the
power to add to the beneficiaries or to a class of
beneficiaries (other than to provide for after-born or
after-adopted children), the grantor will be deemed
the owner under Sec. 674(a). For example, if the
independent trustee was instructed to include
spouses of beneficiaries as beneficiaries of the
trust, the Sec. 674(c) exception would not apply,
and a grantor trust would result.41
A Sec. 674(c) power should not cause the trust to
be included in the grantor’s estate for estate tax
purposes, if certain provisions of the regulations are
followed. Regs. Sec. 20.2038-1 (a)(3) provides that
Sec. 2038 does not apply, and therefore a trust will
not be included in the grantor’s estate, if a power is
held solely by a person other than the decedent/
grantor to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the
trust. However, “if the decedent had the un
restricted power to remove or discharge a trustee at
any time and appoint himself trustee, the decedent
is considered as having the power of the trustee”
and the trust will be includible in the decedent/
grantor’s estate.42
Using certain Sec. 674 powers may risk inclusion
of the trust in the grantor’s estate. Accordingly, Sec.
674 powers should be carefully examined to deter
mine whether they will bring Secs. 2033 through
2042 into play, causing the trust to be taxable as
part of the grantor’s estate.
With the foregoing caveats and potential prob
lems in mind, practitioners can consider using any
of the following provisions or powers to achieve the
desired taxation of income to (and flowing of excess
deductions to) the grantor, without inclusion of the
trust in the grantor’s estate.
1. A direction to the trustee or a discretionary
power in the trustee to pay life insurance premiums
on policies insuring the life of the grantor,

41 See also IRS Letter Ruling 8008085.
42 See also Rev. Rul. 73-21,1973-1 CB 405, relating to a power
in the grantor to replace the trustee, which power under local
law would allow him to name himself as trustee. Such power
caused inclusion of the trust in the grantor's estate under Sec.
2036.

2. a discretionary power held by the trustee to
pay income to the grantor or the grantor’s spouse,
or to accumulate income for future payment to
them, as long as there is no requirement that in
come be used to pay for the support or maintenance
of the spouse,
3. a direction to the trustee to pay income to or
accumulate it for the benefit of the grantor’s spouse,
as long as there is no requirement that income be
used to pay for the support or maintenance of the
spouse,
4. a power held by the grantor to substitute an
asset of equal value for an asset previously trans
ferred to the trust, or
5. a power held by an independent trustee (de
fined in Secs. 674(c) and 672(c)) to add to the
beneficiaries or a class of beneficiaries (other than
to provide for after-born or after-adopted children),
as long as the grantor cannot remove the trustee
and appoint himself as trustee.
The foregoing discussion has examined the in
come tax consequences of a Crummey trust for the
grantor of the trust. The unique characteristics of
the withdrawal right given to the donee of the trust
may also involve income tax consequences, and
this issue is discussed below.

The income tax consequences of the Crummey
withdrawal right to the donee

As discussed above, the “grantor trust” provi
sions treat a grantor who holds certain trust powers
as the “owner” and require trust income, deduc
tions and credits to be taxed to him. Under Sec.
678(a)(1), however, if a person other than the grant
or, “has a power exercisable solely by himself to
vest the corpus or the income” from the trust in
himself, that person will be deemed the owner.43
The typical Crummey trust withdrawal right gives
the donee the power to vest in himself the corpus
(and perhaps the income) of a portion of the trust;44
the donee has the power to vest in himself that
portion of the trust subject to the withdrawal right.
Although there is no authority directly on point, it
appears that the donee of a withdrawal right will
have income, deductions and credits flow over to
him for income tax purposes to the extent that these
items arise from the portion of the trust subject to his
withdrawal right.45 These tax consequences have

43 See also Rev. Rul. 67-241, 1967-2 CB 225.
44 See Turley, “The Five or Five Power: An Obscure Estate
Planning Tool,” 33 Washington and Lee Law Rev. 701 (Sum
mer 1976).
45 But see IRS Letter Rulings 7909031; 8014078; 8103074;
8112087; 8118051; and 8126047, which would tax all income
to the grantor despite the withdrawal right. But compare,
Kaney, “New ruling taxes minor with Crummey-type power
over income from trust,” 8 Estate Planning 10 (Jan. 1981).
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resulted even when the donee of the withdrawal
right was a minor for whom no guardian had been
appointed.46 Accordingly, under Sec. 678(a)(1), the
beneficiary will apparently be treated as owner of at
least part of the trust for income tax purposes, in lieu
of the grantor, even though the grantor held one or
more of the grantor trust powers discussed above.
Sec. 678(b) provides an exception to the general
rule of subsection (a): a person other than the
grantor, who has a power to vest income in himself,
will not be deemed the owner of the trust if the
grantor of the trust is otherwise treated as the
owner. Initially, this provision appears to attribute all
income tax consequences to the grantor of the trust,
rather than the beneficiary. However, Sec. 678(b)
states:
Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a power over
income [as opposed to a power to vest corpus or the income
therefrom]. . . if the grantor of the trust. . .is otherwise
treated as the owner under the provisions of this subpart
other than this section.

The entire value of a contribution to the trust will
qualify as a present interest gift only if the donee is
given a withdrawal right over not only the income of
the gift but also the corpus. Thus, the language of
Sec. 678(b) does not seem applicable to the typical
Crummey withdrawal right, and if Sec. 678(b) does
not apply, the donee should be able to share with
the grantor at least some of the income tax effects of
the grantor trust.
When a trust is designed so that income, credits
and deductions are attributed to the grantor, he
probably would not want to share the income, de
ductions and credits with the beneficiaries. Thus,
the grantor would argue that Sec. 678(b) is applica
ble to a Crummey withdrawal right even though the
statute only refers to income. In contrast, if the
grantor does not want the adverse income tax con
sequences, and would rather have the income tax
able to the beneficiaries, the trust provisions should
clearly state that the withdrawal right extends only
to the principal contributions to the trust, and not to
the income generated thereon. By its own terms,
Sec. 678(b) would not apply in that situation.
In any event, if the donee of the withdrawal right
takes into account the income, credits and deduc
tions of a portion of the trust, under Sec. 678(a), the
next issue to be resolved is what portion. The power
exercisable by the donee is not exercisable over the
entire trust but instead is limited in two ways: First,
because the withdrawal right extends only to the
assets contributed to the trust, the right is limited in
scope to those assets currently transferred to the
trust. Secondly, the Withdrawal right is limited by the
46 Trust No. 3 (C.E. and Margaret Brehm, trustees), 285 F2d 102
(7th Cir. 1960) (7 AFTR2d 347, 61-1 USTC ¶9151), rev’g 33
TC 734 (1960); Rev. Rul. 81-6, 1981-1 CB 385.
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length of time between notice of the right and the
lapse of the right, and the right is therefore limited in
time. Thus, the “portion” of the trust that the donee
of a withdrawal right is treated as owning should be
computed in view of both the limitation on the scope
of the assets over which the right extends47 and the
time constraints limiting the right.48
The scope limitation is included in Regs. Sec.
1.671-3(a)(3), which provides a method for com
puting the portion of the trust deemed to be owned
by a donee. The regulation describes a grantor or
another person who owns an undivided fractional
interest in the trust or an interest represented by a
dollar amount. To compute the portion of the trust
income attributed to the owner (donee), the regula
tion indicates that a fraction should be used. The
numerator should be the amount subject to the
owner’s control and the denominator should be the
fair market value of the entire trust corpus at the
beginning of the tax year.49
Determining the numerator of the fraction raises
additional issues. If the numerator simply equals the
value of the assets subject to the donee’s with
drawal right for the current year (e.g., the $5,000
contributed to the trust), determining the numerator
is rather easy. However, under Sec. 678(a)(2), the
numerator may equal the aggregate value of the
assets subject to the donee’s current withdrawal
right plus the value of all assets subject to the
lapsed rights from prior years; using this interpreta
tion, the computation becomes more complex.
Sec. 678(a)(2) states that a donee is treated as
owner of any portion of the trust with respect to
which the donee “. . . has previously partially re
leased or otherwise modified ... [a power to vest
corpus or income in himself ] and after the release or
modification retains such control . . .” as would
cause a grantor to be deemed an owner within
Secs. 671 through 677. (Emphasis added.) Argu
ably, a donee who allowed withdrawal rights to
lapse in prior years might be treated as the owner of
the portions of the trust to which the right related.
Sec. 678(a)(2) should not apply in this situation,
however. The lapse of a withdrawal right is not a
partial release and no provision in the statute de
fines a lapse as equivalent to a release. Accord
ingly, the numerator of the fraction used to deter
mine what portion of a trust is taxed to the donee
because of his withdrawal right should not be in
creased by the value of the assets subject to the

47 Rev. Rul. 67-241, note 43.
48 Victor W. Krause, 56 TC 1242 (1971).
49 If contributions are made to the trust in the middle of the tax
year, or several times during the tax year, it is unclear whether
the date or dates of contribution should be deemed the “be
ginning” of the tax year.

withdrawal right in earlier years. Instead, the
numerator should equal the aggregate value of the
assets subject to the donee’s withdrawal right in the
current year.
If this analysis was rejected, however, and the
donee’s lapse was considered a partial release,
Sec. 678(a)(2) would apply to a Crummey with
drawal right, and another determination would be
necessary: Did the donee retain the requisite con
trol to be treated as the owner under Secs. 671
through 677?
Whether a lapse can be viewed as “retained con
trol” within the meaning of Sec. 678(a)(2) is un
clear.50 Moreover, a power within Secs. 671
through 677 would have to be retained. In the typical
trust situation, Sec. 673 might apply, causing the
donee to be deemed an owner of the assets subject
to earlier withdrawal rights. Sec. 673 provides that
the grantor (presumably the donee of the with
drawal right who allowed his power to lapse) will be
treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in
which he has a reversionary interest51 in either the
corpus or income that he will or may reasonably be
expected to possess or enjoy within 10 years. Thus,
Sec. 673 would apply only if the income from the
trust could be expected to be paid to the donee of
the withdrawal right within 10 years. Unless all of
these requirements were satisfied, the numerator of
the fraction for determining the portion of income
attributable to a donee would be based upon the
donee’s withdrawal right for the current year, rather
than assets subject to the withdrawal right in prior
years.52
Assuming that only the assets subject to the
donee’s current withdrawal right are taken into ac
count, the scope limitation on the amount of income
attributable to the donee can be illustrated as fol
lows:5354
Suppose a grantor transfers $5,000 to a
trust and gives a donee a withdrawal right over the
$5,000. At the time of the transfer to the trust, the
trust contained $95,000 worth of assets. The
numerator of the fraction for determining the portion
of income attributable to the donee by virtue of his
withdrawal right is the $5,000 over which the donee
had a right of withdrawal. The denominator would
be the entire trust corpus or $100,000. If there were
no time constraints on the withdrawal right, the
donee would report 5% of the trust’s income, deduc
tions and credits.
To determine the portion of the trust that the

50 The language “retained control” should be interpreted differ
ently from a “transfer” that results from allowing a right to lapse
per Est. of Eva M. Miller, 58 TC 699 (1972).
51 See Rev. Rul. 73-251, 1973-1 CB 324.
52 IRS Letter Ruling 7852042 (9/27/78).
53 Lischer, “The ‘Crummey’ Trust,” Estates, Gifts and Trusts J.
17 (July-Aug. 1979).

donee is deemed to own for income tax purposes,
the time limitation must also be considered. The
fraction used to compute this portion is discussed in
Krause.54 The numerator of the fraction equals the
number of days the withdrawal right is in existence
and the denominator is the number of days in the
year. Using the example set out above, assume that
the grantor transfers the $5,000 to the trust on Oc
tober 1, and the trust provides that the donee has a
withdrawal right through December 31 of that year.
The fraction is the number of days between October
1 and December 31 over the number of days in the
year, or approximately ¼. This fraction would then
be applied to the 5% of the trust’s income, deduc
tions and credits computed above, in connection
with the scope limitation. Accordingly, the donee
would be required to report one-fourth of 5%, or
1.25% of the trust income. As suggested in the
earlier discussion, the grantor would report the bal
ance of the income, deductions and credits on his
income tax return.
If the grantor wants the income and, in particular,
excess deductions of the trust to flow over to him,
the time limitation should be made as short as pos
sible, recognizing that the withdrawal right must
exist long enough to qualify contributions to the trust
for the annual exclusion. If the grantor wants to have
at least some of the income flow to the beneficiaries,
however, the withdrawal right should be structured
to last the entire year and extend to income gener
ated from the contributions made during the year. In
addition, the grantor should direct the trustee to
obtain policy loans early in the life of the trust (keep
ing in mind the Sec. 264 limitations on the deduct
ibility of insurance loan interest), before the value of
the trust assets, and thus the denominator of the
scope fraction, increases substantially. For in
stance, if the $5,000 in the example above was
added to a trust worth only $10,000, the fraction
would be one-half. If the donee’s power over the
income extended for the full year, there would be no
time limitation. The donee would therefore report
one-half of the trust income and the grantor would
report one-half of the trust income.55

54 Krause, note 48.
55 For articles containing drafting suggestions on the Crummey
trust, see Madden, “Restrictive future interest gifts to minors
may qualify for the annual exclusion,” 49 J. Taxation 348 (Dec.
1978); Benya, “How to qualify gifts in trust as present interests
for the gift tax exclusion,” 7 Estate Planning 194 (July 1980);
Brown, “Crummey Planning: Present Interest Gifts,” 32 CLU
J. 30 (April 1978); Oshins, “Planning with Irrevocable Life
Insurance Trusts,” 33 CLU J. 32 (April 1979); Denenberg,
“Implementing an irrevocable life insurance trust: an in-depth
analysis,” 42 J. Taxation 42 (Jan. 1975). See also BNA Tax
Management No. 403, A-23; 1976 Miami Institute on Estate
Planning, ¶508.1; Acker, “Grantor need not divest himself of
all powers to obtain tax savings from trust," 22 Taxation for
Accountants 282 (May 1979).
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Conclusion
Although many questions on the tax conse
quences of a Crummey trust remain unanswered,
and many of the “answers” currently available are
based on letter rulings that have no precedential
value,56 this estate planning device offers potential
tax benefits and relatively low risks from errors in tax
predictions. The trust device is therefore very attrac
tive for the right grantor. Errors in prediction are
least likely to occur in the gift tax area, because the
Service apparently accepts the Crummey result.
However, even if the Service determines that the
grantor’s gifts were gifts of a future interest, not a
present interest, the grantor will face relatively low
gift taxes (plus interest) based on the value of the
contributions to the trust over the years. It is very
likely that sizable life insurance proceeds will not be

56 See note 8.
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taxed in his estate at death, provided that the grant
or lives for more than three years after the transfer
of the policies.
An error in the estate tax area will place the grant
or in the same position that he would have been in if
the policies were owned by him at death. The grant
orwill have wasted the opportunity to use his annual
gift tax exclusions to reduce the size of his estate,
however; instead, he will have used the exclusions
to make contributions to a trust that increased his
estate.
An error in the income tax area would result, at
worst, in the loss of interest deductions on policy
loans. To a high income tax bracket grantor, this
result would be decidedly undesirable, but perhaps
a risk worth taking if hundreds of thousands of es
tate tax dollars could be avoided.
The uncertainties connected with the Crummey
trust will eventually be resolved. Despite these un
certainties, the Crummey trust is not at all “crummy”
for the aggressive taxpayer. tta
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